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Glossary 
Adaptation: Process of adjustment to actual or expected climate change and its effects. In human 
systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural 
systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate change and its effects.
Adaptive capacity: Ability of systems, institutions, humans, and other organisms to adjust to potential 
damage, take advantage of opportunities, and respond to consequences of climate impacts.
Agro-pastoralism: Combination of agriculture, crop-based livelihood systems, and pastoralism (see also 
pastoralism).
Anthropogenic biome: Anthropogenic biomes describe the terrestrial biosphere in its contemporary, 
human-altered form using global ecosystem units defined by patterns of sustained direct human 
interactions, for example, rainfed croplands.
Attractiveness: Desirability of a locale based on a number of factors including but not limited to 
economic opportunity, transportation infrastructure, proximity to family, the presence of social amenities, 
environment, and intangibles such as place attachment.
Biodiversity: Variety of plant and animal life in the world or in a particular habitat or ecosystem.
Biome: Large naturally occurring community of flora and fauna occupying a major habitat (for example,
forest or tundra; see also anthropogenic biome).
Climate change: A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (for example, using statistical 
tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural 
variability or as a result of human activity.
Climate change–induced migration (shorthand internal climate migration): In this report, climate 
change-induced migration is migration that can be attributed largely to the slow-onset impacts of climate 
change on livelihoods owing to shifts in water availability and crop productivity, or to factors such as sea 
level rise or storm surge. 
Climate in-migration hotspot: For the purposes of this study, climate in-migration hotspots are areas 
that will see increases in population in scenarios that take into account climate impacts relative to a 
population projection that does not take climate impacts into account. These increases can be attributed 
to in-migration, the “fast” demographic variable. Areas were considered to have increases in population 
when at least two of the three scenarios modelled had increases in population density in the highest 10th 
percentile of the distribution.
Climate migrant/migration: In this report, climate migrants are people who move - within countries 
- because of climate change-induced migration (see above). The modeling work captures people who 
move at spatial scales of over 14 kilometers - within a country - and at decadal temporal scales. Shorter 
distance or shorter term mobility (such as seasonal or cyclical migration) is not captured. 
Climate out-migration hotspot: For the purposes of this study, climate out-migration hotspots are areas 
that will see decreases in population in scenarios that take into account climate impacts relative to a 
population projection that does not take climate impacts into account. These decreases can be attributed 
to out-migration, the “fast” demographic variable. Areas were considered to have decreases in population 
when at least two of the three scenarios modelled had decreases in population density in the highest 10th 
percentile of the distribution
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Climate risk: Potential for consequences from climate variability and change where something of value 
is at stake and the outcome is uncertain. Often represented as the probability that a hazardous event or 
trend occurs multiplied by the expected impact. Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure, 
and hazard.
Coastal erosion: Erosion of coastal landforms that results from wave action, exacerbated by storm surge 
and sea level rise.
Coastal zone: In this report, the coastal zone is land area within 10 kilometers of the coastline.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest. 
Displacement: Forced removal of people or people obliged to flee from their places of habitual residence.
Distress migration: Movements from the usual place of residence, undertaken when an individual and/or 
their family perceive that there are no options open to them to survive with dignity, except to migrate. This 
may be a result of a rapid-onset climate event, other disasters, or conflict event, or a succession of such 
events, that result in the loss of assets and coping capacities.
Environmental mobility: Temporary or permanent mobility as a result of sudden or progressive changes in 
the environment that adversely affect living conditions, either within countries or across borders.
Extreme heat event: Three or more days of above-average temperatures, generally defined as passing a 
certain threshold (for example, above the 85th percentile for average daily temperature in a year).
Extreme weather event: Event that is rare at a particular place and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, 
but an extreme weather event would normally fall in the 10th or 90th percentile of a probability density 
function estimated from observations. The characteristics of extreme weather vary from place to place in 
an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may 
be classified as an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that is itself extreme 
(for example, drought or heavy rainfall over a season).
Forced migration: Migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life 
and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (for example, movements of refugees 
and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, 
chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects). Forced migration generally implies a lack 
of volition concerning the decision to move, though in reality motives may be mixed, and the decision to 
move may include some degree of personal agency or volition.
GEPIC: The GIS-based Environmental Policy Integrated Climate crop model (see Appendix A). 
Gravity model: Model used to predict the degree of interaction between two places and the degree of 
influence a place has on the propensity of a population in other locations to move to it. It assumes that 
places that are larger or spatially proximate will exert more influence on the population of a location than 
places that are smaller and farther away.
HadGEM2-ES: Climate model developed by the Met Office Hadley Centre for Climate Change in the United 
Kingdom (see Appendix A).
Hazard: The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend or physical impact 
that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, 
infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resources.
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Immobility: Inability to move from a place of risk or not moving away from a place of risk due to choice.
Internal climate migrant (migration): See climate change-induced migration and climate migrant/migration.
Internal migration (migrant): Internal migration is migration that occurs within national borders.
International migration (migrant): Migration that occurs across national borders.
IPSL-CM5A-LR: Climate model developed by the Institut Pierre Simon Laplace Climate Modeling Center in 
France (see Appendix A).
Labor mobility: The geographical and occupational movement of workers.
LPJmL: A global water and crop model designed by Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research to 
simulate vegetation composition and distribution as well as stocks and land-atmosphere exchange flows 
of carbon and water, for both natural and agricultural ecosystems (see appendix A).
Migration: Movement that requires a change in the place of usual residence and that is longer term. 
In demographic research and official statistics, it involves crossing a recognized political/administrative 
border.
Mitigation (of climate change): Human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases.
Mobility: Movement of people, including temporary or long-term, short- or long-distance, voluntary or 
forced, and seasonal or permanent movement as well as planned relocation (see also environmental 
mobility, labor mobility).
Other migrant: In this report, the term other migrant is used in reference to migrants who move largely for 
reasons other than climate impacts.
Planned relocation: People moved or assisted to move permanently away from areas of environmental 
risks.
Radiative forcing: Measurement of capacity of a gas or other forcing agent to affect the energy balance, 
thereby contributing to climate change.
Rainfed agriculture: Agricultural practice relying almost entirely on rainfall as its source of water.
Rapid-onset event: Event such as cyclones and floods which take place in days or weeks (in contrast to 
slow-onset climate changes that occur over long periods of time).
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP): Trajectory of greenhouse gas concentration resulting from 
human activity corresponding to a specific level of radiative forcing in 2100. The low greenhouse gas 
concentration RCP2.6 and the high greenhouse gas concentration RCP8.5 employed in this report imply 
futures in which radiative forcing of 2.6 and 8.5 watts per square meter, respectively, are achieved by the 
end of the century.
Resilience: Capacity of social, economic, and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event, 
trend, or disturbance by responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity, 
and structure while maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning, and transformation.
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Sea level rise: Increases in the height of the sea with respect to a specific point on land. Eustatic sea 
level rise is an increase in global average sea level brought about by an increase in the volume of the 
ocean as a result of the melting of land-based glaciers and ice sheets. Steric sea level rise is an increase 
in the height of the sea induced by changes in water density as a result of the heating of the ocean. 
Density changes induced by temperature changes only are called thermosteric; density changes induced 
by salinity changes are called halosteric.
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP): Scenarios, or plausible future worlds, that underpin climate 
change research and permits the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, 
and mitigation. SSPs can be categorized by the degree to which they represent challenges to mitigation 
(greenhouse gas emissions reductions) and societal adaptation to climate change.
Slow-onset climate change: Changes in climate parameters—such as temperature, precipitation, and 
associated impacts, such as water availability and crop production declines—that occur over long periods 
of time (in contrast to rapid-onset climate hazards, such as cyclones and floods, which take place in days 
or weeks).
Stressor: Event or trend that has important effect on the system exposed and can increase vulnerability 
to climate-related risk.
Sustainable livelihood: Livelihood that endures over time and is resilient to the impacts of various types 
of shocks including climatic and economic. 
System dynamics model: A model which decomposes a complex social or behavioral system into its 
constituent components and then integrates them into a whole that can be easily visualized and simulated.
Tipping element: Subsystems of the Earth system that are at least subcontinental in scale and can be 
switched—under certain circumstances—into a qualitatively different state by small perturbations. See 
tipping point. 
Tipping point: Particular moment at which a component of the earth’s system enters into a qualitatively 
different mode of operation, as a result of a small perturbation. 
Vulnerability: Propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety 
of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and 
adapt.
WaterGAP2: The Water Global Assessment and Prognosis (WaterGAP) version 2 global water model 
developed by the University of Kassel in Germany (see Appendix A).
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Internal climate 
migrants are rapidly 
becoming the human 
face of climate change.
By 2050—in just three 
regions—climate 
change could force 
more than 143 million 
people to move within 
their countries. 
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...we have jobs here so people migrate 
very little, there isn’t a high need to go 
away…at the forest level there is employment; 
in businesses there is employment.  The 
quality of the wood is one of our priorities.  
We have the famous green seal as a certified 
forest and not many communities have it.”   
—Javier Martinez (26) Mexico
Latin America by 2050
17 million  
internal climate migrants
Floods come every year, but this 
year the situation is worse. Now all 
my family is living in one relative’s house. I 
don’t want to go back to my village, mainly 
because of the flood. In Dhaka, I can work 
and have a good secure life.”
—Monoara Khatun (23) Bangladesh
South Asia by 2050
40 million  
internal climate migrants
In the planting season, it wouldn’t rain, 
but when we didn’t want it, it would 
rain. This created drought and because of this 
I didn’t want to suffer anymore. I wanted to try 
my luck in the city, so I came to Hawassa.”  
 —Wolde Danse (28)  Ethiopia
Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050
86 million  
internal climate migrants
Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migrationxvi
Foreword  xvii
Kristalina Georgieva
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), World Bank 
Every day, climate change becomes a more urgent economic, social, and existential threat to countries and 
their people. We see this in cities facing unprecedented water crises, in coastal areas experiencing destructive 
storm surges, and in once vibrant agricultural areas no longer able to sustain essential food crops.  
And, increasingly, we are seeing climate change become an engine of migration, forcing individuals, 
families and even whole communities to seek more viable and less vulnerable places to live. 
This report brings a much-needed focus to the nexus between climate change, migration and development 
in three regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America. Its startling conclusion is that they 
may have to cope with more than 143 million internal climate migrants by 2050 unless concerted action 
is taken at the national and global levels. 
Internal, rather than cross-border, migration is the report’s central focus for good reasons. There is growing 
recognition among researchers that more people will move within national borders to escape the effects of 
slow-onset climate change, such as droughts, crop failure, and rising seas. 
The number of climate migrants could be reduced by tens of millions as a result of global action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and with far-sighted development planning. There is an opportunity now to plan 
and act for emerging climate change threats. 
At the World Bank Group, we support countries to tackle their climate challenges and to build robust 
social protection systems. This work ranges from investing in emissions-reducing solar and wind power 
projects to developing climate insurance mechanisms to protect the most climate-vulnerable countries 
from economic disaster. We also work with countries to identify the risks they face from growing threats 
like climate change and plan accordingly. 
We also have a role to play in the global dialogue about how to better manage and prepare for climate 
change and its effects. At this moment, the world is working towards Global Compacts on migration and 
refugees as well as ways that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change can address human 
displacement. 




In recent times, cross-border migration and its implications for host countries have 
captured high-profile global attention. But there is increasing recognition that far 
more people are migrating within their own countries than across borders. They 
move for many reasons—economic, social, political, and environmental. Now, 
climate change has emerged as a potent driver of internal migration, propelling 
increasing numbers of people to move from vulnerable to more viable areas of their 
countries to build new lives. 
KEY FINDINGS
This report, which focuses on three regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America that 
together represent 55 percent of the developing world’s population—finds that climate change will push 
tens of millions of people to migrate within their countries by 2050. It projects that without concrete 
climate and development action, just over 143 million people—or around 2.8 percent of the population 
of these three regions—could be forced to move within their own countries to escape the slow-onset 
impacts of climate change. They will migrate from less viable areas with lower water availability and crop 
productivity and from areas affected by rising sea level and storm surges. The poorest and most climate-
vulnerable areas will be hardest hit. These trends, alongside the emergence of “hotspots” of climate 
in- and out-migration, will have major implications for climate-sensitive sectors and for the adequacy of 
infrastructure and social support systems.  The report finds that internal climate migration will likely rise 
through 2050 and then accelerate unless there are significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and 
robust development action.
APPROACH 
Understanding the scale of internal climate migration and the patterns of people’s movements is critical 
to countries so they can plan and prepare. But robust projections of internal climate migration over large 
areas are rare. This report —the first of its kind to introduce slow-onset climate impacts into a model of 
future population distribution—attempts to fill that gap. The focus on slow-onset climate impacts (water 
stress, crop failure, sea level rise) rather than rapid onset events such as floods and hurricanes, leads to a 
lower-bound estimate of the likely overall impact of climate change on migration across the three regions. 
Beyond the three main regions of focus (Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America), deeper analysis 
was undertaken for three subregions: East Africa, South Asia (in its entirety), and Mexico and Central 
America which have contrasting climatic, livelihood, demographic, migration, and development patterns. 
Results were further contextualized through three country examples: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico. 
The model applies demographic, socioeconomic, and climate impact data at a 14-square kilometer grid cell 
level to model likely shifts in population within countries. To address the uncertainties of analyzing migration 
over the next 30 years, the report considers three potential climate and development scenarios. The model 
can be customized and expanded at different scales. Future work could modify and extend the models to 
more countries, more climate scenarios, and longer time periods, but also to more local levels. The scenario-
based results should be seen as a plausible range of outcomes rather than precise forecasts.
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The three scenarios are: 
• “pessimistic” (high greenhouse gas emissions combined with unequal development pathways)—the “reference scenario” for the report; 
• “more inclusive development” (similarly high emissions but with improved development pathways); and 
• “more climate-friendly” (lower global emissions combined with unequal development).i
This scenario approach provides policymakers with a way to better understand and plan for the likely movement of people within their 
countries—over time and across different geographies—due to climate change impacts.
i According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report under the lower emissions scenario, temperatures are likely to peak at 
0.4°–1.6°C above baseline levels by 2050 and then stabilize. For the higher emissions scenarios, temperatures rise by 1.4°–2.6°C by 2050, and by 2.6°–4.8°C by 2100. 
Figure 1: Projected number of climate migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America under 
three scenarios, by 2050
Note: The whiskers on the bars in the charts represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals.
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The scale of internal climate migration will ramp up by 
2050 and then accelerate unless concerted climate and 
development action is taken. 
Under all three scenarios in this report, there is an upward trend of internal climate migration in Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America by 2050. In the worst-case or “pessimistic” scenario, the 
number of internal climate migrants could reach more than 143 million (around 86 million in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 40 million in South Asia, and 17 million in Latin America) by 2050 (Figure 1). The poorest people 
and the poorest countries are the hardest hit. 
In the “more inclusive development” scenario, internal climate migration across the three regions could 
drop to between 65 and 105 million. The “more climate-friendly” scenario projects the fewest internal 
climate migrants, ranging from 31 million to 72 million across the three regions. 
Across all scenarios, climate change is a growing driver of internal migration. Climate change impacts (crop 
failure, water stress, sea level rise) increase the probability of migration under distress, creating growing 
challenges for human development and planning. Vulnerable people have the fewest opportunities to 
adapt locally or to move away from risk and, when moving, often do so as a last resort. Others, even more 
vulnerable, will be unable to move, trapped in increasingly unviable areas. 
Internal climate migration will intensify over the next several decades and could accelerate after 2050 
under the pessimistic scenario due to stronger climate impacts combined with steep population growth 
in many regions. 
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MESSAGE 2: 
Countries can expect to see “hotspots” of climate-induced 
in- and out- migration. This will have significant implications 
for countries and future development planning. 
The report projects that climate-driven “out-migration” will occur in areas where livelihood systems are 
increasingly compromised by climate change impacts. These “hotspots” are increasingly marginal areas 
and can include low-lying cities, coastlines vulnerable to sea level rise, and areas of high water and 
agriculture stress (Figure 2 for East Africa). In the northern highlands of Ethiopia for example, deteriorating 
water availability and lower crop yields will drive climate migrants from rainfed cropland areas. Even Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia’s largest city, could see slower population growth due to its reliance on increasingly 
unpredictable rainfall. The major cities of Dhaka in Bangladesh and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania will also 
experience dampened population growth due to rising sea level and storm surges. 
Climate “in-migration” hotspots across the three regions emerge in locations with better climatic 
conditions for agriculture as well as cities able to provide better livelihood opportunities. For example, the 
southern highlands between Bangalore and Chennai in India, the central plateau around Mexico City and 
Guatemala City, and Nairobi in Kenya are likely to become areas of increased climate in-migration. 
Both types of hotspots emerge by 2030, and their number and spatial extent increase considerably by 
2050. Planning and early action could help shape these hotspots: they are not pre-destined. 
Many urban and peri-urban areas will need to prepare for an influx of people, including through improved 
housing and transportation infrastructure, social services, and employment opportunities. Policymakers 
can prepare by ensuring flexible social protection services and including migrants in planning and decision-
making. If well managed, “in-migration” can create positive momentum, including in urban areas which 
can benefit from agglomeration and economies of scale. 
Even with expected out-migration, many climate-vulnerable areas will still need to support significant numbers 
of people. This increases the need for development strategies to support people to adapt locally or “stay 
in place” in areas where it makes sense to do so. Components of successful local adaptation strategies 
include: investing in climate-smart infrastructure; diversifying income generating activities; building more 
responsive financial protection systems for vulnerable groups; and educating and empowering women. 
Poverty reduction and social protection programs targeted at rural areas can help to increase adaptive 
capacity to climate change, potentially reducing the need for people to move under distress. 
Still, “adaptation in place” has its limits. Where there is no credible long-term pathway to viable livelihoods, 
there is a risk that people will be induced to remain in places where conditions are deteriorating. For 
example, about 20 million people in coastal Bangladesh are already having their health affected from 
saltwater intrusion into drinking water supplies related to sea level rise. Remittances from family members 
working elsewhere can induce people in these areas to stay, possibly against their best interests. Without 
appropriate policy interventions, perverse incentives to stay in place could greatly undermine community 
health and well-being.
Internal climate migrants do not necessarily stop at borders. While this report does not focus specifically 
on cross-border migration, the modeling identifies numerous migration hotspots in areas close to national 
borders. Climate change can be an inhibitor or a driver of cross-border migration, depending on a range of 
factors that propel individuals to decide to move.
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Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios.  
 
Figure 2: Areas projected to have high climate in-migration and out-migration in East Africa, 2030 and 2050
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MESSAGE 3: 
Migration can be a sensible climate change adaptation 
strategy if managed carefully and supported by good 
development policies and targeted investments. 
Where the limits of local adaptation are anticipated, well-planned migration to more viable areas can be a 
successful strategy. A strong enabling environment for migration needs to be in place supported by direct 
incentives, such as skills training and job creation programs, for people to move to areas of low risk and 
greater opportunity. Strategies supporting internal migration need to safeguard not only the resilience of 
those moving, but also of those in sending and receiving communities.
Between 2030 and 2050, climate migration hotspots will intensify and possibly spread. Countries 
therefore will need to take a long-term, anticipatory approach to planning so that climate migrants are 
factored in to overall growth and development strategies. 
Ethiopia, which could see a population increase of up to 85 percent by 2050 and experience lower 
agricultural productivity due to climate change, will need to plan for a more diversified economy, absorbing 
labor into non-agricultural and less climate-sensitive sectors. 
Bangladesh, which is projected to have a third of the internal climate migrants in South Asia by 2050 
under the pessimistic scenario, is developing a Perspective Plan for 2041 that factors in climate change 
as a driver of future migration. The plan recognizes migration as a potential adaptation option for people 
living in the most vulnerable areas. 
Mexico, as an upper middle-income country with a diversified and expanding economy that is relatively 
less climate sensitive, has some capacity to adapt to climate change but needs to pay close attention to 





Internal climate migration may be a reality but it doesn’t have 
to be a crisis. Action across three major areas could help 
reduce the number of people being forced to move in distress.
Based on the report’s projected range of internal migration, from a low of 31 million in the best-case to 
143 million in the worst-case for the three regions, concerted action in three key areas could help reduce 
the number of internal climate migrants by as much as 80 percent by 2050. 
1. Cut greenhouse gases now
Strong global climate action is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’sii goal of limiting the future temperature 
increase to less than 2°C by the end of this century. Even at this level of warming, countries will be locked into a 
certain level of internal climate migration. Still higher levels of greenhouse gas emissions could lead to the severe 
disruption of livelihoods and ecosystems, further creating the conditions for increased climate migration. 
Without rapid greenhouse gas emissions reductions over the next two decades, the report’s pessimistic 
scenario is likely to become reality. Under the more climate-friendly scenario (in which greenhouse gas 
emissions are significantly reduced), a far lower number of people are projected to migrate in all three regions. 
The window of opportunity to cut greenhouse gases and reverse warming trends is closing quickly. 
2. Embed climate migration in development planning
There is an urgent need for countries to integrate climate migration into national development plans. 
Most regions have poorly prepared laws, policies, and strategies to deal with people moving from areas of 
increasing climate risk into areas that may already be heavily populated. 
National agencies need to integrate climate migration into all facets of policy. To secure resilience and development 
prospects for all those affected, action is needed at each phase of migration (before, during, and after moving). 
Governments will require guidance, technical assistance, and capacity building to develop national laws, policies, 
and strategies that are in line with international frameworks related to climate migration. The engagement of 
private actors, civil society, and international organizations is key to building policy frameworks and capacity. 
3. Invest now to improve understanding of internal climate migration 
More investment is needed to better contextualize and understand climate migration, particularly at scales 
ranging from regional to local, where climate impacts may deviate from the broader trends identified in a 
global-scale analysis. In many cases, a richer, more detailed set of climate, biophysical, socioeconomic, 
and political indicators is available at regional, national, and local levels. 
There are inherent uncertainties in the way climate impacts will play out in a given locale and this will 
affect the magnitude and pattern of climate change-induced movements. Over time, as more data become 
available on climate change and its likely impacts on water availability, crop productivity, and sea level rise, 
the scenarios and models would need to be updated.
Increasing the modeling resolution and improving data inputs to produce more spatially-detailed 
projections are among the possible future applications of the approach used in this report. Building 
country-level capacity to collect and monitor relevant data can increase understanding of the interactions 
among climate impacts, ecosystems, livelihoods, and mobility and help countries tailor policy, planning, 
ii Countries adopted the Paris Agreement at the UN Conference of the Parties—COP21—in Paris on 12 December 2015. The 
Agreement entered into force less than a year later. In the agreement, all countries agreed to work to limit global temperature rise 
to well below 2°C, and given the grave risks, to strive for 1.5°C.
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and investment decisions. Including climate-related and migration questions in national census and 
existing surveys is a cost-effective way to advance understanding. Decision-making techniques under 
deep uncertainty need to be further developed and applied for policy making and development planning. 
Evidence-based research, complemented by country-level modeling is vital. In support of this, new 
data sources—including from satellite imagery and mobile phones—combined with advances in climate 
information can be beneficial to improving the quality of information about internal migration. In all of 
these efforts, the privacy of personal data needs to be protected.
 
CONCLUSION
Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration helps to put a human face on the growing 
development issue of people being forced to move under distress to escape the long-term impacts of 
climate change. Its findings must be taken seriously if the world is to sustain recent development gains 






1Internal Climate Migration as a Key Development Issue
Chapter 1
Mobility is emerging as the human face of climate change. There is also increasing 
recognition that far more people are migrating within their own countries than across 
borders. The impacts associated with climate change are already shifting patterns 
of mobility and will increasingly do so. Migration is a common strategy for survival, 
coping, income diversification, risk management, and adaptation for people facing 
economic stress and adverse climate conditions. Policy makers in countries need to 
anticipate the scale of internal climate migration over time, the places people will go 
to or stay in, and the development implications of their movements. This report uses 
a pioneering scenario-based approach that combines high-resolution demographic, 
socioeconomic, and climate data to isolate the portion of future changes in population 
distribution that can be attributed to internal climate migration.
Climate change impacts will pose one of the greatest threats to people, ecosystems, and development goals 
over the coming decades (IPCC 2014a). Current levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are at a 650,000-
year peak. The average global temperature has risen 1.1°C since 1880; 2016 was the warmest year on 
record; and 16 of 17 of the hottest years in NASA’s 134-year record have been since 2000 (NASA 2017). 
Warming close to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels by midcentury is probably already “locked in” to the 
earth’s atmosphere by past and predicted greenhouse gas emissions. Only highly ambitious mitigation 
action seems likely to keep warming by end-of-century to less than 2°C above preindustrial levels (World 
Bank 2014; Mauritsen and Pincus 2017; Raftery and others 2017).
Climate change will intensify environmental degradation and natural hazards in many regions (UNEP 
2016). In the next few decades, climate change impacts will work together with other stressors, such as 
pollution and overexploitation of resources (Olsson and others 2014), affecting a world population that is 
both urbanizing (UNDESA 2015) and growing rapidly (UNDESA 2017).
The impacts associated with climate change are already shifting patterns of mobility and will increasingly 
do so (Foresight 2011; Adger and others 2014). Because mobility is complex, driven by multiple, 
interacting processes that vary greatly over space and time, there is no straight line of causation from 
environmental stress to the movement of people (Black and others 2011a; Black, Kniveton, and Schmidt-
Verkerk 2013; Foresight 2011). But climate change–driven pressure can directly and indirectly alter 
mobility patterns. In some cases, people migrate in an attempt to adapt to climate change (Black and 
others 2011b; McLeman 2016; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). In others, the impacts of climate 
change will lead to movements under distress, induce displacement, or require planned relocation. 
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Favorable environments attract people who are moving (Hunter, Luna, and Norton 2015); people do not 
only move away from places of environmental stress, they are equally likely to move to them (Foresight 
2011). Millions of people will be unable or unwilling to move from areas of environmental stress, rendering 
them immobile or “trapped” (Foresight 2011).
Such climate change–induced human movement has been increasingly acknowledged in discussions at 
all levels (Gemenne, Zickgraf, and Ionesco 2016). Climate change as a driver of mobility is recognized in 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Agenda for Humanity, the 2016 United Nations 
Summit for Refugees and Migrants, and the processes around the Global Compact for Migration and 
the Global Compact on Refugees. Mobility was not part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
but the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) feature an explicit target (10.7) to “facilitate 
orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of 
planned and well-managed migration policies.” The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the Cancun Adaptation Framework, and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss 
and Damage Associated with Climate Change recognize migration as an adaptation strategy to climate 
change and call for approaches to disaster displacement. A review of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) submissions under the Paris Agreement indicates that at least 44 of 162 (about 27 percent of 
all submissions, mostly in Africa and in Asia Pacific and Oceania) refer to mobility in its various forms, 
including migration as an adaptation strategy.1 Some National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and National 
Programs of Action (NAPAs) under the UNFCCC also mention mobility. More recent developments include 
the Protection Agenda developed by the Nansen Initiative and its successor, the Platform on Disaster 
Displacement (Gemenne and Brücker 2015; Nansen Initiative 2015). Guidance and tools for planned 
relocation have also been developed (Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR 2015; 
Georgetown University, UNHCR, and IOM 2017). Yet, while attention is increasing, environmental mobility 
is still inadequately incorporated in policies and long-term development planning (Martin 2009; Martin 
2012; Warner and others 2014; Warner and others 2015). 
This report—intended as a catalyst for future work by the World Bank, development partners, and client 
countries—focuses on internal climate migration (Box 1.1), expected to be the most frequent form of 
mobility induced by climate change (Foresight 2011; Groschl and Steinwachs 2016; McLeman and others 
2016). Such internal climate migration should be addressed within the development and climate change 
adaptation frameworks of affected countries for four reasons: 
i. Internal migration (not just internal climate migration) is already happening at scale and is expected to 
increase even without climate change.
ii. Climate change will add large numbers of internal climate migrants.
iii. Climate change will hit poorer countries and communities disproportionately. 
iv. Climate migration can have significant effects on the resilience of people affected that need to be 
managed carefully.
1. This figure comes from a background review conducted for this report in September 2016. It does not reflect submissions after 
this date.
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Box 1.1: Climate change-induced migration—scope and terminology used in the report
There is no universally agreed upon terminology for human movement in the context of 
environmental change (Dun and Gemenne 2008). This report uses the terms depicted in 
Figure 1.1, which are informed by the most common use and definitions established by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 1998); the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 2010); the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM 2014); the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014b); the Brookings 
Institution, Georgetown University, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) (2015); and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2017a).
When environmental change affects the drivers of human movements, it is referred to as 
environmental mobility or environmental movement (Foresight 2011). As established in the 
Cancun Adaptation Framework (UNFCCC 2010), these terms encompass the categories of 
migration, displacement, and planned relocation. In practice, human movement seldom falls into 
simple boxes. Migration here is a longer-term change of habitual place of residence perceived 
as more voluntary. Yet, there is an important gray area between migration and displacement, 
and migration should be seen on a continuum from voluntary to forced instances, which can 
include an element of coercion such as threats to life and livelihood (Hugo 1996; Renaud and 
others 2007). 
Environmental change can encompass many phenomena that affect mobility, some of which—
such as volcanic eruptions—are not related to climate change. This report therefore uses climate 
change–induced migration (or the shorthand climate migration) only in discussions of migration 
largely linkable to climate change impacts, such as the results of the modeling of internal 
climate change migration presented in this report. As that modeling focuses on internal climate 
migration, the term migration in this report generally refers to movements within countries; 
discussions of international movements are also included in the report. 
Although Figure 1.1 juxtaposes the umbrella terms mobility and immobility, they are not mutually 
exclusive. People may be trapped not only in their place of habitual residence but also in transit 
or at their final destination (Black, Kniveton, and Schmidt-Verkerk 2013; Zickgraf forthcoming).
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All forms of environmental mobility, including international climate migration, have important development 
implications. Several studies highlight the likelihood of future international climate migration. The links 
are complex: climate change impacts can act as inhibitors or drivers of cross-border movements. For 
example, excessive precipitation has increased international migration from Senegal. But heat waves 
have decreased migration from Burkina Faso (Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava 2017; Nawrotzki, Riosmena, 
and Hunter 2013). Small Island Developing States (SIDS) present a particularly stark illustration of this 
phenomenon: With some of the greatest vulnerability to climate change impacts, they will continue losing 
entire swaths of land and associated livelihoods. Cross-border movements induced by climate change are 
expected to be less frequent than internal movement (Foresight 2011; Groschl and Steinwachs 2016; 
McLeman and others 2016), but the political and development implications could well be considerable 
(see e.g. Watts and others 2017 on possible health consequences). 
Disaster displacement, planned relocation, and immobility are also important policy concerns. There were 
24.2 million new internal displacements brought on by sudden-onset extreme events such as floods and 
cyclones in 2016 (IDMC 2017b). Such rapid-onset extreme events have displaced an average of more 
than 26 million people a year from 2008-15 (IDMC 2015), a number expected to rise as such disasters 
become more frequent and severe because of climate change (Adger and others 2014). 
Millions of people may be unwilling or unable to leave strained environments (Adger and others 2015; 
Foresight 2011). According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014a), vulnerable 
people often have the least opportunity to move or do so only under distress conditions. Mobility is often 
an adaptation of last resort (McLeman, 2009). Because of place attachment, negative incentives through 
policy, and other reasons, people may be unable to move away or choose to stay in areas that are at high 
risk (McKenzie and Yang 2014; Waldinger 2015; Koubi and others 2016). Relocating communities from 
increasingly uninhabitable spaces may be unavoidable for large numbers of people, yet such planned 
relocation could carry significant risks (de Sherbinin and others 2011).
This report emphasizes the importance of these other facets of human movement in the context of climate 
change and explores some of the discussions, trends, and numbers, to provide context for the study’s 
focus on internal climate migration. Chapter 6, on managing climate migration for development, comes 
Figure 1.1: Human mobility and immobility in the context of climate change  
(areas in blue are the focus of the report)
Sources: Extended and adapted from Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (2014), with inputs from OCHA (1998); UNFCCC (2010); IOM 
(2014); IPCC (2014b); Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR (2015); and IDMC (2017a).
Note: Mobility and immobility are not mutually exclusive.
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back to this point, arguing that it is paramount that development planning considers all forms of mobility 
together with internal climate migration in an anticipatory and holistic approach. Understanding where 
people facing intensifying slow-onset climate change might migrate within their own countries, when, and 
at what scale, is a key first step to discussing policy synergies. 
INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION FROM A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE
Internal climate migration needs to be addressed within countries’ development and climate change 
adaptation frameworks for multiple reasons.
Internal migration is already happening at scale and is expected to increase even 
without climate change 
The number of internal migrants worldwide has been conservatively estimated at 740–763 million 
(UNDESA 2013; UNDP 2009). These figures suggest that, at least three times more people migrated 
within countries than across borders in 2013, and about twice as many people were displaced internally 
than across borders in 2016 (IDMC 2017b; UNHCR 2017). 
These numbers can be expected to rise, driven by factors such as population growth and urbanization. The 
global population is currently growing by 1.1 percent (83 million people) a year; it is expected to reach 9.8 
billion in 2050. Within the 47 least developed countries, populations will double by then (UNDESA 2017). 
Photo Credit: Sohel Parvez H
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Internal migration will also be driven by urbanization. By 2050, two-thirds of the global population is 
expected to be living in urban areas—2.5 billion people will live in cities by then, the majority in Asia and 
Africa. These trends will put pressure on urban structures but also provide opportunities in terms of 
agglomeration of population and economies of scale (Montgomery 2008; UNDESA 2015). Even without 
climate change impacts, rising internal migration means that effective management strategies are 
indispensable (UNDP 2009; UNDESA 2013).
Climate change will add large numbers of internal climate migrants 
People have always fled natural disasters and sought better opportunities in new areas (Hugo 2008; IOM 2009). 
What is different today is the intensity and size of climate change–related environmental impacts on human 
communities and ecosystems (IPCC 2014a). They threaten to push many people into poverty (Hallegatte and 
others 2016) . The cascading impacts linked to climate change are already shifting patterns of migration and will 
increasingly do so, especially for internal migration, although climate change always has to be considered as one 
driver among many (Foresight 2011; Adger and others 2014).
Climate change will hit poorer countries and communities disproportionately
Vulnerabilities to climate risks—a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (Adger 2006; 
IPCC 2014a)—are often highest in poorer countries and communities (ND-GAIN 2017; WRI 2016). Natural 
disasters affect poor people more because their resources to confront hazards are scarce and many of 
their livelihoods depend on increasingly threatened ecosystem goods and services (Hallegatte and others 
2017). As a result, the poorest often bear climate impacts disproportionately (World Bank 2012). These 
preexisting vulnerabilities shape the extent to which environmental change causes people to move and 
affects the type of movement. 
The most vulnerable groups tend to have the fewest opportunities to adapt locally or move away from 
risk—and when moving they tend to do so in adverse circumstances. This can increase the probability of 
migration under distress, displacement, and planned relocation, all of which are challenging for human 
development and planning (Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). The past can give an indication of the 
probable locations of future challenges. Most migration relating to environmental change over the past 
two decades has been in countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (McLeman and others 2016), and about 97 percent of global disaster displacement from rapid-
onset hazards (which are not modeled in this study) has been in low and middle income countries from 
2008-13 (IDMC 2014).
Climate migration needs to be managed carefully in order to secure the resilience  
of all affected
Climate migration affects the well-being and resilience of people and surrounding systems in complex and 
evolving ways (UNDP 2009; Milan and others 2015; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). 
The challenges and potential benefits of development associated with climate migration often resemble 
those of labor migration, irregular migration, or forced displacement (Martin 2010). Migration is a common 
strategy for survival, coping, income diversification, risk management, and adaptation for people facing 
economic stress and adverse climatic conditions (Ellis 2000; Adger and others 2014; Melde, Laczko, and 
Gemenne 2017). The benefits and costs of climate migration go beyond the economic to include social, 
cultural, and psychological effects. Climate migration can have positive impacts on income, health, skills, 
education, equality, and resilience, depending on the characteristics of both receiving areas (including 
demand for labor, access to networks, credit, infrastructure, information, and security of land tenure) and 
of the migrants themselves (including their preexisting vulnerability and resilience) (Waldinger 2015). 
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Migration can also be a costly strategy. Some people may migrate to areas at risk (Foresight 2011). 
Discrimination, exclusion from social services, and higher levels of insecurity faced by migrants can also 
reduce their development and adaptation prospects (Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). Authorities 
and migrants, as well as sending and receiving areas, often have diverging perspectives on the cost–
benefit calculus and adaptation potential of climate migration (Gemenne and Blocher 2017). 
Migration under distress and displacement should be avoided as much as possible, but there is no 
consensus on the desirable conditions and forms of climate migration or how criteria are to be measured 
(McLeman and others 2016). By contrast, much can be done to improve the outcomes of migration (DRC 
2009; UNDP 2009) and to mitigate or prepare for climate impacts that lead to migration under distress 
or displacement. To safeguard the resilience and well-being of affected people, development and climate 
change adaptation frameworks should urgently consider the multiple facets of climate migration (ADB 
2012; ADB 2017; Gemenne and Blocher 2017; Martin and Bergmann 2017).
OBJECTIVE AND VALUE OF THIS REPORT
Policy makers in countries need to anticipate the scale of internal climate migration over time, the places 
people will go to or stay in, and the development implications of their movements. Mobility has emerged 
as the “human face of climate change” (Gemenne 2011a), and an appropriate management strategy 
will be vital to safeguard sustainable development prospects, uphold poverty reduction gains, and tackle 
inequalities. Strategies are needed to enable people affected by climate change to stay where they are if 
doing so is sensible and viable; to provide safe, dignified, and orderly mobility options, when staying would 
compromise resilience prospects; and to secure resilience for people who move, become displaced, host 
others, or stay behind. 
Foresight and plausible projections for future climate migration are in short supply. Figures of 200 million 
(Myers 1993, 2002; Myers and Kent 1995) or 300 million people (Myers 2005) displaced by climate 
change worldwide by 2050 have been often cited. These estimates have helped shift the world’s focus to 
the issue, but they suffer from methodological constraints and are not sufficiently robust to anticipate the 
scale, timing, and spatial dimensions of the challenge (Gemenne 2011b). 
Robust and transparent approaches are needed to model climate migration, within countries and regions. 
Population distributions are unlikely to evolve as they have in the past. Spatially and temporally explicit 
projections that take into account climate impacts are important for a range of users, including the 
humanitarian community and development actors grappling with potential limits to adaptation for rural 
livelihoods and how population may be redistributed internally as a result. For instance, unanticipated 
movements can represent risks to the people moving and to host communities and slow poverty-
reduction efforts. Some movements under distress can be forestalled with the right investments made 
early enough, supported by the right projections. At the same time, in some cases migration represents 
an appropriate adaptation response to changing climatic and socioeconomic conditions (McLeman 
2016; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). Much can be done to tap the development potential of 
migration and prepare sending and receiving areas adequately. Beginning to understand potential 
directions, geographic and temporal variation, and the intensity of internal climate migration will help 
decision makers assess potential impacts and inform the policy and planning debate. Anticipatory 
diagnostics, such as the modeling in this report, can be one important piece of the puzzle.
This report presents a novel approach for scenario-based projections of internal climate migration up to 
2050 for Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, in order to provide a baseline for climate-
resilient development planning at scale. Its novelty lies in the transparent methods and the explicit 
illustration of scale, timing, and spatial distribution across regions. The three focus regions were selected 
because they provide contrasting climatic, livelihood, demographic, migration, and development patterns 
with differentiated vulnerability to climate risks. For the three scenarios detailed in the next section—
pessimistic reference scenario, more inclusive development, and more climate-friendly—the report 
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investigates plausible scales, temporal evolution, and spatial patterns of internal climate migration over 
and above internal migration from other sources. The report provides deeper analysis for the subregions 
of East Africa, South Asia (in its entirety), and Mexico and Central America. Spatially, the report provides 
estimates of where people could come from and go to within a country and identifies climate in-migration 
“hotspots” (areas of particularly high in-migration as a result of climate change) and climate out-migration 
“hotspots” (areas of particularly high out-migration as a result of climate change). It also shows how 
internal climate migration plays out over time. The results are contextualized through country examples 
from Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico. 
OVERVIEW OF THE MODELING APPROACH
The report’s approach is based on a population model that combines socioeconomic and climate data. 
The model compares projections of national population distribution based on development pathways 
with projections that include the same development pathways but also incorporate specific, slow-onset 
climate impacts. Differences in population distributions among these sets of projections are assumed 
to be driven primarily by differences in internal climate migration. The modeling method was developed 
through a consortium of the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of the 
Earth Institute at Columbia University; the City University of New York (CUNY) Institute for Demographic 
Research (CIDR); and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). It has been examined 
by global experts through consultations and several rounds of review, including a quality enhancement 
review and an external and internal peer review of the final report. Consultations were also conducted 
with representatives from government, academia, donors, and civil society organizations in Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh, and Mexico, to solicit feedback on the modeling results. 
The model can be customized and expanded at different scales. Future work could modify and extend 
the models to more countries, more climate impacts, and longer time periods, but also to more granular 
levels. The scenario-based results should be seen as a plausible range of outcomes rather than precise 
forecasts. Chapter 3 and Box 3.1 describe the range of uncertainty associated with the projections.
The model has several features:
• It focuses on incremental, decadal internal migration induced by slow-onset climate change over and 
above that expected to occur even in the absence of climate change. Internal migration caused by 
factors such as population growth and urbanization has already been investigated (Jones and O’Neill 
2016); it serves as the “no climate impacts” comparison baseline. The literature shows that water 
scarcity, declining crop yields, and sea level rise are among the major potential climate impacts facing 
low-income countries. These slow-onset impacts will also be important drivers of migration. They affect 
the relative appeal of different locations. The model does not include short-term climate variations 
or extremes such as cyclones, except where successive shocks accumulate over multiple years. 
Although disaster displacement from rapid-onset events cannot be modeled here, it is a substantial 
development concern. Policy responses need to look at it alongside climate migration.
• It focuses on internal migration in three developing regions, by aggregating country-level modeling 
results. Planned relocation, immobility, or movements across borders are also very important policy 
concerns; they are not modeled.2 Development planning should consider all of these forms of mobility 
together, in a holistic and anticipatory manner.
• It focuses on movements in decadal increments up to 2050, not shorter-term or cyclical migration.
The report examines internal climate migration over a timeframe that policy makers can relate to. The 
aim is to inform near- and midterm action as well as long-term planning that needs to begin now. The 
trend of slow-onset impacts for the second half of the century, discussed in Chapter 4, indicates that 
2. Although international climate migration is not modeled, the different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) used in the model 
do include projections of non-climate-related international migration.
9Internal Climate Migration as a Key Development Issue
they will be much more pronounced and nonlinear after 2050. They will likely translate into increasing 
pressure on livelihoods and escalate the scale of climate migration if the global community does not 
make use of the window of opportunity for cutting emissions and act on climate migration now.
• The applied geographical modeling scale limits the spatial scope of results. The model does not 
capture migration over distances of less than about 14 kilometers. Small territories such as Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS) cannot be included at this resolution. Climate migration from such 
territories is an important policy concern. 
Internal climate migration is projected under three scenarios (Figure 1.2).3 In the pessimistic reference 
scenario, little to no climate policy leads to high greenhouse gas emissions, and inequality remains high, leaving 
developing regions highly vulnerable to climate change and with limited adaptive capacity. Urbanization rates 
are also high across low and middle income countries. In the more climate-friendly scenario, development 
challenges remain the same but emissions are lower and close to the goals of the Paris Agreement. In 
the more inclusive development scenario, emissions remain high but inequality, urbanization rates, and 
population growth are more moderate. Population distributions in the three scenarios are compared with 
three projections that include the same development pathways but no climate impacts.4 Chapter 3 and 
Appendix A explain the scenarios and the modeling approach in more detail.
3. Chapter 3 explains the assumptions behind the scenarios.
4. The assumed differences in emissions between the lower and higher emissions futures are less pronounced in the first half of this 
century than after 2050. Because of different demographic growth rates in the scenarios, the projected number of people living 
in the world also differs considerably in the pessimistic reference and more climate-friendly scenarios on the one hand and the 
more inclusive development scenario on the other.
Figure 1.2: Projecting internal climate migration under three plausible scenarios 
Note:
1. The scenarios are based on combinations of two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways—SSP2 (moderate development)
and SSP4 (unequal development)—and two Representative Concentration Pathways—RCP 2.6 (low emissions) and RCP
8.5 (high emissions).
2. Estimates of climate migrants are derived by comparing these plausible climate migration (RCP-SSP) scenarios with
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STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the discussion of the modeling approach and results by reviewing the 
evidence and theories on climate migration. It examines current migration patterns, theories about why 
people migrate, and the role of climate change as a driver. It then reviews climatic changes likely to have 
large impacts on livelihoods and migration patterns and the literature on impacts of climate migration. It 
provides context by looking at international movements, disaster displacement, and the current discussion 
around the relationship among climate change, conflict, and mobility. 
Chapter 3 explains the data, methods, and justifications for the report’s modeling approach, which can be 
customized and expanded at different scales. It sets the report in the context of previous efforts and other 
approaches to model climate migration and explains why the gravity model used to simulate behavior is 
well suited for modeling at broader scale with geographic specificity. 
Chapter 4 provides projections of how climate change will likely shift population distribution under the three 
scenarios in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. It also discusses results from the modeling 
exercise for the three subregions: East Africa, South Asia (in its entirety), and Mexico and Central America.
 
Chapter 5 illustrates and contextualizes the patterns described in Chapter 4 for three country illustrative 
examples: Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico. It relates the findings to each country’s context and 
discusses the implications of the research. It includes a comparison of the examples that highlights both 
common and distinct issues . It also presents the highlights of consultations in the country examples. 
Chapter 6 discusses takeaway messages from the report that can guide a more holistic and anticipatory 
approach to internal climate migration and other forms of movement associated with climate change. 
Appendix A provides technical details on the methodology. Appendix B describes the results of the water 
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Chapter 2
There is growing realization among researchers, policy makers, and the wider public 
that the impacts of climate change will have a large effect on global migration 
patterns in the coming decades. Although there is no consensus on the current 
number of climate migrants, most research recognizes that the rate of climate 
migration is increasing and that growing climate risks in the coming decades will 
accelerate this trend. This chapter presents the state of play of migration trends, 
with a focus on the impacts of climate change on these patterns, and provides 
context for the modeling approach and the analysis done in this report. 
Migration has important impacts on people, places, and development. It can enhance adaptive capacity 
under certain conditions, but it can also destroy livelihoods if not adequately planned for and managed 
(McLeman 2016). A rich body of literature describes the conditions and complexities underlying migration 
(including climate change-induced) and the impacts of climate migration (albeit to a lesser degree). 
Research on climate migration first emerged in the 1980s. Output rose to about 10 peer-reviewed 
publications a year in the 1990s and to more than 100 a year since 2008, including at least 447 
empirical case studies, mostly on Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, and the American continent (Ionesco, 
Mokhnacheva, and Gemenne 2016).5 The work carried out for this report builds on previous work.
This chapter overviews the scale of current internal migration, underlying causes, and its impacts.6 
Overlaying this information with expected climate trends, the chapter aims to draw attention to the change 
in the pace of climate migration and its future impacts. This context informs the modeling approach in 
Chapter 3, and the interpretation and narrative of the results in the subsequent chapters. 
 
5. Ionesco, Mokhnacheva, and Gemenne (2016) draw on studies recorded in the Climig Database by the Institute of Geography 
University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland (https://www.unine.ch/geographie/climig_database), which includes research in several 
languages.
6. The chapter also draws on background papers commissioned for this report, including McLeman (2016) and Hunter (2016).
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TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION
Migration within countries generally entails people moving between administrative units within their 
country. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2009) estimates that there were 740 
million internal migrants globally at the turn of the millennium—three times the number of international 
migrants.7 Bell and Charles-Edwards (2013) estimate that in 2005, 763 million people were internal 
migrants. It is likely that the estimates were conservative and the number is higher today. In China alone, 
some 150 million migrants from rural areas were living in urban areas in 2009 (Chan 2013). Data gaps 
and methodological issues make it hard to estimate the current level of internal migration worldwide.
Internal migration shows significant heterogeneity across and within countries (Bell and Charles-Edwards 
2013). For example, internal migration intensities—the total number of internal migrants as a share of 
the overall population —have fallen in Latin America but increased in China and some African countries. 
Part of this heterogeneity may be definitional: The smaller the administrative unit considered, the higher 
the rates of internal migration, because smaller units capture more of the overall movement of people. 
In 1995–2000, for example, internal migration intensities were as low as 0.8 percent in Indonesia (in 
eight provinces) and as high as 20 percent in New Zealand (in 75 territorial authorities) (Bell and Charles-
Edwards 2013). 
A significant proportion of internal migrants will end up in major cities. Internal migration is a large 
contributor to urbanization (Tacoli and others 2014). The share of the population living in urban areas 
has risen in almost all countries. It averages 32 percent, 49 percent, and 78 percent, respectively, in 
least developed, less developed, and developed countries (PRB 2016; UNDESA 2014). About 40 percent 
of the urban growth rate in low and middle income countries is related to migration (Montgomery 2008), 
although the pattern is not uniform across countries: Migration represents less than one-third of urban 
population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa but far more in Asia (Tacoli and others 2014).
This report focuses on internal climate migration but underlines that all forms of movements induced by 
climate change need to be considered and addressed holistically. For context, Box 2.1 on the next page 
briefly outlines patterns of international movements of people and linkages with climate change.
7. This estimate is conservative, based on census data and counting only movements across the largest administrative units in 
a country (usually states or provinces). Calculation of the number of internal migrants used census data from a sample of 24 
countries covering 57 percent of the world’s population. It applied the regional patterns found in these data to estimate the 
number of about 740 million internal migrants in the world.
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Box 2.1: Cross-border migration and its linkages with climate change  
About nine million people a year migrate between countries (Abel and Sander 2014), and about 244–250 million people live 
outside their country of birth (UNDESA 2015; World Bank 2017a). Although absolute numbers are higher today than in the 
past, international migration has not changed greatly in percentage terms since 1990 (Abel and Sander 2014). 
South–South migration accounts for more than 90 million migrants between countries in the global South, closely followed by 
South–North routes with about 85 million migrants (IOM 2015). A majority of international migration is to areas of economic 
opportunities: More than 60 percent of international migrants (150 million people) are classified as migrant workers (ILO 2015). 
Family relations, social networks, and many other factors also influence the motivations and direction of international migration.
Similar to internal climate migration, there is no single straight line from climate change impacts to international migration, 
and the economic, political, and social obstacles to such movement are often considerable (e.g., Czaika and de Haas 2013; 
Foresight 2011). Results from a systematic review of the small but growing body of peer-reviewed literature on the subject show
that climate change may increase international migration, especially as it plays out through impacts on natural resource-
based livelihoods. Yet it can also inhibit cross-border movements (Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014). Nawrotzki and 
Bakhtsiyarava (2017), for example, find that excessive rain increases international migration from Senegal but that heat waves
decrease it from Burkina Faso. 
While current numbers of international climate migration are probably not large (Obokata, Veronis, and McLeman 2014), it 
is unclear what the future of international climate migration will look like. Cross-border movements provide opportunities for 
people affected by climate impacts but can also entail challenges (such as for health systems, see Watts and others 2017), 
especially when movements are large or rapid, or border spaces are sensitive (Foresight 2011). For example, competition 
over scarce resources in receiving areas can create tensions (Schleussner and others 2016; United Nations and World Bank 
2017). Reuveny’s (2007) meta-review of 38 cases of migration induced by environmental change finds that factors influencing 
conflict included competition over resources, with ethnic tensions and distrust acting as exacerbating factors. Environmental 
changes can intensify tensions in regions where population growth and pressure on natural resources will increase competition 
between migrants and existing populations over access to arable land, water, and pasture (Marc and others 2015).
This highlights the need to take a holistic policy and planning approach that considers all forms of mobility in the context of 
climate change. Cross-border approaches integrated in anticipatory planning mechanisms can help. This includes preparing 
cross-border areas through tailored strategies to minimize risks (Warnecke, Tänzler, and Vollmer 2010). Participatory and 
inclusive resource management mechanisms can also reduce the potential for additional environmental stress (Martin 2005). 
THEORIES AND DRIVERS OF MIGRATION 
Theories of migration provide complementary insights into a complex decision-making process. This 
section focuses on three schools of thought—classical economic approaches, push-pull theories, and the 
New Economics of Labor Migration—to illustrate the factors involved when people decide to migrate (see 
Massey and others 1993 for a good overview of other theories).
Most of the migration literature since the 1950s has been based on classical macroeconomic and 
microeconomic theories. Migrants are assumed to be opportunity-seekers who weigh the financial costs and 
benefits of potential destinations and make rational decisions based on the information available to them 
(see, for example, Todaro 1969, 1980). Classical economic approaches assume that migration typically 
flows from low-wage to high-wage labor markets and from low-opportunity to high-opportunity locales. 
Other factors also affect decisions to migrate and the capability to carry them out. People seldom have 
perfect information. They are rational actors only to a degree, and decisions are not necessarily made 
just by the individual. The poorest people often have insufficient capabilities to access high-wage or high-
opportunity markets.
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Going beyond the idea of individual cost-benefit analysis, the influential push-pull theory suggests that four 
factors shape migration: factors in the sending area, factors in the destination areas, “intervening” facilitators 
and obstacles, and personal factors (Lee 1966). Push factors (such as poverty, lack of opportunities, and 
migration networks) are associated with source areas. Pull factors (such as jobs, social services, family 
members, and social networks) are related to destination areas. The push-and-pull framework suggests 
that individual characteristics of affected populations have an important influence on migration decisions. 
Personal factors include age, gender, and ethnicity (Lee 1966; Geddes and others 2012; De Jong and 
Gardner 2013; Zickgraf and others 2016). Migration studies suggest, for instance, that younger people 
are more mobile (Hatton and Williamson 2005). Ethnicity, wealth, and gender all affect migration outcomes 
within populations similarly affected by climate change (Adger and others 2014). 
Push-pull theories also show that people are rarely able to migrate wherever they wish. Movements can be 
restricted by natural geographic features (such as rivers and mountains) but also by entry requirements, 
travel costs, and sometimes physical obstacles (such as fences), particularly for international destinations 
or movement over long distances (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Barriers to internal migration also exist. For 
instance, concerns over loss of property rights in destination areas and other bureaucratic constraints 
prevent many individuals who would benefit from moving from doing so (Waldinger 2015). Tight financial 
resources and the paucity of information also limit potential migration, as does access to social networks 
to draw on for support (Palloni and others 2001). 
Push-pull theories help explain why large urban areas, with their greater range of economic opportunities 
and better services, are often preferred destinations for migrants from rural areas and smaller towns and 
villages. They also show that alongside factors in sending and receiving areas, intervening and personal 
factors are important.
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) suggests that not all migration decisions can be explained 
by individuals who weigh economic opportunities or are pushed from origin and pulled toward destination 
areas. Through surveys, it has demonstrated that migration decisions are often part of a household’s 
collective strategy to diversify its income sources and reduce its exposure to hardships and risks (e.g. 
Stark and Bloom 1985). In some dryland regions of West Africa, for example, households send young 
adults to cities to seek wages in the dry season to reduce the number of mouths to feed and benefit 
from remittances (Rain 1999). Household members may also migrate indefinitely, on the understanding 
that the migrants will repay the costs and absence from the household workforce by remitting money 
home (Mazzucato 2011). NELM emphasizes the importance of larger households in migration decision 
making and shows that migration may be related to risk reduction and livelihood diversification as much as 
economic opportunity-seeking. All these factors are important in understanding migration in the context 
of climate change, which is often understood to be a livelihood, coping, risk management, or adaptation 
strategy by households (Adger and others 2014). 
These theories of migration mostly focus on more voluntary instances of movements, but mobility occurs 
on a continuum, from voluntary to forced migration and displacement (Hugo 1996). While not within the 
modeling scope of this report, Box 2.2 provides context on the dynamics of disaster displacement. 
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Box 2.2: Spotlight on disaster displacement
For people displaced by extreme events or conflict, both staying and leaving carry high risks; either choice may threaten 
survival (World Bank 2017a). Displacement can be said to be a function of the likelihood, severity, and nature of the hazard; 
the exposure of people; and preexisting vulnerabilities (IDMC 2015). It tends to emphasize “push” more than “pull” factors: 
People make decisions, often quickly and under duress, based on what they perceive to be the optimal coping strategy at a 
particular time. Violence is the strongest correlate of decisions to flee (World Bank 2017a).
Different types of climate-related hazards tend to generate different types of mobility. Key factors are the speed of onset of 
a climate hazard and the ability of the people affected to perceive the risk and adapt in anticipatory fashion (Renaud and 
others 2011). Rapid-onset events, such as extreme storms and floods, usually result in short-term displacement (followed 
by return to affected areas) (Kälin 2010; Brzoska and Fröhlich 2015; Black and others 2011). Such events also tend to 
generate migration “churn”—a mix of shorter- and longer-term displacement and out-migration and, potentially, sudden influxes 
of migrants from unaffected areas, such as reconstruction workers (De Waard, Curtis, and Fussell 2016). By contrast, slow-
onset events, such as droughts, tend not to generate immediate changes in migration patterns, at least not initially (McLeman 
2014). Drought-related changes in migration patterns, for instance, are more likely to emerge in areas where land degradation 
is severe (Neumann and Hilderink 2015) or drought is less common, such as Bangladesh (Gray and Mueller 2012a). Longer-
term trends in crop yields or water availability are likely to contribute to out-migration (Nawrotzki and others 2017; Bohra-
Mishra, Oppenheimer and Hsiang 2014). That said, the impact of successive climate shocks may erode household assets and 
therefore adaptive capacity in ways that can eventually influence decisions to migrate (IDMC 2016; Warner and others 2012), 
or even trap people in place (Black, Kniveton, and Schmidt-Verkerk 2013).
Displacement as a result of extreme and rapid-onset events, such as floods and storms, fluctuates from year to year but continues 
to be high. Between 2008 and 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) recorded an annual average of 26.2 
million displacements caused by natural disasters. In 2015, about 19.2 million people in 113 countries were displaced by 
disasters caused by rapid-onset extreme events such as floods (8.3 million) and storms (6.3 million) —twice the number caused 
by conflict and violence. In 2016, that number was 24.2 million, with South and East Asia most affected (IDMC 2017). 
According to the IDMC, disaster displacement has consistently affected poorer countries the most; low and middle income 
countries account for 95 percent of the global total. Smaller territories, such as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), suffer 
disproportionately. SIDS as diverse as Fiji and Tonga in the Pacific and Belize, Cuba, and Haiti in the Caribbean were among the 
10 countries with the largest disaster displacements relative to population (IDMC 2014, 2016, 2017).
Many poor people have limited resources to confront disasters, and their livelihoods depend directly on increasingly threatened 
ecosystem goods and services (Hallegatte and others 2017). As a result, the poorest often bear climate impacts disproportionately 
(World Bank 2012a), with their well-being losses (equivalent to consumption) more than twice as large as the world’s average 
(Hallegatte and others 2017). The needs of displaced people are often far more pressing than those of other migrants, stemming 
from their lack of land, jobs, and homes; marginalization; food insecurity; and higher morbidity and mortality. 
Disasters through rapid-onset events already displace large numbers of people, and the numbers are expected to rise as such 
events become more frequent and severe because of climate change (Adger and others 2014; IDMC 2015, 2017). The impacts 
of disaster displacement will be added to those of climate migration. Although people often wish to return to their homes after a 
time, some remain in protracted situations for years or become displaced several times (IDMC 2017), underscoring the fact that 
all forms of mobility in the context of climate change require concerted and comprehensive planning and action. 
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CLIMATE CHANGE AS A DRIVER OF MIGRATION
The decision to migrate is complex. The influencing factors change over time and vary across individuals 
and their larger households. Climate change adds complexity to the already difficult decision to stay in 
or leave one’s home. Understanding of four elements—the impacts of climate change on resource quality 
and availability; the implications for livelihood strategies in particular ecological regions; the role migration 
plays in supporting livelihoods; and how migration patterns may shift as people attempt to adapt to the 
changes they experience—is necessary. This section explores the ways in which climate change shapes 
livelihood activities, including migration decisions. 
The Foresight Report (2011) developed a framework of climate migration that builds on theories and 
empirical studies on migration. It emphasizes that climate change influences migration decisions through 
existing migration drivers, especially economic, environmental, and to some extent political drivers—by, for 
instance, depressing rural wages, raising agricultural prices, shaping exposure to hazards, and stressing 
ecosystems. The framework conceptualizes environmental change as affecting macro, meso (intermediate) 
and micro levels of migration choices and capabilities. Macro-level influences are beyond the control of 
individuals, households, or communities but have ongoing direct effects on livelihoods, incomes, and well-
being; they shape migration possibilities and opportunities. Macro-level factors include demographic (for 
example, the size of the population and the rate of growth); economic (for example, labor markets and 
commodity prices); political (for example, laws and conflict); social (for example, gender relations); and 
environmental variables. At the meso level, intervening facilitators and obstacles include employment 
agencies or migrant-smuggling networks. Micro-level factors include characteristics of individuals and 
households (for example, health, skills, and perceptions of risks). The migration decision is not a simple 
binary choice, but is also based on behavioral elements (Martin and others 2014). Such elements include 
the household’s perceptions of its vulnerability to climate change–related risks, its assessment of its 
future needs, household members’ beliefs and norms, and their experience (if any) of migration.
People can decide to migrate as a livelihood strategy when climate change affects overarching variables 
such as the economy, environment, and political system they live in. Climate change has the most direct 
impact on macro-level factors, especially through economic channels, but affects variables at all three 
levels. It can act as a push or pull factor by altering the relative attractiveness of locations. It can also 
affect inhibitors or facilitators of migration and the accessibility of places, or influence the livelihood 
capital of individuals and households. 
Livelihoods depend on access to capital of various types, the quantities and qualities of which vary by 
geographic region and livelihood system. Scoones (1998) identifies the following forms of livelihood 
capital: natural (ecological goods and services); economic or financial; human (skills, knowledge, physical 
health and abilities); and social (benefits and opportunities that arise through social relationships). 
Climate change can affect livelihoods directly and indirectly, sometimes concurrently. Although the 
direct physical impacts of climate change may be the most visible, the less visible indirect effects can 
be just as pernicious (Gemenne, 2011). In Figure 2.1 the impacts of climate change represented by the 
orange arrows are not uniform across space or over time.
24 Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON LIVELIHOODS AND MIGRATION 
PATTERNS THROUGH 2050
Building on the framework in Figure 2.1, this section highlights climate changes that are likely to have large 
impacts on livelihoods and migration patterns through 2050. The data draw on the IPCC Working Group I 
and II contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report and on peer-reviewed literature. 
Climate change will influence migration through warming and drought, which will affect agricultural 
production and access to water; rising sea level, which makes coastal areas and island states 
uninhabitable; the increasing intensity and frequency of natural disasters; and competition over natural 
resources, which may contribute to drivers of conflict. The first three points are discussed in Box 2.3 
below, and Box 2.4 reviews the climate change-conflict-migration nexus. 
Figure 2.1: Foresight model adapted to illustrate climate change, livelihoods, and household migration behaviour
Source: Extended and adapted from Foresight (2011) and McLeman (2016)
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Box 2.3: How does climate change affect people and their livelihoods? 
Four aspects of climate change affecting people and their livelihoods are reviewed here: temperature, water availability, sea 
level rise, and extreme events. 
Temperature
By 2050, average global temperatures are expected to increase by between 0.3°C (the lower boundary [RCP2.6]) and 2.5°C 
(the upper boundary [RCP8.5]). Additional increases for the remainder of the century are projected to range from 0.3°C to 
4.8°C, depending on future emissions (Box Figure B2.3.1).
Figure B2.3.1 Past and projected global average surface temperature change above the 1986–2005 baseline
Source: Adapted from IPCC (2013a).
Note: See Chapter 3 for explanation of the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which are trajectories of greenhouse gas concentrations resulting 
from human activity, and modeling input of RCPs used in this report from 2020-50. The numbers of CMIP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is 
indicated.
Extreme heat events are occurring more frequently. Unusual and unprecedented heat extremes affect livelihoods primarily 
through their effect on agricultural yields and food security. Significant crop yield impacts are already being felt; if temperatures 
rise toward 4°C higher than the 1986–2005 baseline, climate change will add further pressure on agricultural systems. 
Crop yield decreases associated with a 2°C increase in temperatures relative to that baseline are expected to be as large as 
50 percent in Central America and the Caribbean. Ecosystem shifts are projected with increasing temperatures. When coupled 
with changes in precipitation patterns, they greatly diminish ecosystem services. Substantial adverse effects on marine 
ecosystems and their productivity are also expected with rising temperatures, increases in ocean acidity, and likely reductions 
in available oxygen as a result of their combined effects. With increased warming by 2050, and without taking into account 
changes in ocean acidity, fishery catches in several locations are projected to decrease markedly as fish populations migrate 
toward cooler waters.
Water availability
Freshwater resources are at risk from climate change in several regions. The impact of climate change on freshwater resources 
is felt through changes in rainfall patterns, increasing temperatures, and increased evapotranspiration (Abtew and Melesse 
2013). In Central America, some central parts of South America, and southern central Asia, overall surface water availability 
is, with relatively high confidence, projected to decline substantially (Schewe and others 2014). A risk of decreasing water 
availability also exists, albeit with somewhat lower confidence, for Central and Southern Africa. Models also project increased 
water availability for India and the Horn of Africa, but with lower confidence. In many of these regions, population growth and 
rising incomes will have a greater impact on water resource availability than climate change; the two factors may yield declining 
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Box 2.3: How does climate change affect people and their livelihoods? continued 
Regions that are already dry can expect to become dryer and experience greater frequency or intensity of extreme heat events 
(Trenberth and others 2014). This pattern is likely to affect Ethiopia and Mexico, which have extensive drylands (see Chapter 
5). Climate change is likely to undermine food security through decreased crop yields and increasing risk of crop failure caused 
by drought.
Climate change is also diminishing winter snowpack and leading to the retreat of glaciers. Snowpack and glaciers act as 
buffers between precipitation and runoff. Their retreat will affect the magnitude and shift the seasonality of river discharge 
in some of the most populous river basins on earth (Arnell and Gosling 2013; Bozkurt and Sen 2013). Major rivers such as 
the Ganges, Indus, and Brahmaputra are highly susceptible to glacier melt and reductions in snowfall, but are also densely 
populated (World Bank 2013). These three river basins provide water to about 750 million people, indicating immense climate 
vulnerability in these areas (Immerzeel, Van Beek, and Bierkens 2010). Already a substantial loss of glacier volume and extent 
has been observed in the Andes and Central Asia. Since the 1960s, the surface area of Central Asian glaciers has fallen by 
3–14 percent, depending on location; losses of about 50 percent and up to 80 percent are projected, respectively, for a world 
2°C and 4°C warmer than the 1986–2005 baseline (World Bank 2014). Increasing glacial melt poses a high risk of flooding, 
severely reduces freshwater resources during crop-growing seasons, and can have a negative impact on hydropower supply.
Sea level rise
Changes in sea level—currently averaging three millimeters a year and increasing (IPCC 2013b; Hay and others 2015; 
Dieng and others 2017)—will be the most problematic for settlements on very low-lying land (within one meter of sea level), 
especially areas that experience subsidence, erosion, or tropical cyclones and extreme storm events. Sea level rise can salinize 
groundwater and surface freshwater bodies. It can also increase salt-water intrusion into freshwater aquifers (particularly in the 
Middle East and North Africa), a process made worse by other climate impacts (such as reduced water availability). Together, 
these impacts present substantial problems to agriculture and human consumption. 
Sea level rise poses a particular threat to large urban settlements and major infrastructure along the coast, particularly in Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS), where the ability to retreat to higher ground is limited. Rising sea level will greatly increase 
risks from storm surges and tropical cyclones, in particular for highly exposed SIDS and low-lying coastal zones. In the country 
examples in Chapter 5, large areas of Bangladesh are vulnerable.
Extreme events
All populations should expect increasing variability in climatic norms and conditions and be prepared for abrupt, nonlinear 
changes (Streets and Glantz 2000; Schneider 2004). Areas that already experience extreme storm events, especially in mid-
latitudes and the wet tropics, should expect to experience as great or greater frequencies of such events, with the potential for 
more high-intensity events through 2050 (IPCC 2013b). The intensity of extreme storms is likely to increase, creating greater 
risks of flooding and damage to homes and coastal infrastructure (Chan and others 2012). The greater prevalence of extreme 
events will affect rural and urban communities, particularly on sloping lands and in coastal regions. Bangladesh falls into this 
category. SIDS face some of the highest levels of exposure and vulnerability to extreme storm events (World Bank 2013).
This report models climate impacts on internal migration through water availability and crop productivity, 
as well as sea level and storm surge. The literature shows that water scarcity and declining yields, along 
with sea level rise, are among the major impacts facing low income countries, and that these impacts 
will be important drivers of migration (see Henry, Schoumaker, and Beauchemin 2004; Feng, Krueger, 
and Oppenheimer 2010;  Nawrotzki, Riosmena, and Hunter 2013; and Chapter 3). Water deficits can 
also have wider impacts on the economy, as households curtail spending and agricultural-processing 
industries and other businesses retrench. There is less evidence of what may happen to regions that 
experience increases in rainfall over time. Households may send one or more members to cities or other 
rural areas in search of an alternative livelihood, or they may abandon farming or other rural livelihoods 
altogether, as has happened in rapidly urbanizing countries such as China. The literature suggests that 
extremes are more likely to result in short-term displacement than sustained migration (Kälin 2010; Black 
and others 2011; Brzoska and Fröhlich 2015).
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Box 2.4: The climate–conflict–migration nexus 
The review of the empirical evidence in the latest IPCC report concludes that climate change can affect known drivers of 
conflict, such as unstable institutions, but finds little agreement on direct causal pathways or a strong relationship with armed 
conflict (Adger and others 2014). There is some agreement that existing patterns of conflict could be reinforced under climate 
change—in, for example, already fragile regions or areas with ethnical divides (Schleussner and others 2016; Buhaug 2016). 
Major security actors such as the U.S. Department of Defense (2015) have tended to frame climate change as a “threat 
multiplier,” which can exacerbate existing risks. Nonetheless, the world’s development and sustainability trajectory significantly 
influences how climate will influence conflict drivers and risks (Hegre and others 2016).
Conflict is both a process and an inherent feature of human interaction, with a raft of expressions, stages, locations, arenas, 
and impacts (Galtung 2008). However, its emergence and evolution are always “the result of an individual context-specific 
mixture of interconnected factors,” (Schleussner and others 2016, 9216). Climate change is hypothesized to drive or 
exacerbate conflicts through, for example, pressure on resources, natural disasters, and sea level rise. These factors can 
threaten livelihoods, increase competition, intensify cleavages, reduce state capability and legitimacy, trigger poorly designed 
climate action with unintended consequences, and lead to large movements of people that may have negative impacts in 
receiving areas (Buhaug, Gleditsch, and Thiesen 2010).
Some qualitative studies examine the influence of environmental stress on specific conflicts, such as insurgencies in Assam in 
India (Burrows and Kinney 2016; Homer-Dixon 2010). Cross-case quantitative studies find significant statistical correlations 
between climate change and violence or conflict (Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015; Carleton, Hsiang, and Burke 2016; Mares 
and Moffett 2016). They posit that if human responses to climate change remain unchanged, climate change has the potential 
to increase violence and conflict.
This large-scale quantitative work has received criticism with respect to the definition of conflict, sample selection, statistical 
methods, and lack of explanation of causal mechanisms at work (Buhaug and others 2014; Buhaug 2010, 2014; Selby 
2014). Other empirical work and quantitative analyses challenge their findings (Buhaug 2010; O’Loughlin and others 2012; 
Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Slettebak 2012; Klomp and Bulte 2013; Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koubi 2012). These analyses 
argue that adaptation capacity, institutions, and existing vulnerabilities mediate the effects of climate change on factors that 
may drive conflict, and that other factors than environmental ones are often more important in igniting conflict.
For climate impacts and their influence on migration, understanding uncertainty, variability, thresholds and 
“tipping points” is key. Most regions will become hotter and drier. There is uncertainty as to the specific 
manifestations of climate change, however, partly because natural variability will remain the dominant 
factor in observed climate trends in the near term and partly because the period through 2050 represents 
a transition during which anthropogenic changes to the atmosphere become a more dominant influence 
on climate systems (IPCC 2013b). The spatial and temporal variability of the impacts of climate change 
make it difficult to have precise predictions of the frequency or extent to which specific areas, countries, or 
regions will experience particular climate risks or hazards. Chapter 3 explains how this uncertainty affects 
the modeling effort.
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A tipping point is a particular moment at which a component of the earth’s system enters into a qualitatively 
different mode of operation, as a result of a small perturbation (Levermann and others. 2012; Schellnhuber 
2009). Abrupt climate change occurs when the system crosses this tipping point, triggering a transition to 
a new state at a faster rate (Michaelowa 2002). Tipping points exist because of nonlinearity—the fact that 
there is no simple proportional relationship between cause and effect (IPCC 2013b). Systems such as the 
Arctic summer sea ice, the Greenland ice sheet, the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, and the Amazon rainforest 
may reach their tipping points at different times (Lenton and others 2008; World Bank 2013). For instance, 
in about 50 years, the tipping point for the Amazon rainforest may be triggered by changing precipitation and 
dry seasonal length that would make it difficult for the rainforest to reestablish itself, resulting in substantial 
biodiversity loss and further decreases in rainfall (Lenton and others 2008). This report’s modeling cannot 
capture such relationships. Their existence may rapidly affect the scale of climate migration after a system 
reaches a tipping point. An indication of the approach of a tipping point, or rapid movement toward an 
observed change in climate, livelihood, or climate migration trend, underscores the urgency to scale up 
climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts now.
Independently of uncertainties associated with climate change projections, and potential future tipping 
points, evidence shows that climate migration is already taking place (Ionesco, Gemenne, and Zickgraf 
2015). There is also consensus that the future may see the emergence of areas where combinations of 
exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity put whole communities at risk (de Sherbinin 2014). People have 
moved and will continue to move toward zones of environmental risk, such as coastal cities (de Sherbinin 
and others 2012; Geddes and others 2012). Changed climate patterns will expand patterns of cyclical, 
seasonal, and rural-to-urban migration (Ammer and others 2016). The largest form of movement will be 
internal; when people cross borders, most will move to neighboring countries, often from one low-income 
country to another (Foresight 2011; McLeman and others 2016; Groschl and Steinwachs 2016). Table 2.1 
presents the findings of a systematic review of 160 peer-reviewed publications on climate migration.
Table 2.1: Summary of research findings on the interconnectivity between climate change, livelihoods and migration
Finding Characteristics/implications Strength* of evidence
Migration is a key component 
of sustainable livelihoods 
and household adaptive 
capacity in low and middle 
income countries
Migration is one of many possible ways in which households 
adapt to and cope with climatic and nonclimatic risks/
uncertainty.
In countries with weak institutions, migration may be the only 
form of adaptation available.
Households that lack migration options are inherently more 
vulnerable and less adaptable to the impacts of climatic 
variability and change.
Broad base of evidence from 
wide range of empirical studies 
in multiple regions
Reliance on migration to 
meet rural livelihood needs 
is growing
Growing reliance on migration is a common trend across less 
developed countries.
Seasonal migration is common in regions with highly seasonal 
climates.
Migration for longer durations is becoming increasingly common.
Most migrants are young adults.
Broad base of evidence from 
wide range of empirical studies 
in multiple regions
Most climate-related 
migration takes place 
across short distances 
within countries or across 
contiguous borders
Local migration has relatively low costs.
The destination may be urban or rural, depending on wage-
earning opportunities.
Broad base of evidence from 
wide range of empirical studies 
in multiple regions
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Finding Characteristics/implications Strength* of evidence
Households that receive 
remittances from migrants 
have greater long-term social 
and economic prospects 
Remittances from international migrants are typically of greater 
value than remittances received from internal migrants.
Within communities, remittances increase socioeconomic 
inequality.
Remittances can help improve prospects for disaster recovery 
and to some extent for preparedness and adaptation, but the 
overall contribution to building climate resiliency is uncertain.
Broad base of evidence from 
wide range of empirical studies 
in multiple regions
Rural to urban migration 
rates are high and growing 
Rural to urban migration rates are growing especially rapidly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, although that region is less urbanized than 
others. 
Conclusive statistical evidence 
Households that participate 
in rural to urban resource-
sharing networks have 
greater food security
Such networks are likely to grow in importance as impacts of 
climate change on food production systems strengthen.
Households lacking access to such networks are more 
vulnerable.
Strong empirical evidence from 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
America
Migration is a key means 
of recovering from extreme 
weather events, including 
floods and droughts
After an extreme event, households send young adults to seek 
wage labor opportunities to rebuild lost/damaged housing and 
livelihood assets.
The duration and destination of migration vary by context.
Strong empirical evidence from 
Central America, East Africa, 
and South and Southeast Asia
People in remote areas 
have worse migration 
opportunities and adaptation 
prospects 
Remoteness and isolation are important factors in the 
vulnerability of mountain populations and some dryland areas.
People living in areas with good access to roads, markets, and 
social infrastructure have a greater range of adaptation options 
and potential migration destinations.
Strong empirical evidence from 
dryland areas of Africa, the 
Andes, and Nepal
Gender dimensions can 
change over time, but have 
important implications for 
climate migration
Where only men migrate, women, children, people with 
disabilities, and the elderly left behind are at greater risk of food 
insecurity and personal safety.
Land degradation and climatic variability can force higher levels 
of gendered migration or longer-duration migration.
Gender dimensions can change over time.
Case study evidence from 
Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Pakistan; more research 
needed in other countries and 
regions
Empirical research shows 
persuasively that climate 
resilience must be built 
urgently given the known 
risks, but there remains 
uncertainty about which 
strategies hold the greatest 
promise and how to 
implement them
The impacts of extreme heat, dryness, and variability in 
precipitation on regional migration patterns will grow through 
2050 but can be moderated by sound development strategies.
Climate impacts on food systems, water resources, and 
livelihoods accelerate in nonlinear fashion after 2050, as will the 
risks of large-scale displacements and distress migration.
Business as usual will fall far short of meeting future adaptation 
needs.
Climate model evidence 
increasingly strong
Models of future crop yields vary 
but decline for several crops
Systems understandings of 
general climate–migration 
dynamics are increasingly 
strong, with strong agreement 
across the research literature
Further empirical research 
on resilience-building needed 
across most regions
Source: McLeman (2016).
* Green = strong evidence few uncertainties. Yellow = reasonably strong evidence, uncertainties in some regions or areas.
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POSSIBLE INFLUENCES OF CLIMATE IMPACTS ON MIGRATION IN 
SPECIFIC ECOSYSTEMS
This section explores what the literature says about possible future climate migration for key ecosystems. 
The findings are based on a systematic review of the literature conducted in a background paper for this 
report (McLeman 2016). 
Migration patterns will change across ecosystems when facing climate change impacts alongside other 
stressors such as deforestation, land degradation, and biodiversity loss. In drylands, labor migration and 
rural to urban migration can be expected to increase, and extreme events will probably lead to more 
migration under distress. In tropical and temperate forest regions, churning migration patterns in forest 
frontier areas are likely, as are growing rates of young adult labor migration out of more established 
farming areas. In coastal zones, by midcentury there may be increased rates of rural to urban migration, 
temporary and indefinite, as well as displacement from smaller atolls and the seaward edge of deltas as 
a result of erosion and salinization. For montane regions, though case-dependent, further increases in 
already high rates of rural to urban migration and to international destinations are projected. Smallholder 
cropping regions can expect increased rates of rural to urban migration across all regions, both temporary 
and indefinite (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2: Overview of climate change and macro trends on livelihoods in key ecosystems, and possible migration 
trends by 2050
Main climatic 
influences on migration 
by ecosystem type




Extreme heat events, 
droughts, dryness, and 
precipitation variability
Growing intensification 
and market-orientation of 
agriculture
Land degradation, water 
scarcity, and depletion of 
soil nutrients





Average farm size 
shrinks
Small-scale farms lack 
capital to intensify
Outside interests 









Very strong case-based 
evidence from range of 
Sub-Saharan African 
countries
Smaller range of studies 
for dryland migration in 
other regions
Tropical and temperate forest regions
Increased extreme 
heat events and 
precipitation variability, 
which may increase 
fires and adversely 
affect forest health
High rates of deforestation 
in the Americas, Central 
Africa, and Southeast Asia
Loss of biodiversity 
Land degradation
Smallholder farmers are key 
drivers of forest change in 
Africa
Commercial enterprises are 
key drivers of forest change 
in Americas and Asia
Indigenous and 
customary forest users 
squeezed out
Small farms created, 
bought, and sold in 
dynamic process
Larger, intensive farm 
operators acquire best 
lands
Churning migration 
patterns appear in 
forest frontier areas
Rates of young adult 
labor migration out 




evidence of migration 
processes in Americas 
and Southeast Asia
More evidence from 
Africa desirable
Considerable variability 
in expected impacts of 
climate change across 
regions
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Main climatic 
influences on migration 
by ecosystem type




Sea level rise and 
increased intensity 
of storms, causing 








Rapid urbanization and 
industrial development in 
deltaic regions of Asia










declines in many 
regions
Coastal farms under 
increasingly intensive 
cultivation
Some farms in 
Southeast Asia 
converted to shrimp 
aquaculture 





smaller atolls and 
seaward edge of 
deltas occurs, as 
a result of erosion 
and salinization
Strong statistical and 
case-based evidence for 
coastal states in Asia 
and Oceania; fewer data 
and cases for Africa 
Montane regions 
Increased precipitation 
variability and warming 
temperatures, leading 
to growing seasonal 
and interannual water 
scarcity; flash floods 
and landslides of 
increasing magnitudes; 
effects vary widely 
across regions 
because of inherent 
heterogeneity of 
mountain environments
Reinforced endemic poverty 
through remoteness, lack 
of physical and social 
infrastructure
Deforestation problematic 
around many mountain 
settlements
Pastoralism declines, 
but larger numbers of 








becomes essential to 
livelihoods 
Further increases in 
already high rates 







evidence from Ecuador, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Peru
Statistical evidence on 
migration weak for Nepal
Strong confidence in 
region-wide predictions, 
but local experience will 
vary considerably
Smallholder cropping regions
Increased frequency of 
extreme heat events, 
dryness, droughts in 
most regions; more 
intense extreme 
precipitation events 
in some regions; 
greater variability of 
precipitation in some 
regions; water scarcity 
in some regions 
Global and regional 
population growth drives 
growing food demand
Greater pressure for 
intensification of production 
in all regions, especially 
Africa and South Asia, 




squeezed off best land
Need to intensify 
production increases 
need for cash incomes, 
capital to invest in new 
technologies, crop 
varieties, irrigation
Some areas in Asia 
under irrigation may 
need to revert to rainfed 
agriculture, reducing 
household incomes
Productivity in some 
regions and of some 
crops may decline, rates 
to vary by region and 
crop type
Rural to urban 
migration temporary 
and indefinite, 
increase across all 
regions
Strong statistical 
evidence on current crop 
production
Models of future crop 
productivity display 




from several countries 
in Latin America, Asia, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa 
provide strong evidence 
of climate–rural income–
migration linkages
Large array of case-
based evidence from all 
continents
Source:  McLeman (2016).
* Green = strong evidence few uncertainties. Yellow = reasonably strong evidence, uncertainties in some regions or areas.
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Small Island Developing States are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts, making them an important 
location of future climate migration. These states are likely to experience more frequent and more severe 
storms, coastal erosion, and sea level rise (IPCC 2013b). Because of their small size, they could not be 
included at the resolution of the model applied in this report. 
IMPACTS OF MIGRATION ON PEOPLE AND AREAS
Migration affects the well-being of people and surrounding systems in complex ways that evolve over time 
(UNDP 2009; Milan and others 2015; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). Migration is a common coping, 
income diversification, risk management, and adaptation strategy for people facing economic stress and 
adverse climatic conditions (Ellis 2000; Adger and others 2014; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017). 
Climate migration is not good or bad in itself; the cost-benefit calculus is heavily dependent on perspective 
(Gemenne and Blocher 2017). Understanding the conditions under which positive or negative outcomes 
can result is necessary for managing the possible future trends outlined in this report in Chapters 4 and 
5. As studies on the impacts of climate migration are still limited, this section also reviews evidence drawn 
from the general migration literature on systemic issues that arise from migration. 
Impacts on migrants and their households
Outcomes of movements depend on the conditions under which people move (UNDP 2009). Climate 
extremes erode household livelihoods and assets (Zomers and others 2016; Warner and Van der Geest 
2013), diminishing the capabilities needed for successful establishment in destination areas. Hugo 
(2009) argues that displaced people are more likely to find it difficult to adjust to their new destination 
for multiple reasons, connected with the unexpectedness of the move, their emotional state, and the 
unfamiliarity of their new surroundings.
People with greater capabilities—and therefore greater freedom to choose migration timing and 
destinations—often improve their economic situation after migrating. Harttgen and Klasen (2009) find 
that in 14 of 16 developing countries they studied, the Human Development Index was higher for internal 
migrants than for nonmigrants. For cross-border migrants moving from low- to high-income countries, 
a World Bank study (2017b, 15) finds on average “a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling of school 
enrollment rates, and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality.” Access to better health services, water 
quality, and sanitation at the destination, combined with a longer duration of stay, can have profound 
positive health impacts on migrants (UNDP 2009; Yabiku and others 2009). People who migrate to urban 
centers with better access to health services improve their chances of survival relative to rural residents, 
although their health outcomes are worse than those of urban nonmigrants (UNDP 2009).
Migration generally has positive impacts on households in sending areas, although those benefits are 
unevenly distributed. Respondents in surveys conducted through the Migration, Environment and Climate 
Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project, implemented by the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) through a consortium of six universities, find migration to have generally positive, or neutral, impacts 
on the household economy. Only a very small proportion of respondents indicate that migration had 
negative impacts on income, employment, safety, and education (Figure 2.2).
33Understanding the Climate Change–Migration Nexus
Migration can be a positive adaptation strategy for people who migrate, but displacements challenge 
adaptation, and planned relocation shows mixed results. In Haiti seasonal migration helped reduce 
vulnerability. In all six countries studied by Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne (2017), migrant households 
reported mainly positive impacts of migration on income growth and diversification. Many also reported 
having learned, applied, and taught new skills through migration. Most migrant households also stated that 
they improved their health conditions and education thanks to migration. However, migrant households 
also experience more discrimination, exclusion from employment and access to important social services 
and systems than nonmigrants and are more likely to face insecurity; some also live in less robust houses 
than locals. Although these factors can undermine human development and adaptation prospects, the 
report finds that migration can increase adaptive capacities, especially if policy enables better access to 
social services, action against discrimination and exclusion, and protection of migrants.
Migration often generates remittances that can buffer environmental and economic shocks faced by 
household members who remain behind. Such transfers can increase and diversify assets and resources 
available to the sending household, allowing for more flexibility in livelihood strategies and less reliance 
on the local environment (World Bank 2006; Acosta 2007; Adams 2011; Acharya Leon-Gonzalez 2012; 
Le De, Gaillard, and Friesen 2013; Guadagno 2017). Remittances are often spent primarily on food, 
but better-off households also spend sizable shares on education, health care, and housing (UNDP 
2009). Remittances are part of livelihood and insurance strategies in the event of sudden shocks and 
slow-onset disasters. In response to rainfall shocks in the Philippines, remittances decrease when the 
recipients’ income increases and rise when local income falls. About 60 percent of exogenous declines in 
income are replaced by remittance inflows from migrants overseas (Yang and Choi 2007). Remittances 
can help improve prospects for disaster recovery and to some extent preparedness and adaptation; the 
contribution to resilience is less clear (for example, Mohapatra, Joseph, and Ratha 2009; Joseph, Wodon, 
and Blankespoor 2014; Manandhar 2016; Banerjee and others 2017).
Figure 2.2: Perceived impact of migration on households according to a 2016 survey conducted by the 
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Out-migration and remittances are not altogether beneficial for sending areas, however. Remittances may 
increase inequality, as the poorest households may be unable to send migrants—and even if they do, they 
may not be able to send remittances (Zickgraf and others 2016). Migration can also lead to remittance 
dependence and loss of intellectual capital (de Haas 2007), although the literature has cast doubt on 
the universal validity of the brain drain (de Haas 2010). In terms of environmental impacts, out-migration 
sometimes leads to a reduction in environmental pressure, through agricultural deintensification and 
land abandonment, because of the decline in the available labor force and the increase in cash income 
through remittances (Reichert 1981; Zimmerer 1993; Rudel and  others 2005; Qin 2010). In Albania, 
Bolivia, and Mexico, out-migration is associated with an increase in vegetation cover (Preston, Macklin, 
and Warburton 1997; Lopez and others 2006; Muller and Sikor 2006). But out-migration can also weaken 
traditional forms of community-based natural resource management, as a result of declines in the human 
capital necessary to maintain it (Robson and Nayak 2010), and remittances can finance the use of 
environmentally destructive methods of natural resource extraction.
Impacts on migrant receiving areas
Migration has positive and negative impacts on receiving or destination areas. International in-migration 
replenishes the labor supply and skills, spurs entrepreneurship and innovation, eases strains on 
pension systems, and helps care for the elderly (KNOMAD 2017). However, it is frequently associated 
with localized population growth and attendant environmental impacts through, for example, changes in 
land use, deforestation, and land degradation (Starrs and Wright 1995; Hugo 1996; Bilsborrow 1992). 
Migration-related shifts in land use may alter the local environment, with negative impacts on health and 
forests. In the Brazilian Amazon, it can increase malaria risk (de Castro and others 2006). Environmental 
degradation is also associated with conflict, although the linkages are complex (see Box 2.4).
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The effect of in-migration on the wages and employment of existing employees depends largely on whether 
migrants are substitutes for or complements of the existing labor force (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1997; 
Card 2001; Borjas 2003; Borjas 2006; Federman, Harrington, and Krynski 2006; Boustan, Fishback, 
and Kantor 2010). In many receiving areas, migrants may take “dirty, difficult, and dangerous” jobs, 
seasonal work, and informal sector work (IOM 2005). Some studies find no local wage effects on in-
migration. Others find evidence of downward pressure (Kleemans and Magruder 2012; Maystadt, Mueller, 
and Sebastian 2016; McIntosh 2008). Generally, however, the impact of migration on destination areas 
is context dependent, based on the characteristics of the migrants, the receiving areas, and the larger 
overall structures, creating scope for policy entry points.
Urbanization is among the most important impacts of migration in destination areas. By 2050, it is 
expected that 70 percent of the world’s population will be urbanized (PRB 2016). Many rapidly growing 
cities have struggled with negative externalities, such as high unemployment, strained infrastructure, and 
environmental degradation (Bencivenga and Smith 1997; Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2005; Yin and 
others 2011; Kavzoglu 2008). By 2030, some two billion people—40 percent of urban residents—are 
expected to be living in slums (UNDP 2009). Most slum areas have inadequate access to safe water 
and sanitation; insecure land tenure; and inadequate waste management, transport, and electricity (de 
Sherbinin and others 2009; Connell and Lea 2002). Yet cities are often unfairly stigmatized; they may 
offer the best hope for improved conditions for migrants, as well as environmental conservation in rural 
areas (Marcotullio, Baptista, and de Sherbinin 2011).
Gendered impacts of migration patterns and impacts on vulnerable groups
This section draws from a review of the literature conducted in a background paper for this report (Hunter, 
2016).
The impacts of shocks to ecosystems and livelihoods from climate change are not distributed evenly 
across population subgroups (Soares and others 2012). In many places, social groups in vulnerable 
situations—the poor and underprivileged, women, the elderly, children—are also the most severely affected 
by climate change impacts (for example, Reckien and others 2017). These subgroups are generally less 
able to cope with and respond to hazards or shocks because of their disadvantaged position: socially 
because of marginalized status; economically because they are poorer; and politically because of lack of 
independence, decision-making power, and underrepresentation (Gaillard 2010; Alston 2015). Beyond 
embodied vulnerabilities, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reports 
that vulnerabilities can arise from the circumstances that people on the move encounter in transit, at 
borders, and at reception or destination, particularly in lengthy and fragmented journeys. 
Migration shows wide regional variation by gender. African countries and Mexico have seen increased 
migration by men in recent decades (Donato and Gabbacia 2015); other parts of the world have seen 
increases in migration by women. Asian countries have recorded increases in the proportion of female 
emigrants since 1960; emigrants from the Philippines include more women than men (IOM 2014). These 
streams are shaped by globalization, which has shifted labor demands and resulted in new migration 
“pulls” for women. The increase in dual-income households and aging populations in destination countries, 
for example, has fueled a rise in demand for care-giving services, for which women are most often sought.
Internal rural to urban migration patterns have led to shifts in traditional gender roles and some 
empowerment of women in their communities and households. In Vietnam, for example, women’s 
migration to urban areas has increased since the mid-1990s, influenced in part by the economic reforms 
of the late 1980s (Thao and Agergaard 2012). Rural women, particularly single women, are now heavily 
employed in light manufacturing, social work, and health care sectors in urban areas. Married female 
migrants are more likely to be employed in the informal sector. In their wives’ absence, husbands have 
taken on greater responsibilities for child care, housework, and agriculture. These changes in the division 
of labor have seen women gain influence in household purchasing and investment decisions, especially 
concerning remittances (World Bank 2012b). Where male household heads migrate for work, women may 
increasingly manage household finances. In agriculture, for example, male migration leaves many women 
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as the de facto head of household, with more responsibility for overseeing and maintaining subsistence 
production for the family (Griener and Sakdapolrak 2013; Deere 2005; Radel and Schmook 2008).
A handful of studies offer insights on the effect of climate-related migration on gender issues. Gender norms 
often shape the ways in which men and women engage in agricultural and natural resource tasks; changes 
in these aspects of the local environment have gendered impacts, including on migration. In rural Nepal, for 
instance, men are responsible for gathering fuelwood and women for gathering fodder (Bohra-Mishra and 
Massey 2011). In these areas, environmental changes that make wood collection more time consuming 
are associated with local migration by men but not women; increases in the collection time for fodder are 
associated with increases in local migration by women but not men (Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire 2010). 
Land tenure, tenure security, and productivity play roles in the gender–migration–climate change association. 
In the Loja province of the southern Ecuadorian Andes, for example, land-poor households are less likely 
than others to migrate abroad, although both women and men migrate internally, to diversify livelihoods. 
Land-rich households, in contrast, are more likely to send male but not female migrants abroad (Gray 2010).
Women and girls experience greater disadvantage than men from pervasive discrimination and structural 
inequalities in access to, and control of, resources. For instance, women with low socioeconomic status 
are more likely to get injured or die in natural disasters (Cannon 2002; Frankenberg and others 2011; 
Ikeda 1995; Hunter and others 2016; Paul 2010); greater socioeconomic gender equality mitigates this 
dynamic (Neumayer and Plümper 2007). Such inequalities also shape postdisaster experience. Women 
sometimes have less access to relief resources (Bradshaw 2004) and may be subject to additional 
workloads (Enarson, Fothergill, and Peek 2002). Women displaced by disasters are often at increased 
risk of sexual violence (Felten-Biermann 2006; Anastario, Shehab, and Lawry 2009) and mental health 
problems (Dell’Osso and others 2013; Viswanath and others 2013), in part because of exposure to 
violence (Anastario, Shehab, and Lawry 2009) and heavy caregiving burdens, which can increase anxiety 
and posttraumatic stress (Mills, Edmondson, and Park 2007).
But men and boys can also be in vulnerable situations (Demetriades and Esplen 2008). Gender norms 
for migration influence who is more likely to migrate when climate pressures intensify. Cultural norms that 
encourage male migration can put them in risky situations. Masculine gender norms such as those related 
to risk perceptions and risk-taking behavior can increase the vulnerability for men during natural disasters, 
as seen during Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 (Bradshaw 2004; West and Orr 2007).
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FIVE MAIN POINTS EMERGE FROM THIS CHAPTER
• Internal migration is already happening at scale and is expected to increase.
• Migration decisions are the product of complex human decision making.
• Climate change will affect multiple aspects of human livelihoods that feed into migration decisions. 
• The impacts of internal migration can be substantial in both sending and receiving areas.
• Migration is an adaptation strategy and must be managed for both its opportunities and challenges.
Climate change affects livelihoods both directly and indirectly. People can decide to migrate as a livelihood 
strategy when climate change affects overarching variables such as the economy, environment, and 
political system they live in. Climate change can also affect inhibitors or facilitators of migration, and 
people’s natural, financial, human, and social capital. Ecosystems and associated livelihoods can shape 
current and future outcomes. The impacts of migration are often substantial; they need to be carefully 
investigated and managed within development and adaptation frameworks. Migration can be an important 
strategy for livelihood diversification and poverty reduction, and it is a major part of adaptation. At the 
same time, migration presents multiple challenges. For example, migrants and their families can face high 
risks and costs, such as discrimination and violence. Many migrants are also moving to areas that will be 
increasingly vulnerable. Remittances have the potential to create or increase inequalities in some cases. 
Furthermore, under certain conditions, in-migration can have adverse impacts on destination areas, 
including on social cohesion, infrastructure, and the environment.
Policy makers need to bear in mind the opportunities and challenges of internal climate migration when 
designing responses and long-term plans. Much can be done to improve the outcomes of migration (DRC 
2009; UNDP 2009); bolster its adaptation potential (Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017); and mitigate or 
prepare for climate impacts that lead to migration under distress, displacement, entrap people or require 
planned relocation. For example, integrated spatial planning that considers climate migration in terms 
of areas of destination or origin, as well as targeted interventions such as social protection measures 
and diversification of livelihoods, can help communities adapt in place or move in safety and dignity (see 
Chapter 6). People in vulnerable situations should be prioritized in responses and planning, as they will 
bear the brunt of climate change impacts. The gendered dimensions of climate migration also require 
special attention.
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Chapter 3
Internal climate migration is already taking place. As climate impacts increase 
over the course of this century, the scale of such migration is expected to increase. 
But by how much, over what time frame, and where? This chapter presents the 
modeling methods used in the scenario-based approach to estimate climate 
change-induced migration within countries. This first-ever attempt to introduce 
climate impacts into a model of future population distribution over large areas 
starts with the most important sectoral impacts on migration—on water and crop 
models—and through sea level rise. This focus on slow-onset climate change, 
excluding cross-border movements and displacement from climate variability and 
extremes and cross-border movement, presents a lower-bound estimate of the 
likely impact of climate change on migration. The modeling provides transparent, 
spatially explicit estimates of change in population distribution (and indirectly 
climate migration) as a function of climate and development trends. Sources of 
uncertainty and the possibilities of expanding the scope of the work are laid out.
Governments and development partners can no longer assume that the evolution of population distribution 
and development activities targeting rural livelihoods will remain unchanged. They need to anticipate shifts 
in population distribution as a response to climate change. The modeling is intended to assist governments 
and development partners in understanding possible future outcomes based on combinations of two 
development pathways and two climate trajectories, using multiple model combinations. 
The selected development pathways, based on Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), include a 
“moderate development” and an “unequal development” scenario. Under the moderate development 
pathway, low and middle income countries are characterized by moderate population growth, 
urbanization, income growth, and education. Under the unequal development pathway, low and middle 
income countries follow different pathways. Low income countries have high population growth rates 
and urbanization and low gross domestic product (GDP) and education levels. Middle income countries 
have low population growth rates, high urbanization, moderate GDP, and low education levels. Inequality 
remains high, and economies are relatively isolated, leaving developing regions highly vulnerable to 
climate change with limited adaptive capacity.
The forecasts are based on two greenhouse gas concentration trajectories (based on Representative
Concentration Pathways [RCPs]). According to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report under the lower emissions 
scenario, temperatures are likely to peak at 0.4°–1.6°C above baseline levels by 2050 and then stabilize. 
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Figure 3.1: Modeling approach to estimating climate change-induced internal migration 
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MODEL
Estimates of climate migrants derived by comparing grid-cell level population for each 
of the three “climate impact” scenarios with that of the “no climate impact” scenario 
(derived from the development only pathway i.e. SSP2, SSP4). The positive difference 
across all grid cells are aggregated to the national level (and then regional) to produce 
the estimated number of climate migrants under each of the three scenarios
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For the higher emissions scenarios, temperatures rise by 1.4°–2.6°C by 2050, and by 2.6°–4.8°C by 
2100 (IPCC 2014). In this report, the lower emissions pathway is a world in which temperatures are likely 
to peak at 0.25°–1.5°C above recent baseline levels by 2050 and then stabilize through the end of the 
century. In the higher emissions scenario, temperatures rise by 0.5°–2°C by 2050 and by 3°–5.5°C by 
2100. The slight variation in the projected range of temperature change associated with each RCP between 
AR5 and our report, reflects the choice of two general circulation models used to drive the ISIMIP climate 
impact models, whereas the AR5 figures represent the entire Climate Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5; 
Taylor and others 2012) model ensemble.
The development-only scenarios include population and urbanization trends in a population gravity model that 
assesses the attractiveness of different locales over time. Future population distributions are influenced by 
climate impacts, which reflect impacts on the water and agriculture sectors and sea level rise in the coastal 
zone augmented by an increment for storm surge.8 The model estimates the number of climate migrants and 
their future locations by comparing population distributions that incorporate climate impacts with scenarios 
based on development trajectories only. Figure 3.1 summarizes the basic steps of the modeling process.
STATE OF THE ART ON CLIMATE MIGRATION MODELING
Climate migration modeling is a new but growing field (de Sherbinin and Bai forthcoming; McLeman 2013). 
This section overviews recent developments in the field, describes the approach to gravity modeling, and 
reviews the antecedents to this report’s work. 
Review of climate migration modeling efforts
The simplest approach to modeling climate migration is exposure mapping. This approach usually involves 
overlaying a climate-related hazard on a population distribution map. In some cases, assumptions are 
made about the number of people who will be displaced if that hazard occurs. Hazards that have been 
mapped in this way include sea level rise, for which there is a large and growing body of literature (for 
example, McGranahan and Anderson 2007; Mondal and Tatem 2012; CIESIN 2013; Neumann and others 
2015); floods (Hirabiyashi and others 2013); multiple climate hazards (Christensen and others 2014); 
and multiple climatic and nonclimatic hazards (Dilley and others 2005; Peduzzi, Herold, and Mouton 
2009). Although useful to illuminate the potential risks to human populations, these approaches generally 
make fairly simplistic assumptions about who will stay or go.
Empirical and theoretical advances from studies of the influence of climate variability and change on 
recent migration have helped ground recent modeling efforts. These studies generally employ statistical 
models of migration as it relates to environmental phenomena (for example, Henry, Schoumaker, and 
Beauchemin 2004; Afifi and Warner 2008; Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer 2010; Massey, Axinn, and 
Ghimire 2010; Nawrotzki and others 2012; Backhaus, Martinez-Zarzoso, and Murus 2015; Gray and Wise 
2016) to develop coefficients related to climate parameters as they influence migration. These studies 
need to carefully control for known determinants of migration. Field studies and surveys that delve into 
household decision making can illuminate perceptions of environmental change and the appropriateness 
of a decision to migrate (or not). 
Agent-based models build on this empirical and theoretical understanding of environmental and other 
influences on human migratory behavior. They model the behavior of autonomous decision makers when 
confronted with environmental, economic, or other changes. The theory of planned behavior, coming out of 
cognitive psychology, provides a basis that can be used to break down the reasoning process relating to the 
development of a behavioral intention. In this theory, a decision to take an action is related to three factors: 
the individual’s attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms governing the behavior in that society, and the 
individual’s perceived capacity to act on the desired behavior (Ajzen 1991). Agent-based models consider 
8. Impacts on water availability, crop productivity, and sea level rise/storm surge are likely to have the greatest impacts on migration. 
Future modeling efforts could include additional climate impacts. 
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the migration decision in terms of the rules of behavior that govern the response of individuals to complex 
combinations of multilevel stimuli. They are often parameterized using extensive household survey research 
and data on migration. Agent-based models for environmental migration have been developed for Burkina 
Faso (Kniveton, Smith and Wood 2011) and Thailand (Walsh and others 2013). 
A significant strength of agent-based models is the explicit modeling of micro-level demographic 
behavior based on theory and empirical evidence. This feature is a strength for local analyses for 
which sufficient data exist but is a limitation for regions for which empirical evidence on migration and 
migration intention is scarce. 
Another limitation of agent-based models is the limited spatial definition (or resolution) of the migration 
pathways. Models typically produce volumes of flows out of one location. They may identify flows into alternative 
locations, but they do not typically identify source or destination areas with spatial precision, making it difficult 
to map changes in population that may result from the migration decision making of individual actors. 
System dynamics models have been developed to examine environmental migration and displacement. 
The International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) developed a model that simulates the impacts 
of droughts, floods, and climate change on the displacement of pastoralists in northern Kenya. It simulates 
what happens when different measures are implemented to prevent, mitigate, or respond to displacement 
(Ginnetti 2015). They can be used to develop “what if” scenarios involving complex econometric models 
and utility functions. However, work on system dynamics models of climate migration is still in its early 
stages, and these models tend to lack spatial specificity.
Gravity modeling
Derived from Newton’s law of gravity, gravity models are used to predict the degree of interaction between 
two places. “Bodies” and “masses” in Newton’s law are replaced by “locations” and “importance,” where 
importance can be measured in terms of population numbers, GDP, or other variables. 
A gravity model of migration is based on the idea that as the importance of two locations increases, 
movement between them increases.  Movement between two locations is lower the greater the distance 
or geographic and political barriers between them. This phenomenon is known as “distance decay.”
Gravity models in demography seek to simulate aggregate human behavior. Population potential, a type of 
gravity model, can be interpreted as a measure of the influence the population at one point in space exerts 
on another point. Population potential can be considered an indicator of the potential for interaction 
between the population at a given point in space and all other populations (Rich 1980). This potential 
will be higher at points closer to large populations. Population potential is also often considered a proxy 
for accessibility, indicating the relative ease with which populations may be accessed from a given point. 
In the aggregate, locational choice can be tied to factors such as economic opportunity, transportation 
infrastructure, proximity to family, the presence of social amenities, and intangibles, such as place 
attachment (Gustafson 2001; Clark and Davies 2002; Kim, Horner, and Marans 2005). Changes in 
spatial distributions over time reflect changing perceptions. The tendency of populations to gravitate 
toward larger urban agglomerations, reflected in high rates of urbanization globally, supports the notion 
that the presence of population is indicative of relative attractiveness.
Gravity modeling has been carried out for the United States using population and land use change 
scenarios (Bierwagen and others 2010), which were used to estimate land-based emissions from certain 
settlement patterns. Also for the United States, McKee and others (2015) projected population to 2030 
and 2050 using a spatial population projection model that incorporates gravity and multivariate methods. 
Their model considers factors that affect population distribution, such as land cover, the steepness of 
local terrain, distances to larger cities, and a moving average of the current population. A novelty of their 
model is the inclusion of population projections, variables, and weights that are adapted to address local 
characteristics of each of the 3,109 counties in the United States. Their model has the ability to examine 
53Modeling Climate Migration Within Countries
“what if” scenarios, such as significant economic decline or climate impacts. The work described here 
shares in common with McKee and others (2015) the introduction of environmental factors into gravity 
models that affect the relative attractiveness of locations and, by extension, the implicit migration that 
contributes to population distribution.
The work in this report builds on Jones and O’Neill (2016), who produced scenario-based global population 
projections to 2100 by downscaling national-level projections of urban and rural population change to 
a 7.5 arc-minute grid framework. The population projections include explicit international and domestic 
migration modules. For domestic migration, they downscaled projected national-level urban and rural 
population change using the National Center for Atmospheric Research - CUNY Institute for Demographic 
Research (NCAR-CIDR) gravity-based approach (Jones and O’Neill 2013). This model is described below.
Gravity model approaches are largely silent on the question of individual motivations for migration. These 
models can help illuminate the relative importance of push factors (environmental or economic factors 
at origin that influence the decision to migrate) versus pull factors (factors at destination such as higher 
wages that influence the decision to migrate), because modeling the attractiveness of locations in terms 
of economic or demographic agglomeration factors fits with existing theory.
Climate migration modeling: conclusions
Each approach to modeling is fit-for-purpose and faces different constraints. Exposure mapping is useful to 
illuminate the potential risks to human populations, but generally makes fairly simplistic assumptions about 
movements.  Agent-based models and systems dynamics models depend on rich data on individual- and 
household-level decision-making processes as well as empirical grounding. They generally lack a strong 
spatial definition of movements. Gravity models address some of these constraints and are based on 
past aggregate behavior of human populations. It can be difficult, within the gravity framework, to tease 
out the specific factors—job opportunities, social amenities, or social networks—that result in population 
redistribution, as well as the relative contribution of those factors, if specific indicators related to drivers 
of movement are absent as they all contribute to the agglomeration effect captured by population 
potential.  When specific data related to economic, demographic, or environmental drivers are available and 
incorporated into the model, however, it becomes easier to infer causality. This shortcoming notwithstanding, 
gravity modeling is one of the few approaches available to take climate migration modeling to scale. 
MODELING INPUTS 
The Representative Concentration Pathways
The magnitude of future global warming can be framed through Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs). Developed in advance of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, RCPs represent the latest generation of 
global scenarios for climate change research (van Vuuren at al. 2014). RCPs are trajectories of greenhouse gas 
concentrations resulting from human activity corresponding to a specific level of radiative forcing in 2100.9 For 
example, the low greenhouse gas concentration RCP2.6 and the high greenhouse gas concentration RCP8.5 
employed in this analysis imply futures where radiative forcing of 2.6 and 8.5 watts/m², respectively, are 
achieved by the end of the century.10 The additional warming implied by these RCPs is 0.3°C (RCP2.6) to 2.5oC 
(RCP8.5) by 2050, with far more warming anticipated (about 4oC) by 2100 under RCP8.5. 
RCPs do not rely on a fixed set of scenario-specific assumptions on economic development, technological 
change, or population growth. Many different socioeconomic futures or pathways may lead to the same 
level of radiative forcing. This framework allows researchers to consider alternative policy decisions 
9. Radiative forcing is the measurement of the capacity of a gas or other forcing agent to affect that energy balance, thereby 
contributing to climate change.
10. These RCPs are sometimes referred to in this report as “emissions scenarios.” They are actually “warming scenarios,” as they reflect 
the radiative forcing (in watts per square meter) associated with various emissions levels. Technically, low to moderate emissions 
could produce RCP8.5 should the climate system prove to be more sensitive to emissions than anticipated. Climate sensitivity reflects 
the degree of warming associated with a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from pre-industrial levels. The potential range is 1.5
o–4.5oC. 
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with combinations of social, economic, and technological change. A future with high population growth 
but rapid development of clean technology may achieve the same level of radiative forcing as a world 
characterized by low population growth but continued reliance on fossil fuels. This framework allows 
researchers to specify certain levels of temperature change and then explore alternative policy options 
to achieve greenhouse gas concentration levels consistent with the goal. A previous process (the Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios) specified the socioeconomic conditions that drove the climate change 
models, from which impacts were then calculated. 
Low (RCP2.6) and high (RCP8.5) emissions scenarios were chosen. They drive the indicators of water and 
agriculture sector change, which are incorporated in projections of future population distributions. 
Under RCP2.6, greenhouse gas emissions begin to decline by 2020, and radiative forcing peaks by 
midcentury before declining to near current levels by 2100. This scenario is consistent with the extremely 
rapid adoption of cleaner technologies, slower population growth, and strong environmental policies. To 
achieve RCP2.6, new technologies would need to be widely deployed over the next 5–10 years. The 
extended RCP2.6 scenario assumes “negative emissions” by 2070, meaning that humans remove more 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) from the atmosphere than they release. RCP2.6 is thus consistent 
with the Paris Agreement, which seeks to limit temperature rise to 2°C.
RCP8.5 is characterized by increasing greenhouse gas emissions, leading to high atmospheric concentrations. 
It is a future consistent with scenarios of energy-intense development, continued reliance on fossil fuels, and 
a slow rate of technological development. Pathways characterized by rapid population growth and land use 
intensification (croplands and grasslands) are also consistent with this scenario. RCP8.5 implies little to no 
climate policy. It is characterized by significant increases in carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) emissions.
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
To create scenarios illuminating different possible development pathways, this analysis builds on spatial 
population projections by Jones and O’Neill (2016) that are based on Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 
(SSPs). SSPs represent a set of scenarios—or plausible future worlds—that underpin climate change 
research and permit the integrated analysis of future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and 
mitigation (Ebi and others 2014). They can be categorized by the degree to which the different scenarios 
represent challenges to mitigation (reducing the sources or enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases) and 
societal adaptation to climate change. 
The analysis uses SSPs as story lines to guide the development of spatial population projections at a 7.5 
arc-minute resolution (grid cells of about 14 square kilometers at the equator). The five SSPs developed 
by O’Neill and others (2014) span a wide range of possible future development pathways for the world 
and describe trends in demographics, human development, economy, lifestyles, policies, institutions, 
technology, the environment, and natural resources. They are the scenario benchmarks used for 
adaptation planning purposes. Table 3.1 summarizes the SSP narratives; Figure 3.2 relates the SSPs to 
one another. National-level estimates of population, urbanization, and GDP have been released for each 
SSP and are available through the SSP database.11 
The model used in this report builds on SSP2 and SSP4. Under SSP4 only low income countries experience 
high population growth, coupled with substantial inequality leading to adaptation challenges. Middle 
income countries experience low population growth much like high income countries. SSP2 is a moderate 
development scenario between SSP1 (“sustainability”) and SSP3 (“fragmentation”) with a slow reduction 
in inequalities among world regions and more moderate trends in population growth, urbanization, income, 
and education. These scenarios were chosen because they represent divergent development pathways. 
They were also selected for consistency, or the ability to be paired, with the high and low emissions 
pathways (RCPs) used in this report. The high emissions pathway (RCP8.5) can be paired with both SSP4 
and SSP2; the low emissions pathway (RCP2.6) can be paired with SSP4.
11. See IIASA’s website https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about.
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Table 3.1: Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) narratives
SSP Illustrative starting points for narrative Level of challenge
SSP1 Sustainable development proceeds at a reasonably rapid pace, inequalities are reduced, and 
technological change is rapid and directed toward environmentally friendly processes, including 
lower carbon energy sources and higher productivity of land.
Low for mitigation 
and adaptation
SSP2* Intermediate case between SSP1 and SSP3. Moderate
SSP3 Unmitigated emissions are high, as a result of moderate economic growth, rapid population 
growth, and slow technological change in the energy sector, making mitigation difficult. 
Investments in human capital are low, inequality is high, a regionalized world leads to reduced 
trade flows, and institutional development is unfavorable, leaving large numbers of people 
vulnerable to climate change and many parts of the world with low adaptive capacity.
High for mitigation 
and adaptation
SSP4* A mixed world, with relatively rapid technological development in low-carbon energy sources in 
key emitting regions, leading to relatively large mitigative capacity in places where it matters 
most to global emissions. However, in other regions, development proceeds slowly, inequality 
remains high, and economies are relatively isolated, leaving them highly vulnerable to climate 
change with limited adaptive capacity.
High for adaptation, 
low for mitigation
SSP5 In the absence of climate policies, energy demand is high and most of this demand is met 
with carbon-based fuels. Investments in alternative energy technologies are low, and there are 
few readily available options for mitigation. Economic development is relatively rapid, driven by 
high investments in human capital. Improved human capital also produces a more equitable 
distribution of resources, stronger institutions, and slower population growth, leading to a less 
vulnerable world better able to adapt to climate impacts.
High for mitigation,
low for adaptation
Source: Based on O’Neill and others (2014).
Note: * SSP2 and SSP4 used in the model for this report. 
Figure 3.2: Qualitative SSP narratives (left) and the underlying assumptions (right) on various indicators for 
countries by income group. 
Source: Jiang (2014).
Note: H = high, M = medium, L = low, POP = population, URB = urbanization, GDP = gross domestic product, EDU = education, HIC = high income countries,  
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The SSP population projections include cross-border movements, but these do not include climate change 
as a potential driver of future migration flows. As this study builds on the SSPs, by definition it also includes 
the bilateral migration flows included in the national-level population projections that correspond to each 
SSP (Samir and Lutz 2014). For both SSP2 and SSP4, these flows are in the middle of the range.12 
They are based on an existing global-level matrix of in- and out-migration (Abel and Sander 2014) that is 
adjusted to reflect assumptions regarding, for example, conflict and political changes and the degree of 
openness of national borders in each SSP (O’Neill and others 2014). 
Scenario combinations used in the model
Three plausible future internal climate migration scenario combinations are examined (see Figure 1.2): 
• A pessimistic reference scenario (SSP4 and RCP8.5), in which low income countries are characterized 
by high population growth, high rates of urbanization, low GDP growth, and low education levels. High 
emissions generally drive greater climate impacts. This scenario poses high barriers to adaptation 
because of the slow pace of development and isolation of regional economies. 
• A more inclusive development scenario (SSP2 and RCP8.5), which holds emissions as they are in the 
pessimistic reference scenario but combines them with reduced inequalities among world regions and 
more moderate trends in population growth, urbanization, income, and education than under SSP4. 
Population growth is lower than in SSP4 for low income countries and higher for middle income countries.
• A more climate-friendly scenario (SSP4 and RCP2.6), which has a lower emissions pathway, but holds 
the development scenario as it is in the pessimistic reference scenario. 
Climate impact scenarios 
Many studies seeking to understand the effects of climate change on mobility have used climate variables 
such as temperature and precipitation rather than actual climate impacts on different sectors. A key 
innovation of this research project is that, rather than simply incorporating likely future climate trajectories, 
it incorporates actual impacts on two critical sectors, water and agriculture, as well as sea level rise in 
coastal zones, augmented by storm surge. 
Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project
The Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP) is a climate-impact modeling initiative 
aimed at contributing to a quantitative and cross-sectoral synthesis of the differential impacts of climate 
change, including uncertainties. The ISIMIP project uses a subset of the general circulation models used 
in the IPCC AR5 process. This leads to slight variations in the projected temperature range associated 
with RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 used in this report. ISIMIP has compiled a database of state-of-the-art computer 
model simulations of biophysical climate impacts. It offers a framework for consistently projecting the 
impacts of climate change across affected sectors and spatial scales. 
The analysis for this study used outputs of the ISIMIP Fast Track modeling effort, which covers 1970–
2010, as well as projections for 2010–50 (Piontek and others 2013).13 Under the Fast Track, the future 
sectoral impact models are driven by a range of general circulation models. This project used two general 
circulation models that provide a good spread for the temperature and precipitation parameters of interest: 
the HadGEM2-ES climate model developed by the Met Office Hadley Centre for Climate Change (in the 
United Kingdom) and the IPSL-CM5A-LR climate model developed by the Institut Pierre Simon Laplace 
Climate Modeling Center (in France) (see Appendix A for details). 
12. Migration flows are considered medium across all SSPs except SSP3 (“fragmentation”), where they are low, and SSP5 
(“conventional development”), where they are high. A more sophisticated set of SSP projections is under development.
13. See the ISIMIP website https://www.isimip.org/gettingstarted/fast-track-simulation-protocol/. 
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Climate impacts addressed in the model
The ISIMIP collection of sectoral models includes a range of systems and sectors, such as health, coastal 
infrastructure, forests, and other ecosystems. The focus of this study is on water availability and crop 
production, as well as sea level rise scenarios that were developed outside the ISIMIP framework. The global 
simulations—at a relatively coarse spatial scale (0.5 degrees or roughly 55 kilometers at the equator)—
are an advance over purely climate model–based indicators of rainfall and temperature, because they 
represent actual resources of relevance to development. These climate impacts were selected because 
the literature shows that water scarcity and declining yields, along with sea level rise, are among the major 
potential slow-onset climate impacts facing low income countries and these impacts will also be very 
important drivers of migration.14 
The model leaves out many important impacts, including the impacts of flood, drought, and cyclones 
(except to the extent that they affect water availability and crop yields). As devastating as they may be 
for rural livelihoods, short-duration, rapid-onset events are not directly included. This first-ever attempt to 
introduce climate impacts into a model of future population distribution over large areas starts with the 
most important sectoral impacts on migration as a first step, but future efforts could also incorporate 
more sectoral models. For these reasons, the results should be seen as a lower-bound estimate of the 
likely impact of climate change on migration.
The focus of this work is not on short-term climate variability or extremes—which are not as well captured 
by the impact models—but on deviations from baseline conditions over decades. There are compelling 
theoretical reasons to focus on trends rather than extremes.
• Extremes are more likely to result in short-term displacement (followed by population return to affected 
areas) (Kälin 2010; Black and others 2011; Brzoska and Fröhlich 2015).
• Longer-term trends in crop yields or water availability are more likely to contribute to out-migration 
(Bohra-Mishra, Oppenheimer and Hsiang 2014; Nawrotzki and others 2017).
• The impact of successive climate shocks may erode household assets and therefore the ability to 
adapt locally, eventually affecting decisions to migrate (Warner and others 2012; IDMC 2016).
• Successive shocks over several years will affect the index values described below, because they 
represent more prolonged deviations from the mean. 
The analysis also considers sea level rise projections from the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, augmented 
by an increment for storm surges. The figures in Table 3.2 represent the lower-, middle-, and upper-bound 
sea level rise by 2030 and 2050, as reported by the IPCC (Church and others 2013) but do not take 
storm surge into account. According to Dasgupta and others (2007, 6), “Even a small increase in sea 
level can significantly magnify the impact of storm surges, which occur regularly and with devastating 
consequences in some coastal areas.” A comprehensive assessment of the likely levels of storm surge for 
all the coastal areas covered by this report was beyond the scope of this project. 
Two scenarios meant to be representative of changes in sea level by 2050 associated with RCP2.6 and 
RCP8.5 were adapted by adding an increment storm surge to account for storm surge on top of the estimates 
in Table 3.2. Under RCP2.6, the increment was 0.85–0.90 meters, for a total of one meter; under RCP8.5, 
the increment storm surge was 1.68–1.85 meters, for a total of two meters. These assumptions are applied 
to all coastlines for 2050; they represent the loss of habitable land as a result of sea level rise plus storm 
surge in each coastal grid cell. Both the one and two meter sea level rises are based on NASA Shuttle 
Radar Topography Mission data, as modified by the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN 2013). Although the addition of the increments is technically sound and based on past 
work (Dasgupta and others 2007; Hallegatte and others 2011), the one and two meter bands were chosen 
partly as an expedient (the global sea level rise layers were developed in earlier work) and partly because at 
the 14-kilometer modeling resolution, smaller sea level rise increments would have barely registered.
14. Water availability is influenced by rainfall and rising temperatures. Crop production is a function of rainfall, temperature, CO2 
concentrations, irrigation, and other management practices that are incorporated in the ISIMIP models.
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Table 3.2: Projected rise in sea level under low and high Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCP) (meters above current mean sea level)
RCP 2.6 RCP 8.5
Year Lower Middle Upper Lower Middle Upper
2030 0.092 0.127 0.161 0.098 0.132 0.166
2050 0.157 0.218 0.281 0.188 0.254 0.322
Source: Church and others (2013).
Note: Sea level rise was augmented with storm surge increments under RCP 2.6 (0.85-0.9m); and RCP 8.5 (1.68-1.85m).
Water and crop models used in the gravity model
Data on water availability and crop production were integrated into the gravity model using the following 
approach. The water sector model outputs represent river discharge, measured in cubic meters per 
second in daily/monthly time increments. The crop sector model outputs represent crop yield in tons per 
hectare on an annual time step at a 0.5° x 0.5° grid cell resolution. Crops include maize, wheat, rice, and 
soy beans; for regions with multiple cropping cycles, yield reflects only the major crop production period.15 
The data were converted to decadal average water availability and crop production (in tons) per grid cell.16 
An index was then calculated that compares those values with the 40-year average for water availability 
and crop production for 1970–2010: 
Index = (Davg - Bavg) / Bavg     (Equation 3.1)
where Davg is the decadal average crop production/water availability and Bavg is the baseline average crop 
production/water availability for the 40-year period 1970–2010. The indexes for water availability and 
crop production represent deviations from the long-term averages (0.2 indicates 20 percent above the 
baseline average; –0.6 indicates 60 percent below the baseline average). 
The ISIMIP models are based on different combinations of climate, crop, and water models. Applying 
the combinations—two global climate models driven by two different emissions scenarios, which in turn 
drive two sets of sectoral impact models (described below)—provides a range of plausible population 
projections. It also gives a sense of the level of agreement across scenarios. Because the population 
modeling process is time consuming and computationally intensive, it was important to work with 
a reduced set of ISIMIP inputs.17 The modeling employed the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global 
climate models, which drive combinations of the two water models and two crop models: the LPJmL water 
and crop models, the WaterGAP2 water model, and the GEPIC crop model (Table 3.3). Appendix A provides 
detailed information on model selection. 
The crop and water models were selected based on several criteria, including model performance over the 
historical period, diversity of model structure, diversity of signals of future change, and availability of both 
observationally driven historical (ISIMIP2a) and global climate model-driven historical and future (ISIMIP 
fast-track) simulations. Table 3.3 presents the combinations of models used.
For each of the three climate migration scenarios (Figure 1.2)—pessimistic reference, more inclusive 
development, and more climate-friendly model outputs were averaged to generate a mean or “ensemble.” 
Figure 3.3 shows how the four model results for the pessimistic reference scenario (SSP4-RCP8.5) were 
averaged to create an ensemble for Ethiopia. 
15. The ISIMIP models seek to assess the risk that climate change will affect the potential for agriculture in a given location. For this 
purpose, the relative changes in average yield potential are useful.
16. The models report “pure crop yields” in tons per hectare (that is, they assume that a given crop is grown everywhere, irrespective 
of growing conditions or the location where crops are actually grown). These yields were multiplied by observations-based growing 
areas (in 2005), separately for rainfed and irrigated yields, to obtain grid cell-level production (in metric tons) (Portmann, Siebert, 
and Döll, 2010).
17. Feeding all potential ISIMIP water and crop model outputs into the gravity model would have yielded 12,500 model runs: 2 RCPs 
* 5 GCMs * 25 crop model outputs * 50 water model outputs =12,500.
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Table 3.3: Matrix of climate, crop and water model combinations used in this report.
Crop simulation
Water simulation GCM1, LPJmL (crop) GCM1, GEPIC GCM2, LPJmL (crop) GCM2, GEPIC
HadGEM2-ES, LPJmL (water) Model 1
HadGEM2-ES, WaterGAP2 Model 2
IPSL-CM5A-LR, LPJmL (water) Model 3
IPSL-CM5A-LR, WaterGAP2 Model 4
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ISIMIP water and crop model results 
Climate impacts on water availability and crop production have important impacts on the population 
potential of locations in the gravity model. Appendix B presents the water and crop production indexes in 
the context of climate trends and projections for each of the regions. The climate impacts are an input to 
the gravity model; when combined with parameters derived from the development scenarios (the SSPs), 
they directly affect the population potential of regions within countries. Chapters 4 and 5 translate this 
information into regional and country-specific estimates of climate migration.
Population data
The population baseline used is the 2010 baseline in the Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network (CIESIN) Gridded Population of the World Version 4 (GPWv4) (CIESIN 2016) (Map 3.1). The gravity 
model was calibrated based on population change estimates for 1990-2000 from GPW version 3 (CIESIN 
and others 2005) and for 2000–10 from GPWv4. GPW versions 3 and 4 model the distribution of the 
population on a continuous global surface based on the highest spatial resolution census data available 
from the 2000 and 2010 rounds of censuses, respectively. In this work, population count grids were 
used that were adjusted to national-level estimates from the United Nations World Population Prospects 
reports. GPWv3 and v4 are gridded data products with output resolutions of 2.5 arc-minutes (a square 
approximately four kilometers on a side at the equator) and 30 arc-seconds (a square approximately one 
kilometer on a side at the equator), respectively. For model calibration and the baseline population for the 
future projections, the data were aggregated to 7.5 arc-minutes (a square approximately 14 kilometers on 
a side at the equator [i.e. grid cells with an area of 196 square kilometers]). Uncertainties about these 
data are discussed in Appendix A.
Map 3.1: Global population density, 2010 
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POPULATION MODELING METHODS
The modeling work is based on a modified version of the National Center for Atmospheric Research-CUNY 
Institute for Demographic Research (NCAR-CIDR) gravity model (Jones and O’Neill 2016).18 Technical 
details on the model specification are in Appendix A.19
The gravity model
The original NCAR-CIDR model is a gravity-based approach that downscales national population projections 
to subnational raster grids (Jones and O’Neil 2013, 2016) as a function of geographic, socioeconomic, 
and demographic characteristics of the landscape and existing population distribution. Gravity-type 
approaches are commonly used in geographic models of spatial allocation and accessibility. They take 
advantage of spatial regularities in the relationship between population agglomeration and spatial 
patterns of population change. These relationships can be described as a function of the characteristics 
known to correlate with spatial patterns of population change. 
The NCAR-CIDR model uses a modified form of population potential, a distance-weighted measure of the 
population taken at any point in space that represents the relative accessibility of that point. For example, higher 
values indicate a point more easily accessible by a larger number of people. Summed over all points within an 
area, population potential represents an index of the relative influence that the population at a point within a 
region exerts on each point within that region, and can be considered an indicator of the potential for interaction 
between the population at a given point in space and all other populations (Rich 1980). This potential will be 
higher at points closer to large populations; potential is thus also an indicator of the relative proximity of the 
existing population to each point within an area (Warntz and Wolff 1971). Such metrics are often used as a 
proxy for attractiveness, under the assumption that agglomeration is indicative of the various socioeconomic, 
geographic, political, and physical characteristics that make a place attractive. 
Adding climate impacts
The calculation of potential was modified by adding local characteristics, including climate impacts. Figure 
3.4 is a flowchart of the modeling steps; boxes in red show the addition of climate impacts or results 
incorporating climate impacts. Population potential is a relative measure of agglomeration, indicating the 
degree to which amenities and services are available. In the original model, this value shifts over time as 
a function of the population; of assumptions regarding spatial development patterns (for example, sprawl 
versus concentration); and of certain geographic characteristics of the landscape. 
Beginning with the 2010 gridded urban/rural population distribution for each country, the modeling done for 
this report incorporated the influence of climate impacts on relative attractiveness in the following manner:
a. Calculate an urban population potential surface (a distribution of values reflecting the relative attractiveness 
of each grid cell).
b. Calculate a rural population potential surface.
c. Allocate projected urban population change to grid cells proportionally based on their urban potentials.
d. Allocate changes in the projected rural population to grid cells proportionally based on their rural 
potential.
e. Because the allocation procedure can lead to some redefinition of population from rural to urban (for 
example, rural population allocated to a cell with an entirely urban population is redefined as urban), 
this step entails redefining population as urban or rural as a function of density and contiguity of fully 
urban or rural cells to match projected national level totals. 
18. Data for the original SSP-only population projections are available for download via the NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications 
Center (SEDAC) at https://doi.org/10.7927/H4RF5S0P. These projections are produced using a baseline 2010 population of 
GPWv3 rather than GPWv4, as used here.
19. Climate and social scientists conducted a technical review of the modeling approach in March 2017. A number of useful suggestions 
were incorporated. 
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart of modeling steps
Note: Boxes in red represent the addition of climate impacts into the modeling framework or results that reflect climate impacts.
* The counterfactual population projection simply scales the population distribution in 2010 to country-level population totals appropriate to each SSP. 
** The SSP-only population projection represents the population projection without climate impacts (i.e., based only on the development trajectories embodied 
in the SSPs). 
These steps are then repeated for each decadal time interval. Figure 3.5 illustrate steps “c” and “d” for a 
hypothetical population distribution. Note that population potential surfaces, urban and rural, are continuous 
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Figure 3.5: Hypothetical example of the gravity-based population projection model for a single time step
Based on the modified NCAR-CIDR population potential (vi) is calculated as a parametrized negative exponential function:
Where:
Ai = Local characteristics
li = Spatial mask
a = Population parameter etc.
P = Population








Distribution Population Potential 
Surface (influenced by 
local characteristics, 
including climate change 
- see Figure 3.4)
New Population Distribution
(Equation 3.2)
It is weighted by a spatial mask20 (l) that prevents population from being allocated to areas that are 
protected from development or unsuitable for human habitation, including areas that will likely be affected 
by sea level rise between 2010 and 2050. Pj is the population of grid cell j; d is the distance between two 
grid cells. The distance and population parameters (α and ß) are estimated from observed patterns of 
historical population change. The ß parameter is indicative of the shape of the distance–density gradient 
describing the broad pattern of the population distribution (for example, sprawl versus concentration). 
The α parameter captures returns on agglomeration externality, interpreted as an indicator of the 
socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics that make a place more or less attractive. 
20. Spatial masks are used in geospatial processing to exclude areas from consideration. The effect is that the algorithm is not applied 
in these areas. Examples in this instance would include protected areas or places where the terrain is too rugged to inhabit.
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The SSPs include no climate impacts on aggregate total population, urbanization, or the subnational spatial 
distribution of the population. The NCAR-CIDR approach was modified by incorporating additional spatial 
data in the form of the ISIMIP sectoral impacts likely to affect population outcomes. The index Aj is a weight 
on population potential that is calibrated to represent the influence of the crop and water sectoral impact 
indicators on spatial patterns of population change. The ISIMIP data, which represent decadal deviation 
from long-term baseline conditions, are incorporated into the model as gridded spatial layers. The value Aj 
is calculated as a function of these indicators; it represents an adjustment to the relative attractiveness 
of (or aversion to) specific locations (grid cells), reflecting current water availability and crop yields relative 
to “normal” conditions. The model is calibrated over two decadal periods (1990–2000 and 2000-10) 
of observed population change relative to deviations of water availability and crop production from the 
1970–2010 average for a subset of representative countries in each region.21 For the three focus regions, 
the countries include Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania for East Africa; Mexico for Mexico and Central 
America; and Bangladesh and India for South Asia. For the additional regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America, the countries include Guinea and Mauritania for West Africa, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo for Central Africa, and Botswana for Southern Africa as well as Argentina and Brazil for South America. 
Details on the modeling methodology, including the methods used for calibration, are in Appendix A.2. 
Proposals for additional model enhancements in the future are in Appendix A.3. Summary methods for 
data visualization are in Section 4.2, with details in Appendix A.4.
Characterizing the model
This modeling provides transparent, spatially explicit estimates of changes in the population distribution 
(and indirectly migration) as a function of climate and development trends. It is important to understand 
what the model does and does not do. 
Gravity models can be used to model past evolutions of population distributions based on observed 
agglomeration effects over large geographic regions, under varying conditions, and at alternative spatial 
scales. They can also be refined to incorporate additional details, such as environmental parameters that 
affect the relative attractiveness of locations. 
Gravity models do not directly model internal migration. Instead, deviations between the population 
distributions in model runs that include the crop and water impacts and the development-only (also referred 
to as the SSP or “no climate impact”) model runs are assumed to be driven primarily by differences in 
climate change–induced internal migration. Migration is a “fast” demographic variable compared with 
fertility and mortality; it is responsible for much of the decadal-scale redistributions of population. Without 
significant variation in fertility and mortality rates between climate-migrant populations and nonmigrant 
populations, it is fair to assume that differential population change between the climate impact scenarios 
and the development-only scenarios occur as a function of migration. Another way of saying this is that the 
model assumes that fertility and mortality rates are relatively consistent across populations in a locale. 
21.  Accurate spatial data from censuses on the location of populations or the change in population over time are not available for 
most low and middle income countries before 1990.
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For each climate migration scenario, the model produces a range of estimates that reflect variation in 
the underlying inputs to the model, which in turn reflect scientific uncertainty over likely future climate 
projections and impacts and development trajectories. In any scenario, outcomes are a function of the 
global climate models and the sectoral impact models that drive climate impacts on population change. 
For each of the three scenarios, there are four models, consisting of different global climate models and 
ISIMIP combinations. The ensemble mean (or average) of the four models is reported as the primary result 
for each scenario. Uncertainty is reflected in the range of outcomes (across the four models) for each grid 
cell and at different levels of aggregation. While some may prefer to have just one figure, in a complex 
issue like climate-related migration, a scenario-based approach is preferable. It would be desirable to 
have even more scenarios, to better assess the uncertainty (or conversely confidence) in the results (Box 
3.1). However, for the reasons noted above, time and resource constraints prevented more than four 
realizations for the model per climate-development combination.
Box 3.1: Sources of uncertainty in modeling climate migration 
The climate migration modeling results incorporate six main sources of uncertainty that can affect the estimated number of 
climate migrants or the differences between the three scenarios and the development-only scenario. 
1. ISIMIP impacts vary across models. In Central America, for example, the combined LPJmL water and crop models have 
generally lower impacts than the WaterGAP-GEPIC combination of water and crop models, though these differences vary 
across the region. The differences result in different effects in the gravity model; models with the highest impacts repel more 
people from affected areas in the former set of outputs than in the latter set. 
2. Variations between the two global climate models—HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR—can amplify the ISIMIP differences. 
The global climate models were selected in part because their future precipitation trends differ substantially in magnitude, 
and partly even in sign, for the focus regions (see Appendix A). This variance in precipitation has an impact on both the water 
and crop models.
3. The modeling has a temporal component that can influence population distribution trajectories. Stronger sectoral impacts 
early in the 40-year projection period will have greater influence than the same impacts later in that period, because those 
early impacts affect the gravitational pull of locations, creating “temporal” momentum over which later climate impacts 
may have less influence. Similarly, the timing of population change (growth or decline) projected by the SSPs relative to the 
development of sectoral impacts can influence outcomes. For example, for most countries in the study, projected population 
growth is greatest during the first decade; if conditions are also predicted to deteriorate severely during that period, the 
impact on migration will be greater than if the deterioration took place during a more demographically stable period.
4. If the SSP-only model finds that a place is relatively attractive and the sectoral climate impacts are positive or neutral 
(relative to other areas that see negative impacts), it will have the effect of reinforcing the attractiveness of that area. 
Conversely, in remote areas experiencing population decline and negative climate impacts, “push” factors will be reinforced. 
This phenomenon creates spatial momentum.
5. Model parameterization affects the results. The model was calibrated using actual population changes in association with 
actual climate impacts (represented by ISIMIP model outputs) for two periods, 1990–2000 and 2000–10. This calibration 
was done using the two separate sets of model combinations: the LPJmL water and crop models and the WaterGAP water and 
GEPIC crop models. Different parameters correspond to the different models. If the parameter estimates are close together 
across the different crop or water models, there will be less variation in the population distribution projected by each model; 
the uncertainty around the ensemble mean (measured using the coefficient of variation) will therefore be lower. Conversely, if 
parameter estimates are not close together, there will be greater uncertainty around the ensemble mean. 
6. Countries within regions are at different stages of economic development, which can have a significant impact on the 
population totals by 2050 for the two groups. 
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This “top-down” model shows the results of household-level decisions that influence migration (de 
Sherbinin and others 2008), but it does not build directly on the evidence (or data) from microlevel studies. 
It considers such factors only at an aggregate level. In an effort to connect this work to household-level 
migration research, Chapter 5 provides case study narratives for Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico—three 
countries on which there is a rich body of literature on household-level decision making and environmental 
migration. Those illustrative country examples situate, and to some degree validate, this work in the 
context on the household dimension.
The model is run at spatial and temporal scales that capture migration well. With grid cells of about 14 
square kilometers at the equator, population shift can be considered a form of short-distance migration. 
The temporal scale of decadal increments from 2010–50 is adequate to capture the longer-term shifts 
in population caused by slow-onset changes in water availability, crop conditions, and sea level rise. The 
model does not capture movements over shorter time periods.
This period represents a meaningful planning horizon, especially when considering the social dimension 
of migration. Chapter 4 considers water and agriculture sector impacts beyond 2050 by examining ISIMIP 
outputs for 2050–2100. They suggest that, if anything, the climate signal will become far stronger toward 
the end of the 21st century.
The model cannot forecast all future adaptation efforts or conflict, cultural, political, institutional, or technological 
changes. Discontinuities are likely to arise as a result of political events and upheavals that can heavily influence 
migration behavior. Armed conflict itself may have links to climate variability and change (Box 2.4), but models 
have generally failed to forecast armed conflict or state failure with any precision. The scenario framework 
is not designed to predict shocks to any socioeconomic or political system, such as war or market collapse. 
The models also cannot anticipate new technologies that may dramatically affect adaptation efforts to the 
degree that climate impacts become negligible. The SSPs, as well as output from the global climate model and 
ISIMIP, reflect plausible futures that span a wide range of global trajectories, with the caveat that extremely 
unpredictable or unprecedented events are explicitly excluded. 
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Chapter 4
This chapter presents modeling results across three regions—Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, and Latin America. As per the approach used in this report, modeling 
of climate induced shifts in population distribution is applied at a country level, 
and results are then aggregated at the broader regional level. The chapter starts 
by presenting a more in-depth analysis for the three focus subregions—East Africa, 
South Asia (in its entirety), and Mexico and Central America—which have contrasting 
climatic, livelihood, demographic, migration, and development patterns. Results 
underscore the potential for an increase in the number of climate migrants through 
2050. Results are then aggregated at the regional level for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America. For Sub-Saharan Africa, this includes results from the East, West, 
Central, and Southern Africa subregions. For Latin America, this includes aggregated 
results for Mexico and Central America, and South America. The emergence of climate 
in-migration and out-migration hotspots in each of the subregions through to 2050 
are also discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how climate impact 
trends will evolve beyond 2050 and what this means for the potential intensification 
of climate migration levels. In Chapter 5, these results are further contextualized 
for deeper narrative through illustrative country examples from the three regions—
Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico. 
The results underscore the potential for upward trends in the number of climate migrants through 2050, 
with an emergence of climate migration hotspots across the landscape. The geographic distribution of 
climate in- and out-migration hotspots will vary widely across the three subregions. Many in-migration 
hotspots are in cooler highland areas that will become even more densely populated. Out-migration of 
varying degrees is projected from coastal zones (defined as areas within 10 kilometers of the coast) in 
all three subregions. Mexico and Central America will see the largest proportion of migration from coastal 
areas and South Asia the lowest, though the absolute numbers are higher in South Asia than in the other 
two subregions. East Africa, and Mexico and Central America, will see climate out-migration from rainfed 
cropping areas, indicating that climate impacts on crop productivity in these subregions may potentially 
disproportionately affect farming households.
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Climate migration trends are likely to become more intense in the second half of the century, when climate 
impacts become more prominent. For some subregions, particularly Mexico and Central America, but also 
India under certain models, negative deviations from baseline conditions become much more marked. 
Given the sensitivity of population shifts to climate impacts in the historical period (used to calibrate the 
model) and through 2050, it is highly likely that climate migration numbers will go up dramatically after 
2050 unless significant mitigation and adaptation efforts are put in place.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBREGIONS
East Africa
Much of East Africa is semi-arid, with large swaths of grasslands, shrublands, and savannahs. The region 
has patches of flooded grasslands and savannahs. In the more humid highlands (of, for example, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Uganda) and along a coastal belt, tropical broadleaf forests dominate 
(Olson and others 2001). The nonarable shrublands are generally thinly settled, although countries in 
the subregion have reasonably high fertility rates (and by extension, population growth rates) as shown 
in Table 4.1. The urban share of the population is also relatively low, though like much of the developing 
world, it is rapidly urbanizing. Except for Kenya and Zambia, the rest of the countries in the subregion are 
in the lowest human development category (UNDP 2016). Map 4.1 shows the political boundaries and 
elevation in East Africa.
Table 4.1: Demographic indicators and projected population in 2050 by subregion under the 










Projected population in 
2050 (millions)
SSP4 SSP2
East Africa 422 4.7 27 786 675
West Africa 371 5.3 46 792 678
Central Africa 163 5.9 44 391 349
Southern Africa 65 2.5 62 66 73
South Asia 1,885 2.4 35 2,290 2,373
Mexico and 
Central America
177 2.3 74 204 211
South America 423 1.9 83 461 491
Source: The first three columns are from Population Reference Bureau (PRB 2017); the last two columns are based on Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs).
Note: SSP2 = moderate development and SSP4 = unequal development (Jiang 2013). 
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Map 4.1: Political boundaries and elevation in East Africa 
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South Asia
With a population of 1.9 billion people in 2017, South Asia has a high population density, with 855 people 
per square kilometer of arable land (PRB 2017). Population in South Asia will increase to about 2.3 billion 
by 2050 (Table 4.1).
The subregion’s climate is characterized by annual monsoon rains, which typically arrive in May and June. 
It has a wide diversity of climate and vegetation zones. Bangladesh and the eastern portions of India are 
tropical humid. The climate is drier to the south and in the west of India, which features dry broadleaf 
forests in the southern highlands. Much of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the northwestern areas of India are 
semi-arid to arid, with deserts and scrublands. The Himalayan region features cooler climates at altitude, 
with high montane grasslands and coniferous forests. Lower elevations have broadleaf and mixed forests. 
Map 4.2 shows the political boundaries and elevation in South Asia. 
South Asian countries are in the middle human development category except for Afghanistan, the 
subregion’s poorest country (UNDP 2016). Fertility rates in the subregion have fallen in the past 20 years 
and now stand slightly above replacement. 
Map 4.2: Political boundaries and elevation in South Asia

































































77Climate Migration Projections for Regions and Subregions of Focus 
Mexico and Central America 
The subregion comprising Mexico and Central America is mountainous, with a spine of mountains running 
from Panama in the south to the central plateau of Mexico, bracketed by mountain chains to the east 
and west in the north. To the east of the mountains are moist tropical broadleaf forests, the presence 
of which indicate higher rainfall; to the west are patches of dry broadleaf and coniferous forests. A dry 
corridor extends from the southeastern corner of Guatemala through much of El Salvador and southern 
Honduras. In the southernmost countries—Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua—the climate is humid 
and the dominant biome is moist tropical broadleaf forests. In central and northern Mexico, the climate 
becomes progressively drier, with deserts and dry shrublands in parts of the central plateau and across 
the border with the United States. Map 4.3 shows the political boundaries and elevation in Mexico and 
Central America.
Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama have high human development indicators; the remaining countries 
are in the medium category (UNDP 2016). Fertility rates (and therefore population growth rates) are lower 
in this subregion. The population in this subregion will increase from 177 million in 2017 to over 200 
million by 2050 (Table 4.1). Guatemala has the subregion’s highest total fertility rate, at 2.9 births per 
woman (PRB 2017). Nearly three-quarters of the subregion’s population live in urban areas. 
Map 4.3: Political boundaries and elevation in Mexico and Central America
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Shared characteristics 
All three subregions have areas of water scarcity and large shares of population that depend on agriculture, 
although there are country-specific variations. Large areas of South Asia (excluding Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Bhutan) and Mexico have high to extremely high baseline water stress (WRI 2013).22 South Asia has 
the largest proportion of arable land under irrigation (FAO 2011). Some of this water comes from rivers, 
but in northwestern India much irrigation depends on subterranean aquifers, and the water table has 
fallen substantially (Tiwari and others 2009). Water resources are less of a constraint in East Africa. They 
remain largely undeveloped there, but some areas are prone to periodic severe droughts. 
Dependency on agriculture—especially rainfed agriculture—is high in all three subregions. Data on 
agricultural employment for East Africa are incomplete, but the share of people employed in agriculture 
appears to be above 60 percent in Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; about 70 percent in Rwanda 
and Uganda; and 73 percent in Ethiopia (ILO 2017). In South Asia, about half the labor force works 
in agriculture. The rate is lower (about 15 percent) in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Mexico and 
Central America the proportion ranges from 13 percent in Mexico to more than 30 percent in Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua. In comparison, the rate in high-income countries is about three percent. These 
high rates suggest a high degree of sensitivity to climate variability and change. 
METRICS USED FOR DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION 
Each of the three plausible climate migration scenarios—pessimistic reference, more inclusive 
development, and more climate-friendly—was compared with a no climate change impact population 
distribution scenario to generate estimates of climate migration.23 Areas where population numbers 
exceeded the no climate impact scenario were assumed to have grown as a result of in-migration; areas 
where numbers are lower than the no climate impact scenario are assumed to have experienced slower 
rates of growth (or lost population) as a result of out-migration.
Four types of results are presented for each subregion: 
• The total number of climate change–induced internal migrants (“climate migrants”) under the three 
scenarios.
• The number of internal climate migrants as a share of the number of total internal migrants.
• Maps of hotspots of climate in- and out-migration24. 
• Net in- and out-migration for three types of zones (rural livelihood zones, coastal zones, and urban 
areas) within subregions and trends in population projections under different scenarios. 
22. Baseline water stress measures the ratio of total annual water withdrawals to total available annual renewable supply, accounting 
for upstream consumptive use. Higher values indicate more competition among users.
23. Chapter 3 describes the modeling methods, data inputs, and resulting scenarios. Appendix A describes the data visualization 
methodology used.
24. The report provides spatial estimates of where people could come from and go to within a country and identifies climate in-migration 
“hotspots” (areas of particularly high in-migration as a result of climate change) and climate out-migration “hotspots” (areas of 
particularly high out-migration as a result of climate change, although the overall population in these areas still tends to grow).
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PROJECTIONS FOR EAST AFRICA
Results for this subregion suggest the following:
• The subregion could see an average of 10.1 million climate migrants by 2050 under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, with numbers steadily increasing from 2.6 million in 2020. The share of climate 
migrants in the population is projected to rise from 0.6 percent to 1.3 percent in the same period. 
• The more climate-friendly scenario has lower numbers of climate migrants. Under this scenario, the 
number of climate migrants rises from 1.8 million in 2020 to 6.9 million in 2050.
• The share of climate migrants in other internal migrants will increase across the scenarios albeit at a 
slower pace. The largest shares occur in the pessimistic reference scenario.
• The Lake Victoria Basin will be an in-migration hotspot, as will the eastern highlands of Ethiopia and 
the area around Lilongwe, the capital of Malawi. 
• Out-migration climate hotspots include coastal regions of Kenya and Tanzania, western Uganda, and 
parts of the northern highlands of Ethiopia.
• Rainfed croplands are likely to see declines in populations as a result of out-migration. In contrast, 
pastoral and rangeland areas will see dramatic increases due to more favorable climate conditions.
• Population growth under both the moderate (SSP2) and unequal (SSP4) development pathways will be 
rapid across the subregion, creating challenges for development that will be magnified by the future 
impacts of climate change. 
East Africa’s population in 2017 was 422 million (PRB 2017). It is projected to increase rapidly to 
675 million under SSP2 (a moderate development pathway) and 786 million under SSP4 (an unequal 
development pathway) by 2050 (Figure 4.1).25 These SSPs are used to derive the development-only or no 
climate impact scenarios.























Figure 4.1: Projected population in East Africa under two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), 2020–50 
Source: Jones and O’Neill (2016).
Note: SSP2 = moderate development and SSP4 = unequal development. 
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Climate trends
East Africa comprises four main climatic regions: the Horn, highland, coastal, and southern regions. 
In the Horn, the climate is semi-arid to arid, with rainfall during the June–October monsoon season. 
Temperatures have risen and monsoonal precipitation has declined throughout much of the Horn over 
the past 60 years (Niang and others 2014), rendering this region hotter and drier. In the highlands (Great 
Lakes) region, temperatures tend to be more moderate, with limited seasonal variation. Rainfall has a 
bimodal distribution, with peaks in March–May and October–December; the climate is humid to sub-
humid. The coastal region has the same bimodal distribution but is characterized mostly by a semi-arid 
climate. The southern portions of East Africa have experienced a significant increase in temperature since 
the beginning of the early 1980s (Anyah and Qiu 2012), but rainfall increases over the past century are 
deemed “very likely” (Niang and others 2014). 
The Horn has been beset by frequent droughts in recent years. There is considerable uncertainty in 
climate projections for the Horn and the rest of coastal East Africa, largely because of the limited ability of 
global climate models to capture the effect of sea surface temperature gradients (Yang and others 2015). 
Models predict this area to get wetter, but evidence shows that it has gotten drier over the past century 
(Williams and Funk 2011). The southern parts of East Africa are likely to get drier, in part because of 
increased temperature trends (Christensen and others 2014). There is medium confidence in projections 
showing reduced precipitation in the austral winter in this region. Overall, given projected increases in 
temperature in East Africa, even modest increases in rainfall are likely to be offset by increases in potential 
evapotranspiration, rendering much of the region hotter and drier (World Bank 2013).
Except in the highlands, interannual and intra annual variability in rainfall is marked throughout East 
Africa. This variability puts stress on livelihood systems, ranging from pastoralism in the northern portions 
to subsistence farming and domestic livestock-keeping in the rest of the region. Rising temperatures 
and extremes are also putting stress on water availability and cropping systems. Climate variability, and 
particularly drought in dryland areas, has been a common driver of migration in the region (Morrissey 
2014). Cottier (2017) finds a curvilinear relationship between precipitation and rural to urban migration 
across a large sample of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with higher than normal levels of migration for 
extreme floods and extreme droughts. 
Seasonal and circular patterns of migration take advantage of different climate zones, including across 
national borders (Morrissey 2014). The East African Community protocol on the common market and 
the relaxation of visa restrictions by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have 
facilitated transboundary movements (Morrissey 2014). Rapid population growth in the region has 
contributed not only to land fragmentation, which has spurred rural to urban migration, but also to rapid 
urbanization through natural increase. The region also has had a history of internal displacement and 
refugee flows, as a result of conflict and major droughts (IOM 2015).
Projected numbers of climate migrants 
The number of climate migrants is projected to increase from 1.9–2.7 million (0.4–0.7 percent of the 
population) in 2020 to 6.9–10.1 million (0.9–1.4 percent of the population) by the middle of the century 
across scenario averages. 
The largest numbers are under the pessimistic reference scenario, followed by the more inclusive 
development scenario, and the lowest numbers are under the more climate-friendly scenario (Figure 4.2). 
The projected increase under the pessimistic reference scenario is from 2.6 million in 2020 to 10.1 
million by 2050 (1.3 percent of the population) on average. The number of climate migrants under the 
more inclusive development and more climate-friendly scenarios are slightly lower, but comparable at 
9.2 million (1.4 percent of the population) and 6.9 million (0.9 percent of the population), on average by 
2050, respectively.
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Numbers of other internal migrants grow from about 15.3 million in 2020 to 57.3 million in 2050 across 
scenario averages (Figure 4.3). Climate migrants as a share of all internal migrants will also increase across 
scenarios albeit at a slower pace. The largest shares occur in the pessimistic reference scenario. The shares 
under the more inclusive development and more climate-friendly scenarios are lower but comparable. 
Figure 4.2: Projected numbers of internal climate migrants in East Africa under three scenarios, 2020–50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are in 
part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes. 
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Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.62 0.87 1.04 1.28 0.67 0.95 1.18 1.37 0.44 0.67 0.77 0.87
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
Photo Credit: W
orld Bank
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Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
East Africa’s population is projected to rise steeply by 2050, from 422 million to 676 million (in SSP2) or 
786 million (in SSP4), increasing population densities across most of the subregion (Figure 4.4). Figure 
4.5 displays the change between the baseline 2010 population density and the 2050 population density 
projection for the pessimistic reference scenario, in terms of both the absolute change and the percentage 
change. Areas with small population baselines tend to have higher percentage changes. 
The increases in population density will exert immense pressure on natural resources and institutions. Even 
in areas of climate out-migration, the population will grow in absolute terms, albeit more slowly than it would 
without climate change impacts. Comparing shifts in population density under the climate impact scenarios 
with the no climate impact scenario reveals the climate in- and climate out-migration hotspots (Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.3: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in East Africa under three scenarios, 
2020-50
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are no 
confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
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Figure 4.4: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, East Africa
Figure 4.5: Absolute and percentage change in population density in East Africa under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, 2010-50
Note: The results for Zimbabwe differ strikingly from the results for the rest of the subregion, because Zimbabwe had a population of only about 12 million in 
2010 and has a projected population increase that is lower compared to other East African countries (11.5 million under the SSP4 scenario by 2050). 
b. 2050a. 2010
a. Change in population density b. Percentage change in population density
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By 2030 climate migration hotspots begin to emerge, and by 2050 these begin to spread and intensify 
all over the region (Figure 4.6). Climate out-migration hotspots, which reflects convergence of at least 
two of the three scenarios, include northern parts of the Ethiopian highlands; parts of western Uganda, 
southern Rwanda, and southern Malawi; and coastal stretches of Kenya and Tanzania. These hotspots 
reflect deteriorating water availability and crop yields in out-migration areas. In the coastal zone, declining 
land availability, reflecting sea level rise and storm surges, is also a factor.
Climate in-migration hotspots are largely in the southeastern highlands of Ethiopia, the Lake Victoria 
basin, and the region near Lilongwe, Malawi, as well as isolated pockets of other countries. The change in 
population density highlights strong changes, generally in excess of 100 people per square kilometer. The 
increases in the highland areas are driven by relatively favorable climate conditions with lesser impacts of 
climate change relative to coastal areas. These areas already have very high population densities.
These projections do not take into account the current carrying capacity of agricultural lands in the 
highlands.26 If the model placed limits to growth in already heavily populated rural subsistence agriculture 
regions, it is likely that migrants would be pushed elsewhere, perhaps to cities.
26. They also ignore technological advances or adaptation responses that might make these regions better able to sustain large 
populations.
Figure 4.6: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in East 
Africa, 2030 and 2050
 b. 2050a. 2030
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution, which in 
East Africa represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 4.2 to 4.8 people per square kilometer, depending on the scenario. For decreased 
population density, it is about minus 3.6 to minus 5.5 people per square kilometer.
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
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Figure 4.7: Livelihood zones in East Africa, by anthropogenic biome, 2015
Many of the climate in- and out-migration hotspots in 2050 run along national borders, especially around 
Lake Victoria. Although the model does not explicitly include cross-border movements as a result of climate 
change impacts (only the continuance of transboundary movements based on historical precedent), 
climate change could amplify or inhibit cross-border movements depending on the contexts that propel 
individuals to decide to move.
Trends in livelihood zones
The distribution of livelihood zones in accordance with anthropogenic biomes is presented in Figure 4.7 
for the baseline year of 2015. Significant out-migration from rainfed croplands is projected under all three 
climate impact scenarios (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).27 It ranges from more than 300,000 by 2050 under 
the two high emissions scenarios (pessimistic reference and more inclusive development) to more than 
500,000 under the more climate-friendly scenario. Under all scenarios, pastoral and rangeland areas, as 
well as semi-natural and wildland areas, see potential in-migration, induced by generally improved water 
availability in those areas.28
27. Given the large number of livelihood zones, the focus here is on the central tendency rather than the spread (as represented by 
the confidence intervals). 
28. There is considerable uncertainty about rainfall projections in many parts of East Africa, but these generally point to wetter 
conditions, with the exception of the southern region comprising Zimbabwe, Zambia and southern Madagascar, which is likely to 
become drier. See Appendix B.
Source: Ellis and others (2010).
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Trends in coastal zones
The number of people living in coastal zones is expected to decrease as a result of climate change, with 
the highest levels of out-migration (150,000–750,000 people) under the pessimistic reference and more 
inclusive development scenarios, which are based on the high emissions pathway (Figure 4.9). The high 
emissions pathway, RCP8.5, is projected to result in combined sea level rise and storm surge of two 
meters, against one meter under RCP2.6 on which the more climate-friendly scenario is based (for details 
on sea level rise, see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3). This outcome reflects the combined impacts of sea level 
rise and declining water availability in large swaths of coastal Kenya and Tanzania. On average, the more 
climate-friendly scenario sees no strong in- or out-migration, but the spread is wide, from –200,000 to 
+200,000 people. 
Figure 4.8: Projected net climate migration in and out of livelihood zones in East Africa under three scenarios, 
2020–50
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Trends in urban areas
Given high population growth across East Africa, the spatial extent of urban areas will grow substantially in all 
three scenarios by 2050 (Figure 4.10), mainly in the more temperate highlands. This sprawl may constitute 
high-density areas that are functionally rural, whereas in other cases it will represent an extension of the 
urban fabric. The urban population is projected to roughly quadruple, from 100 million in 2010 to 350 million 
in 2050 under the more inclusive development scenario and to more than 450 million under the pessimistic 
reference and more climate-friendly scenarios. Urban populations will increase to more than 50 percent 
across scenarios, up from the current average of 27 percent. Under all three scenarios, cities in East Africa 
will potentially face significant challenges because of this population growth, even before climate change is 
taken into account.
Urban areas of East Africa are likely to see increases in populations as a result of climate change impacts. 
More people are driven to cities under the climate impact scenarios than under the no climate impact 
scenarios (Figure 4.11), with the largest increases under the high emissions pathway (pessimistic 
reference and more inclusive development scenarios), with roughly 750,000 additional people by 2050. 
However, the extra 750,000 figure equates to only 0.16 percent of East Africa’s total urban population 
of more than 450 million people by 2050. Under the more climate-friendly scenario, the projection is for 
300,000 additional people.
Figure 4.9: Projected net climate migration in and out of coastal zones in East Africa under three scenarios, 
2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are 
in part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes.
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Figure 4.10: Baseline and projected population density in urban areas of East Africa, 2010 and 2050 
Note: An “urban” area is an area with density of at least 300 people per square kilometer. The map for 2050 shows all areas in which any one of the three 
scenarios has populations of such density. It thus represents plausible urbanization outcomes rather than its most likely spread.
a. 2010 a. 2050
Figure 4.11: Projected net climate migration in and out of urban areas in East Africa under three scenarios, 
2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are in 
part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes.
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PROJECTIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA
The results for this subregion suggest the following:
• South Asia could see an average of 35.7 million climate migrants by 2050 under the pessimistic 
reference scenario. The share of climate migrants in the population is projected to rise from about 1 
percent in 2020 to 1.6 percent in 2050 under this scenario.
• The more climate-friendly scenario results in lowest numbers of climate migrants, ranging from 11.4 to 
22.4 million people, or 0.5 to 1 percent of the total population. 
• By 2050, climate migrants make up about 23 percent of all internal migrants under the pessimistic 
reference scenario. 
• The southern Indian highlands, especially between Bangalore and Chennai will be climate in-migration 
hotspots. Parts of Nepal, as well as northwestern India, also see climate in-migration.
• Climate out-migration hotspots include eastern and northern Bangladesh, the northern part of the 
Gangetic Plain, and the corridor from Delhi to Lahore. Climate out-migration will also occur from coastal 
metropolitan areas such as Mumbai, Dhaka, and Chennai as a result of sea level rise and storm surge 
impacts. 
• Irrigated areas and rice-growing areas are likely to see population dampening as a result of out-
migration. In contrast, rainfed cropping areas are likely to see population increases. 
The South Asia population will increase from 1.9 billion in 2017 to about 2.3 billion inhabitants by 2050 
under both the unequal (SSP4) and moderate (SSP2) development pathways. Most countries in South 
Asia (except Nepal and Afghanistan) fall in the middle-income category. Population projections for middle-
income countries are slightly higher under SSP2 than under SSP4 (Figure 4.12), under which population 
growth for these countries is low.29 
29. Under SSP4 population growth is particularly high in low income countries (LICs), but low in middle income countries (MICs) (see 
Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3). But under SSP2, population growth is moderate in MICs, meaning that for most of South Asia, there is 
slightly higher population growth under the more inclusive development scenario. 
Figure 4.12: Projected population of South Asia under two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, 2020-50
Source: Jones and O’Neill (2016). 
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Climate trends
The summer monsoon is the predominant feature of the climate system in South Asia. Depending on the 
location, the monsoon extends from April through December, with lower latitudes experiencing earlier 
onset and a later end. In Delhi the onset is in June and peak rains end in September. The region saw 
increasing annual mean temperature trends during the 20th century (Hijioka and others 2014). Changes 
in the summer monsoon dominate annual rainfall (Christensen and others 2014). Seasonal mean rainfall 
shows interdecadal variability, noticeably a declining trend with more frequent below-normal monsoons 
(Hijioka and others 2014). The proportion of rainfall coming in heavy rainfall events is increasing.
There is medium confidence in an increase in summer monsoon precipitation in South Asia (Christensen 
and others 2014). Projections indicate that more rainfall will be very likely at higher latitudes of South Asia 
by the mid-21st century under the RCP8.5 scenario. Under the RCP2.6 scenario, more rainfall at higher 
latitudes is likely by midcentury; substantial changes in rainfall patterns are not likely at low latitudes. In 
addition to these long-term average trends, rainfall variability both within the rainy season and between 
years is projected to increase in the South Asian monsoon region (Menon and others 2013a, 2013b), 
consistent with observational evidence (Singh and others 2014). 
The high dependency on rainfed agriculture makes the population of South Asia particularly sensitive to climate 
variability and change. Projections suggest that South Asia will have the largest numbers of food-insecure 
people by the middle of the century (Hijioka and others 2014). Significant levels of rural to urban migration 
can be attributed to the impacts of droughts and floods on agricultural production (Hugo and Bardsley 2014). 
From 2005 to 2010 about 8.5 million people migrated out of South Asia to other regions. More than half of 
them (4.6 million) travel to the Persian Gulf, a destination for largely unskilled migrants (Abel and Sander 
2014). Another 2.9 million more highly skilled migrants travel to Europe and North America. 
As large as these international flows are, internal migration is still the main form of migration in South Asia 
(ADB 2012). Although urbanization remains relatively low, there is increasing temporary, circular migration 
between rural and urban areas. Dyson and others (2005) show that the low level of urbanization in India 
is misleading, because many people in rural areas depend on family members who work in urban areas. 
Projected numbers of climate migrants 
Changes in population distribution in South Asia have historically been a story of continued densification 
in a subregion with already very high densities (World Bank 2017c). The fastest growth has been along 
the Indus River and on the Gangetic Plain. Major urban areas such as Delhi, Dhaka, Lahore, and Karachi 
have seen particularly rapid growth, fueled by migrants from rural areas. 
The subregion experiences natural disasters such as glacial-lake outburst floods, storm surges, droughts, 
cyclones, and heavy precipitation (IOM 2017). These disasters displace hundreds of thousands of people 
every year, regularly making India one of the countries with the largest numbers of people displaced in 
this way (IDMC 2017). The subregion’s high dependency on agricultural livelihoods means that climate 
variability, late-onset or failed monsoons, and other climate hazards have large impacts on farming 
households. As a result, an increasing number of households send at least one member to urban areas to 
seek alternative livelihoods (ADB 2012). 
The number of climate migrants is projected to increase from 1.7–6.1 million people (0.1–0.3 percent of 
the population) in 2020 to 16.9–35.7 million by 2050 (0.7–1.6 percent of the population) by 2050 across 
scenario averages (Figure 4.13). The largest numbers are under the pessimistic reference scenario, with 
35.7 million climate migrants by 2050 on average (1.6 percent of the population). The numbers are lower 
under the more inclusive development scenario with 21.1 million climate migrants (0.9 percent of the 
population) and lowest under the more climate-friendly scenario with 16.9 million climate migrants (0.7 
percent of the population) on average by 2050. These lower numbers suggest positive effects of better 
development policies and lower global emissions, but are still significant nevertheless. 
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Figure 4.14: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in South Asia under three scenarios, 
2020-50 
Climate migration will not occur in isolation, and the subregion will see rising numbers of other internal 
migrants (Figure 4.14), growing from 33.8 million in 2020 to 119.9 by 2050 across scenario averages. 
While the total population of the subregion is higher for the SSP2 development pathway, the number of 
other internal climate migrants is lower reflecting the positive impact of inclusive development. The share of 
climate migrants in all internal migrants is projected to increase across all scenarios, with the largest shares 
occurring under the pessimistic reference scenario. The shares under the more inclusive development and 
more climate-friendly scenarios are lower.
 



























Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The intervals are in 
part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes.
 


























Other internal migrants under SSP4 Other internal migrants under SSP4
Internal climate migrants
Other internal migrants under SSP2
Internal climate migrants
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are 
no confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.17 0.58 0.99 1.56 0.33 0.43 0.61 0.89 0.09 0.28 0.52 0.74
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
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Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
The subregion’s population is likely to grow by 25 percent by 2050, from about 1.9 billion in 2017 to about 
2.3 billion under both SSPs by 2050. Population density in many parts of the subregion that are already 
heavily populated will increase by 2050 (Figure 4.15). 
Figure 4.16 displays the change between the baseline 2010 population density and the 2050 population 
density projection for the pessimistic reference scenario, in terms of both the absolute change and the 
percentage change. Areas with small population baselines tend to have higher percentage changes. 
Comparing the shifts in population density under the climate impact scenarios with the no climate impact 
scenario reveals the climate in- and climate out-migration hotspots.
 
Figure 4.15: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, South Asia
b. 2050a. 2010
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By 2030 climate in-migration hotspots begin to emerge on the Gangetic Plain and in western Bangladesh 
(Figure 4.17). By 2050 these hotspots begin to spread and intensify all over South Asia, with large 
migration destination areas seen throughout India’s regions, especially in the south; as well as in western 
Bangladesh. These regions will generally see more favorable climate conditions. The WaterGAP water 
model in particular shows improved water availably over the historical baseline in southeastern India, 
between Bangalore and Chennai, one of the larger in-migration hotspots (see Appendix B). 
Climate out-migration hotspots for 2050 include eastern and northern Bangladesh and the northern part 
of the Gangetic Plain, as well as some spots of the broader Gangetic Plain, the corridor from Delhi to 
Lahore, and even Mumbai (Figure 4.17). 
Bangladesh is a site of both major out-migration hotspots (in the east) and an in-migration hotspot (in the 
west) and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Figure 4.16:  Absolute and percentage change in population density in South Asia under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, 2010-50
b. Percentage change in population densitya. Change in population density 
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Trends in livelihood zones
Livelihood zones in South Asia are dominated by rainfed croplands (Figure 4.18). Figure 4.19 shows net 
climate migration by livelihood zones. Under the pessimistic reference scenario, rainfed croplands will see 
up to 5.5 million net migrants by 2050, potentially putting pressure on regions where land is already facing 
degradation. The more inclusive development and more climate-friendly scenarios project about half as 
many new migrants, but with wide confidence intervals. Under the pessimistic reference scenario, there 
is also significant out-migration from dense settlements (about 3.0 million people), irrigated croplands 
(about 1.4 million people), and rice croplands (about 1.1 million people), effectively compensating for the 
movement toward rainfed croplands.
In all three scenarios, South Asia will see strong climate in-migration to rainfed cropland areas and 
relatively strong climate out-migration from dense settlements, irrigated areas, and rice-growing areas. 
Anticipation and preparedness for migration to rainfed areas is vital, especially given the relatively low 
historical productivity of these areas compared with irrigated and rice-growing areas.
Figure 4.17: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in 
South Asia, 2030 and 2050
b. 2050a. 2030
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution, which in 
South Asia represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 8 to 14 people per square kilometer, depending on the scenario. For decreased 
population density, it is about minus 10 to minus 25 people per square kilometer.
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
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Figure 4.18: Livelihood zones in South Asia, by anthropogenic biome, 2015 
















































Source: Ellis and others (2010).
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Trends in coastal zones
Results for coastal zones suggest net out-migration of 0.5–1.5 million people by 2050, depending on the 
scenario (Figure 4.20). The more inclusive development scenario, which is based on the high emissions 
pathway, sees the highest levels of out-migration (1.5 million on average), suggesting that the combination 
of development patterns and high sea level rise will drive many people from the coast. The range is widest 
for the pessimistic reference scenario, from negative 5.4 million to positive 4.4 million by 2050. This 
spread can be explained by a disagreement across the general circulation models as to water availability 
in South Asia’s coastal areas, and moderate disagreement across the climate impact models as to crop 
productivity. Sea level rise also acts as a factor that pushes people away from coastal areas. Different 
combinations of these three factors lead to a wide variation in outcomes, resulting in the observed spread. 
In no case do climate migrants make up more than 0.1–0.3 percent of the population of the coastal zone. 
These areas would benefit from more customized analysis to examine how these factors would play out at 
a local level and the subsequent impacts on the scale and pattern of climate migration. 
Figure 4.20: Projected net climate migration in and out of coastal zones in South Asia under three scenarios, 
2020-50 


























Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals 
are in part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes.
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Trends in urban areas
A far higher population density threshold (3,000 people per square kilometer) was applied to define urban 
areas in South Asia, because density is so much higher in this region (if the 300 people per square 
kilometer density threshold used for East Africa were applied, much of South Asia would be represented
as urban). Despite this higher threshold, urban areas in South Asia still expand by 2050, particularly in 
peri-urban areas, around existing metropolitan areas, and in some smaller conurbations in the eastern 
portion of the Gangetic plain in India (Figure 4.21). The number of people living in urban areas is projected 
to grow from roughly 150 million in 2010 to 264 million under SSP2 and 325 million under SSP4. However, 
while urban areas will grow overall, climate out-migration is expected to occur from certain coastal cities, 
such as Dhaka, parts of Karachi and parts of Mumbai, as a result of sea level rise and storm surge 
impacts (Figure 4.17). This will dampen overall population growth in these major metropolitan areas. 
Figure 4.21: Baseline and projected population density in urban areas of South Asia, 2010 and 2050
b. 2050a. 2010
Note: An “urban” area is an area with density of at least 3,000 people per square kilometer. The map for 2050 shows all areas in which any one of the three 
scenarios has populations of such density. It thus represents plausible urbanization outcomes rather than its most likely spread.
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PROJECTIONS FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 
Results for Mexico and Central America suggest the following:
• The number of climate migrants will increase from 2020 to 2050 across all scenarios. The region 
could see an average 1.4 to 2.1 million climate migrants by 2050, depending on the scenario. 
• There is a significant range around the average estimates in Mexico and Central America—from a low 
of 0.2 million to a high of 3.9 million—because of the heterogeneity in development levels between 
Mexico and the rest of the subregion.
• The pessimistic reference scenario sees the largest numbers of climate migrants reaching a high 
of 3.9 million by 2050. Under this scenario, climate migrants make up about one percent of the 
population by 2050. 
• Climate migrants as a share of other internal migrants are projected to rise from 6.3 to 8.9 percent in 
2020 to 8.5 to 12.6 percent by 2050. 
• Under the high emissions pathway, Mexico and Central America could potentially see dramatic 
increases in climate migration toward the end of the century, because of steadily worsening impacts 
for water availability and crop productivity.
• The Central Plateau of Mexico and the highlands of Guatemala will be climate in-migration hotspots. 
People will leave the hotter, lower-lying areas of these two countries and move toward climatically more 
favorable highland areas.
• Climate out-migration hotspots include low-lying coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific 
coast of Guatemala. Some cities, such as Monterrey and Guadalajara in Mexico will see climate out-
migration. 
• Rainfed cropping areas are likely to see declines in population as a result of climate out-migration. In 
contrast, pastoral and rangeland areas are likely to see increases. 
There are large population increases in most of Central America and moderate increases in Mexico under 
the unequal development pathway scenario SSP4. The subregion includes several middle-income countries 
(Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica). Population growth therefore appears slightly higher under SSP2 than 
under SSP4, as the latter assumes low population growth in middle-income countries (Figure 4.22). 
Figure 4.22: Projected population of Mexico and Central America under two Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, 
2020-50
Source: Jones and O’Neill (2016).
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Climate trends
The region’s topography creates large gradients in temperature, precipitation, humidity, and wind, 
determined in part by interactions with neighboring oceans (Karmalkar and others 2011). The region 
is characterized by extremes, including drought and tropical storms, with attendant heavy rainfall and 
high winds. The frequency and intensity of extremes have increased (Kaenzig and Piguet 2014; Magrin 
and others 2014). Summer rainfall has been starting later and become more irregular and the intensity 
of rainfall has been increasing during the onset season (Magrin and others 2014). The higher share of 
rainfall in extremes increases the destructive potential of rainfall events. However, there is also a high 
level of agreement on decreasing mean annual runoff and discharge, particularly in northern parts of the 
region (Reyer and others 2016). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has medium confidence that Mexico and Central 
America will experience a decrease in precipitation over the coming century. Ensemble mean projections 
indicate a decrease in precipitation between October and March in northern Central America and 
Mexico by the end of the century (Christensen and others 2014). CMIP530 global climate models and 
regional models project reductions in precipitation over all of Mexico and Central America from June to 
September in the region. 
The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is the main driver of interannual climate variability. El Niño is 
generally associated with dry conditions in the southern part of the region and wet conditions in the 
northern part; La Niña has the opposite pattern (Mason and Goddard 2001). ENSO will continue to 
influence the climate in Mexico and Central America, but changes in the frequency or intensity of ENSO 
remain uncertain, although there is some evidence for more extreme El Niño events in the future (Wenju 
and others 2014). Projected drier conditions may also be related to the decreased frequency of tropical 
cyclones, though the associated rainfall rate of these systems is higher in projections. 
For climate change trends and the ISIMIP water and crop model projections for Mexico and Central 
America, see Appendix B.
Projected numbers of climate migrants 
The general pattern of changes in population distribution historically has been a story of rapid population 
growth, driven by high fertility in the highlands of Guatemala and urbanization in Mexico’s Central Plateau 
and other urban centers. The subregion is known for its international migration to the United States, and 
studies have demonstrated that Mexican migration (Nawrotzki and others 2013; Feng and others 2010) 
and Central American migration (WFP and others 2017) fluctuate in response to climate variability. The 
literature finds that households dependent on rainfed agriculture are particularly sensitive to drought events 
and to cyclone impacts, forcing family members to seek alternative livelihoods in cities and abroad (Warner 
and others 2009).
The food system is heavily dependent on maize and bean production. Long-term climate change and 
variability will significantly affect the productivity of these crops in Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; 
less dramatic effects are expected in Guatemala (Etzinger and others 2013). Climate change effects will 
translate into significant economic losses for smallholder farmers, including farmers involved in market 
crops like coffee, as well as likely higher rates of both internal and international migration (Tucker and 
others 2010; WFP and others 2017). 
The number of climate migrants in Mexico and Central America are projected to rise over time, reaching 
1.4 to 2.1 million or 0.7–1 percent of the population by 2050 (Figure 4.23). The pessimistic reference 
scenario sees the largest numbers, growing from 0.6 million (0.4 percent of the population) in 2020 to 
30. Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5
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Figure 4.23: Projected number of internal climate migrants in Mexico and Central America under three 
scenarios


























Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are 
in part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes.
 
























Other internal migrants under SSP4 Other internal migrants under SSP4
Internal climate migrants
Other internal migrants under SSP2
Internal climate migrants
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are 
no confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
Figure 4.24: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in Mexico and Central America under 
three scenarios, 2020–50
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.37 0.60 0.87 1.03 0.14 0.29 0.48 0.68 0.25 0.51 0.72 0.85
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
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2.1 million by 2050, but also has the widest spread, ranging from 0.3 to 3.9 million. Under this scenario, 
climate migrants make up about 1 percent of the subregion’s population by 2050, with a range of 0.2–
1.9 percent. The more inclusive development and more climate-friendly scenarios yield somewhat lower 
numbers of climate migrants at 1.4 million (0.7 percent of the population) and 1.7 million (0.9 percent 
of the population), on average by 2050, respectively. These lower numbers suggest positive effects of 
better development policies and lower global emissions. The lowest numbers under the more inclusive 
development scenario could reflect the outcome of the stronger adaptive capacities of countries in the 
subregion—driven largely by Mexico and other middle-income countries.
The subregion will see a marked increase in the number of other internal migrants (Figure 4.24) ranging 
from a low of 3.3 million in 2020 to a high of 18.8 million by 2050. These numbers are higher under 
SSP4 (unequal development pathway), which is shared by the pessimistic reference and more-climate 
friendly scenarios. Climate migrants as a share of all internal migrants are projected to increase across all 
scenarios, albeit at a slower rate. 
Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
Figure 4.25 displays the change between the baseline 2010 population density and the 2050 population 
density projection for the pessimistic reference scenario, in terms of both the absolute change and the 
percentage change. The pessimistic reference scenario projects increases of more than 1,000 people per 
square kilometer during 2010–50 for most of Guatemala and El Salvador and increases of 500–1,000 
people per square kilometer for Mexico and the rest of Central America. Under SSP4 there are large 
population increases in most of Central America and moderate increases in Mexico. Significant challenges 
await the low-income countries of Central America if they follow the SSP4 population growth scenario, 
regardless of the climate impacts they experience (Figure 4.26). 
Photo Credit: shutterstock
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Figure 4.25: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, Mexico and Central America
Figure 4.26: Absolute and percentage change in population density in Mexico and Central America under the 
pessimistic reference scenario, 2010-50 
b. 2050
b. Percentage change in population density
a. 2010
a. Change in population density
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Climate out-migration hotspots include lowland areas along the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific coast of 
Guatemala (Figure 4.27). Some cities, such as Monterrey and Guadalajara in Mexico, are out-migration 
hotspots. The hotspots of climate in-migration are in the Central Plateau of Mexico and the highlands of 
Guatemala. Some people will thus leave the hotter, lower-lying areas of these two countries and move toward 
climatically more favorable highland areas. The results for Guatemala are consistent with the results of a 
study by Etzinger and others (2013), which finds that climate impacts on future maize and bean productivity 
will be less pronounced in Guatemala than in other parts of the subregion.
 
Figure 4.27: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in 
Mexico and Central America, 2030 and 2050
b. 2050a. 2030
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution,
which in Mexico and Central America represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 3.3 to 6.8 people per square kilometer, depending on the 
scenario. For decreased population density, it is about minus 1.8 to minus 3 people per square kilometer.
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
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Trends in livelihood zones
Mexico and Central America have large pastoral and rangeland areas, semi-natural and wild areas, and 
arid and forested land (Figure 4.28). Rainfed croplands are found along Mexico’s Gulf coast and sprinkled 
throughout the other countries. Belts of irrigated croplands are found along Mexico’s northern Pacific 
coast, in the Central Plateau, and in parts of southern Guatemala. 
Net migration trends by livelihood zone show general out-migration from rainfed cropping areas of 
200,000–500,000 people, with the largest out-migration projected under the pessimistic reference 
scenario (Figure 4.29). This outcome may relate to the marginality of some agricultural areas, particularly 
mountainous areas. There is a corresponding increase in dense settlements and pastoral and rangeland 
areas. The numbers are generally not significant for irrigated croplands and rice-growing areas, given their 
limited geographic scope.
Figure 4.28: Livelihood zones in Mexico and Central America, by anthropogenic biome, 2015
Source: Ellis and others (2010).
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Figure 4.29: Projected net climate migration in and out of livelihood zones in Mexico and Central America 
under three scenarios, 2020–50 

























Figure 4.30: Projected net climate migration in and out of coastal zones in Mexico and Central America under 
three scenarios, 2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. Unshaded white areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are in part 
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Trends in coastal zones
Mexico and Central America see out-migration in the coastal zone (Figure 4.30). Out-migration is 
greatest in the pessimistic reference scenario, projecting close to 400,000 fewer people on average in 
the coastal zone by 2050. The other two scenarios show lower coastal out-migration—between 250,000 
–300,000 people—on average by 2050. The confidence interval across the scenarios is wide, however, 
ranging from 0 to 700,000. As a percentage of the population in the coastal zone in 2050, the range 
for the central tendency is 1–1.5 percent. The complexity of factors in coastal areas which coincides 
with a number of urban areas coupled with sea level rise and storm surge suggests the need for more 
customized analysis to understand the local context and subsequent impacts on the scale and pattern 
of climate migration. 
Trends in urban areas
The spatial extent of urban areas is projected to grow by 2050 (Figure 4.31). Growth in urban areas is 
consistent across the three scenarios: It is projected to rise from 90 million people in 2010 to about 
140 million people in 2050. Climate migration to cities generally trends upward with increases of roughly 
225,000–300,000 people compared to the no climate impact scenarios—a very small change given 
projected urban populations of about 140 million. These findings concur with the work by Nawrotzki and 
others (2015) on climate change as a driver of rural to urban migration.
Figure 4.31: Population density in 2010 and projected population density in 2050 in urban areas of Mexico and 
Central America
b. 2050a. 2010
Note: An “urban” area is an area with density of at least 300 people per square kilometer. The map for 2050 shows all areas in which any one of the three 
scenarios has populations of such density. It thus represents plausible urbanization outcomes rather than its most likely spread.
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PROJECTIONS OF CLIMATE MIGRATION IN FOUR ADDITIONAL 
SUBREGIONS 
Modeling was conducted for three additional subregions of Africa (West, Central, and Southern) and for 
South America, in order to get a better sense of broader regional trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
America. The modeling results were not analyzed as closely as the results for the three focus subregions. 
The main objective was to assess the scale of migration across these regions by 2050. 
Table 4.2 shows the climate migration numbers and percentages of the population for the four additional 
subregions by 2050, which together with the subregions of East Africa and Mexico and Central America 
give a complete picture of all subregions within Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. West Africa has the 
highest levels and percentages of climate migrants, suggesting that climate impacts will have a particularly 
pronounced impact on migration in a region that has long been a bellwether of climate-related migration 
(UNEP 2011). In all subregions, the more climate-friendly scenario has the lowest climate migration levels. 
In all subregions except South America, the pessimistic reference scenario projects the highest migration 
levels. In South America, the more inclusive development scenario projects slightly higher numbers, although 
the relative share of climate migrants in the total population remains on par with the pessimistic scenario.
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Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 10.1 9.2 6.9
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 8.1 12.1 7.2 11.2 4.3 9.3
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.28% 1.37% 0.87%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 1.03% 1.54% 1.07% 1.66% 0.56% 1.19%
West Africa
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 54.4 38.5 17.9
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 44.8 64.0 32.0 45.0 11.1 24.8
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 6.87% 5.67% 2.27%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 5.67% 8.08% 4.71% 6.63% 1.40% 3.13%
Central Africa
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 5.1 4.3 2.6
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 3.1 7.1 2.9 5.7 1.7 3.5
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.31% 1.31% 0.66%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 0.80% 1.81% 0.83% 1.65% 0.43% 0.89%
Southern Africa
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 1.5 1.5 0.9
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 0.6 2.5 0.07 2.8 0.2 1.6
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 2.31% 1.98% 1.40%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 0.85% 3.77% 0.09% 3.86% 0.85% 3.77%
Mexico and Central America
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 2.1 1.4 1.7
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 0.3 3.9 0.5 2.4 0.2 3.3
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.03% 0.68% 0.85%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 0.17% 1.90% 0.22% 1.14% 0.09% 1.61%
South America
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 8.6 9.1 4.1
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) (million) 3.9 13.2 4.4 13.2 2.0 6.2
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.86% 1.86% 0.89%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 0.86% 2.86% 0.90% 2.82% 0.44% 1.34%
Note: The scenarios are based on combinations of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). SSP2 =moderate 
development and SSP4 = unequal development; RCP 2.6 =low emissions; RCP 8.5 = high emissions. 
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Table 4.3 shows aggregate projections for total climate migration for the three regions of focus: Sub-
Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America. 
Common trends emerge regarding the scale, magnitude, and direction of climate migration:
• Internal climate migration will increase under all three scenarios across all three regions.
• Under the pessimistic reference scenario, which reflects high emissions coupled with unequal 
development, the number of climate migrants could reach more than 143 million by 2050; the average 
is 118 million; the minimum 92 million. Sub-Saharan Africa could see as many as 85.7 million climate 
migrants, South Asia 40.5 million, and Latin America 17.1 million. 
• Under the more inclusive development scenario, the number of climate migrants is projected to be 38 
million lower than under the pessimistic reference scenario, with the biggest decreases in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (down 21 million) and South Asia (down 16.4 million); while the number of climate migrants in 
Latin America drops slightly (down 0.9 million). The changes reflect the fact that climate migration is 
closely intertwined with a country’s development context. The more moderate development trajectory 
in this scenario means slower population growth in low-income countries, as well as less economic 
inequality, slower urbanization, higher GDP, and more education. 
• The fewest internal climate migrants are projected under the more climate-friendly scenario: 28.3 million 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16.9 million in South Asia, and 5.8 million in Latin America. In all regions, the 
average number is cut by at least half by 2050 from the pessimistic reference scenario. This means 
that large gains in sustaining rural livelihoods that help people stay in place may come from investing in 
stringent mitigation measures and commitments to reduce emissions globally. 
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CLIMATE IMPACT TRENDS 2050–2100
The climate migration trends projected through 2050 may be just a starting point for much greater flows in 
the second half of the century in some regions. According to results from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 
Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP) water and crop sectoral models, maps that compare water runoff and crop 
productivity changes for 2050–2100 with the baseline values for 1970–2010 show that impacts will be more 
severe, further strengthening the conditions for increased climate migration. Just as with the results for 2010–
50, the ISIMIP results vary spatially. The scenarios modeled in this study represent two climate models, two 
water models, and two crop sector models. They do not represent the full range of results possible. In some 
regions—East Africa in particular—climate projections are highly uncertain, in part because the projections of 
future precipitation appear to contradict evidence of current drying. Models were selected in part because 
their future precipitation trends differ substantially in magnitude, and partly even in sign, for the focus regions. 
In general, however, the ISIMIP model runs to the end of the century suggest more extensive and extreme 
climate impacts on water availability and crop productivity, which will have significant ramifications for 
population movements. The model calibration using historical impacts and population distribution data 
demonstrated that populations are already sensitive to climate impacts in ways that will affect population 
distributions through 2050. Therefore, more accentuated impacts from 2050 onward would have the 
potential to drive more migration, particularly distress migration. 
Table 4.3: Projected numbers and shares of internal climate migrants by 2050 for the three regions of focus—Sub-Saha-









Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 71.1 million 53.3 million 28.3 million
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 56.6 mn 85.7 mn 42.1 mn 64.7 mn 17.4 mn 39.9 mn
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 3.49% 3.01% 1.39%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 2.71% 4.03% 2.33% 3.58% 0.91% 2.04%
South Asia
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 35.7 million 21.1 million 16.9 million
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 30.9 mn 40.5 mn 18.1 mn 24.1 mn 11.4 mn 22.4 mn
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.56% 0.89% 0.74%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 1.35% 1.77% 0.76% 1.02% 0.50% 0.98%
Latin America
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 10.6 million 10.5 million 5.8 million
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 4.3 mn 17.1 mn 4.9 mn 16.2 mn 2.2 mn 9.4 mn
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.61% 1.50% 0.88%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 0.65% 2.56% 0.70% 2.31% 0.33% 1.42%
Total
Average number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 117.5 million 85.1 million 51.1 million
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 91.8 mn 143.3 mn 65.1 mn 105.3 mn 31.2 mn 71.7 mn
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 2.36% 1.75% 1.02%
Minimum (left) and Maximum (right) 1.81% 2.80% 1.33% 2.14% 0.64% 1.47%
Note: The scenarios are based on combinations of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP2—moderate development; SSP4—unequal development) and Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCP 2.6—low emissions; RCP 8.5—high emissions) that drive climate impacts on crop productivity and water availability as well as sea level rise and storm surge. 
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For water availability in East Africa, the results are not markedly worse than for 2010–50 (Figure 4.32), 
although the literature suggests that there will be more variability and more extreme rainfall events, which 
long-term averages may not capture. The crop productivity projections are significantly worse (Figure 
4.33), with large areas under RCP8.5 seeing steep declines. 
In South Asia, water availability is projected to increase over broad swaths of the continent through the 
end of the century but to decline in Afghanistan, northeastern Pakistan, and northwestern India under 
the IPSL-CM5A RCP8.5 scenario (Figure 4.34). However, even areas that may see stable or increasing 
water availability on average may see extremes of flooding (because of the trend toward increasingly 
intense rainfall events) or periodic drought. For crop production (Figure 4.35), the picture is more negative, 
particularly under the GEPIC crop model (see Chapter 3), according to which much of India will see sharp 
declines in crop productivity, especially under the high greenhouse gas concentration RCP8.5 scenarios, 
where the climate impacts toward the end of the century are severe for both water availability and crop 
productivity across most model runs. 
In Mexico and Central America, results are generally more negative, especially for the high greenhouse gas 
concentration RCP8.5 scenarios, where the climate impacts toward the end of the century are severe for 
both water availability and crop productivity across most model runs. Water availability declines sharply 
relative to the historical baseline (Figure 4.36), and crop productivity follows a similar pattern (Figure 4.37). 
This region will see potentially dramatic impacts and consequences for climate migration toward the end of 
the century. Results are consistent with the extreme drought conditions projected by Dai (2012) by the end 
of the century under RCP8.5. 
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Figure 4.32: Projected change in water availability in East Africa between 1970–2010 and 2050–2100 
 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and WaterGAP water models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 
and 8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in water availability for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Figure 4.33: Projected change in crop production in East Africa between 1970–2010 and 2050–2100 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and GEPIC crop models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 and 
8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in crop production for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Figure 4.34: Projected change in water availability in South Asia between 1970–2010 and 2050–2100 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and WaterGAP water models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 
and 8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in water availability for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Figure 4.35: Projected change in crop production in South Asia between 1970–2010 and 2050–2100 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and GEPIC crop models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 and 
8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in crop production for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Figure 4.36: Projected change in water availability in Mexico and Central America between 1970–2010 and 
2050–2100 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and WaterGAP water models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 
and 8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in water availability for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Figure 4.37: Projected change in crop production in Mexico and Central America between 1970–2010 and 
2050–2100 
Note: Both global climate models are used in conjunction with the LPJmL and GEPIC crop models under low and high emissions pathways (RCP pathways 2.6 and 
8.5, respectively). The maps represent indices of change in crop production for the 2050-2100 period relative to the long-term average for 1970-2010. Values 
such as 0.2 represent 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are 
represented in blue scale and red scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative values, respectively) on 
both scales. See Chapter 3 for details on the HadGEM2-ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR global climate models.
a. Impact models driven by the HADGEM2-ES 
global climate model
b. Impact models driven by the IPSL-CM5A 
global climate model
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Chapter 5
Slow-onset climate change will shape migration decisions and outcomes in 
different ways across different economic and livelihood systems. The findings in 
Chapter 4 are embedded in a deeper understanding of local development contexts 
and of issues addressed in the literature in this chapter. An emerging common 
theme across these countries is that decision makers should view internal climate 
migration as a cross-cutting issue to be integrated into policy and planning. Key 
differences on how to do so reflect each country’s development context, institutional 
capacity, and climate vulnerabilities. 
Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico were selected as illustrative examples for several reasons. All are 
populous countries with differing climatic conditions, ecosystems, indicators of development, and 
urbanization. They also differ in their vulnerability to climate risk, demographic profiles, past migration 
patterns, and institutional capacity. Data and previous studies on climate migration are available on all 
three countries.
Ethiopia is a low-income country, Bangladesh is lower-middle-income, and Mexico is an upper-middle-
income country (Table 5.1). This pattern, from low to high, also holds for the share of urban population, 
secondary school enrollment, and literacy. Ethiopia is the most dependent on agriculture (37 percent 
of GDP), followed by Bangladesh (15 percent) and Mexico (4 percent). Population growth and the total 
dependency ratio are high for Ethiopia, indicating a larger youth bulge in its demographic profile. The 
youth bulge is smaller for Bangladesh and Mexico, where a larger part of the population has entered the 
workforce. In terms of vulnerability to climate and disaster risk, Mexico is less vulnerable and has greater 
readiness than both Ethiopia and Bangladesh, according to the ND-GAIN Index (ND-GAIN 2017). The 
World Risk Index, which captures mainly natural disaster risk, ranks Bangladesh 5th in the world, Ethiopia 
75th, and Mexico 95th (United Nations University 2016).
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Table 5.1: Demographic, socioeconomic, and climate risk indicators for Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico 
Indicator Ethiopia Bangladesh Mexico
Population
Population (millions) 102 163 127
Annual population growth (percent) 2.5 1.1 1.3 
Population in 2050 under SSP2 (millions) 159 199 145
Population in 2050 under SSP4 (millions) 184 177 136
Age dependency ratio (percent) 80.5 51.5 51.0
Population density (people per square kilometer of land) 102 1,252 66
Urban share of population (percent) 20.4 35.8 79.2
Share of population engaged in agriculture (percent) 73 (2013) 47 (2010) 13.4 (2011)
GDP
World Bank Group income classification Low Lower-middle Upper-middle 
GDP (billions of current dollars) 72 221 1,046
Annual GDP growth (percent) 7.6 7.1 2.3
GDP per capita (current dollars) 707 1,359 8,201
Value added of agriculture (percent of GDP) 37 15 4
Value added of industry (percent of GDP) 21 29 33
Value added of services (percent of GDP) 41 56 63
Poverty
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (percent of population) 29.6 (2010) 24.3 (2016) 50.6 (2016)
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 purchasing power parity, 
percent of population, 2010)
33.5 18.5 3.8
Education
Gross secondary school enrollment (percent) 35 (2015) 64 (2015) 91 (2014)
Literacy rate (percent of people 15 and older) 49.1* 72.8 (2011) 94.5 (2015)
Climate and disaster risk indexes
ND GAIN Index (2015)
 Rank 146 142 68
 Score 40.0 41.0 56.7
World Risk Index 
 Rank 70 5 95
 Score 7.0 19.2 6.0
Source: World Bank (2017a, 2017b); ND-GAIN (2017); United Nations University (2016)
Note: All figures are for 2016, except where otherwise indicated.
* of total population (2007)
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This chapter presents the modeling results for each country. It reviews potential policy and development 
implications of climate migration and considers the broader development and mobility trends in each country. 
OVERALL FINDINGS 
In all three countries, the scale of climate migration is projected to increase by 2050 in all three 
scenarios—pessimistic reference, more inclusive development, and more climate-friendly. The distribution 
of climate migrants between hotspots of climate in- and out-migration and livelihood zones depends on 
each country’s climate vulnerability and development context. 
Table 5.2 presents the key climate migration findings for the three countries. 
Key takeaways include the following: 
• Climate migration occurs against a backdrop of overall population growth through 2050 in all three 
countries. In Ethiopia the population is expected to grow 60–85 percent by 2050, driven mainly 
by a youth bulge that will result in population growth for several decades to come. In Bangladesh 
population growth rates are half those of Ethiopia, but population density is among the highest in the 
world, particularly in low-lying urban and coastal areas. In both countries, increases in the number of 
climate migrants are thus likely to exert additional pressures on land, natural resources, infrastructure, 
and institutions. In contrast, as an upper-middle-income country with a diversified economy that has 
already experienced a demographic transition, Mexico could anticipate and cope with climate change-
induced population redistribution.
• Climate migration will occur in a context of already high internal mobility in all three countries. In Ethiopia 
most migrants have historically been internal, as a result of resettlement policies and rural to rural and 
rural to urban migration. Rural to rural and rural to urban migration is also significant in Bangladesh. 
The internal migration pattern in Mexico is somewhat different. Given the country’s already high level 
of urbanization, intra-metropolitan mobility and mobility from central downtown areas to surrounding 
suburban and peri-urban areas is replacing the rural to urban flows. Policy makers need to understand 
how climate will interact with other factors to induce future climate migration in countries at different 
development stages.
• While there is an overall increase in climate migrants across the scenarios, locality matters in the 
context of climate change. In Bangladesh and Mexico, the pessimistic reference scenario projects 
the largest number of climate migrants by 2050. In Ethiopia, the more climate-friendly scenario has 
the largest number of climate migrants by 2050. The higher number of climate migrants under this 
scenario is in part driven by the regional climate models which project lower water availability by 2050 
in general compared to the other two scenarios (pessimistic reference and more inclusive development 
scenarios) which are coupled with higher emissions. 
• Similarly, baseline development context and development trajectories influence the trajectory of 
climate migrants. In Ethiopia and Mexico, the more inclusive development scenario yields the lowest 
numbers of climate migrants by 2050. These results show that sustained development gains are 
imperative to reduce the scale of climate migration, though for different reasons depending on country 
context. In a low-income country with high population growth like Ethiopia, inclusive development can 
help absorb a growing young labor force into less climate sensitive sectors. In an upper-middle-income 
country like Mexico, a stronger economy means higher adaptive capacity and financial resources to 
target the most vulnerable areas and groups. In a highly climate vulnerable country like Bangladesh, 
the more climate-friendly scenario yields the lowest numbers of climate migrants by 2050, indicating 
that global low emissions pathways can help reduce pressures on livelihoods from climate impacts 
and thus the scale of climate migration. 
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• The share of climate migrants in total internal migrants is projected to increase in all scenarios by 
2050 in all three countries, although there are differences. In Bangladesh, where past population 
distributions have been highly sensitive and responsive to climate impacts, climate migration 
outpaces other internal migrations by 2050 under the pessimistic reference scenario. In Ethiopia 
climate migrants are projected to constitute a smaller portion of all internal migrants (about 12 
percent in the more climate-friendly scenario) by 2050. In Mexico, climate migrants could constitute 
about 11 percent of all internal migrants in the pessimistic reference scenario by 2050 suggesting 
that broader development will continue to drive other internal migration. Internal climate migration 
must therefore be addressed as an important part of the broader adaptive opportunities and 
challenges associated with internal migration.
• While urban areas will generally see population increases, this growth could be dampened in 
some cases by climate out-migration. Urban areas will be out-migration hotspots in Ethiopia and 
Bangladesh but not in Mexico. Addis Ababa located in the heart of the rainfed agricultural region 
is projected to be affected by declines in crop productivity. Bangladesh’s major urban centers 
(Dhaka and Chittagong) are in deltaic and coastal areas, leaving them vulnerable to rising seas 
combined with storm surge. In contrast, the central plateau around Mexico City offers more 
favorable conditions for livelihoods and settlements than the arid north and low-lying states along 
the coast are Mexico’s south and southeast. Anticipatory diagnostics to understand these trends 
and planning are needed to avert mass distress migration in and out of urban areas. Efforts are also 
needed to accommodate people who cannot adapt in place because of the impacts of climate and 
natural hazards or deteriorating livelihood conditions.
• Changes in water availability and crop productivity by 2050 will drive population redistribution across 
agricultural livelihood zones in the three countries. In Ethiopia, climate out-migration hotspots will 
occur in the increasingly desiccated rainfed cropland areas of the northern highlands; in-migration 
hotspots will develop in the pastoral/rangelands and semi-natural and wild areas (mostly semi-arid to 
arid areas) of the southern highlands and Ahmar Mountains in the east. In Bangladesh out-migration 
hotspots will occur in the rice-growing areas of the northeast; in-migration hotspots will develop in 
the irrigated and rainfed cropland areas of the Ganges River basin in the west. In Mexico, declining 
water availability and crop productivity in low-lying and hotter regions, and impacts in coastal Mexico 
(especially the Yucatan), will drive climate migrants out of rainfed cropland-based rural livelihoods 
into peri-urban or urban locations. This pattern reflects Mexico’s advanced urbanization, the declining 
relevance of farming-only livelihoods, and continuing depopulation of rural areas. In contrast to Mexico, 
significant proportions of the populations of Ethiopia and Bangladesh still depend on agriculture. 
Understanding local vulnerabilities and constraints is key to designing adaptive agricultural practices 
for people to stay where they are if possible, and to facilitate movement when needed.
• Climate induced migration can be a positive adaptation choice, but may further reduce the availability 
of, or access to, already stretched land resources in productive areas with burgeoning populations 
and intensifying climate impacts. If the viability of rural ecosystems deteriorates despite adaptive 
practices, opportunities for livelihood diversification out of climate-sensitive areas and sectors 
will need to be identified and pursued, so that climate migrants can be absorbed into the national 
economy. In Ethiopia, labor migration in pursuit of non-agrarian livelihoods is becoming increasingly 
prominent. In Bangladesh, employment in manufacturing, particularly textiles, and services is growing.
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Table 5.2: Key climate migration results for Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico in 2050 
Result Ethiopia Bangladesh Mexico
Population in 2050 
compared to 2020
Increases to 159 million from 103 
million (in SSP2) or 184 million 
from 105 million (in SSP4)*
Increases to 196 million from 166 
million (in SSP2) or 177 million 
from 164 million (in SSP4)* 
Increases to 149 million from 126 
million (in SSP2) or 136 million 
from 125 million (in SSP4)*
Number of climate 
migrants by 2050
Highest in more climate-friendly 
scenario, with average projection 
of 1.5 million**
Highest in pessimistic reference 
scenario, with average projection 
of 13.3 million
Highest in pessimistic reference 





Ahmar Mountains in the east
Main stem of the Ganges River 
basin in the west
Central plateau near Mexico City 
and east of Puebla
Smaller hotspots farther south in 
Oaxaca State and on the northern 






Dhaka and river delta south of the 
city
Eastern coast near Chittagong
Northeast
Along Gulf of Mexico, especially 
Veracruz and Tabasco States; in 
southern state of Chiapas; and on 
Pacific coast, especially Guerrero 
State
Scattered in the arid north
Climate migration 
in/out of rural 
livelihood zones
In-migration: Pastoral and 




Out-migration: Rice-growing areas 
In-migration: Pastoral and 
rangelands
Out-migration: Rainfed croplands
Note: SSP2= moderate development; SSP4 = unequal development.
*The moderate development SSP2 scenario for Bangladesh and Mexico yield larger populations than the unequal development SSP4 scenario because both are middle-
income countries. Only low-income countries show marked increases in population under SPP4.
**The higher number of climate migrants under the more climate-friendly scenario in Ethiopia is in part driven by the regional climate models which project lower water availability 
by 2050 in general compared to the other two scenarios (pessimistic reference and more inclusive development scenarios) which are coupled with higher emissions.
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My name is Wolde Danse, I am from 
Wolayita zone, Damosorey district, 
Ethiopia.  I am 28 years old.  My father was 
a small-scale farmer and the farm was not 
sufficient for farming. Sometimes it would rain 
and other times it wouldn’t. Because of this, 
many people had to migrate, and as a result I 
left and came to Hawassa.”
The floods come every year but this 
year the situation is worse. Every house 
in my village was affected.  Now all my family 
is living in one of my relatives house.”
It’s really important to have the 
wood at hand because there are 
communities that don’t have that. We’ve 
learned how to manage the forest.  We 
manage it and we work in it.”
“I thought I could work and 
change my life by leaving 
and coming to the city. I 
got into a food security 
program and it helped 
change my life.  Before I 
could either pay rent or 
buy food. But now my wife 
works and I work and from 
the assistance the program 
gives me I am ok. The 
program is for three years.”
ETHIOPIA
The 8th of 16 children, he fled his 
father’s small farm in a drought-
stricken part of Ethiopia and 
walked to the small but bustling 
city of Hawassa.
BANGLADESH
23-year-old Monoara  Khatun fled 
the flooding in her home village. 
She moved to the capital Dhaka 
to join a program that teaches 
young rural women life skills. She’s 
learned how to navigate the city, 
how to handle money and to take 
care of herself. 
MEXICO
26 year old Javier Martinez of the 
little village of Trinidad in Oaxaca, 
Mexico counts himself as lucky.  
He and his family have been able 
to thrive in their little village 
without having to migrate to create 
a new life. They are carpenters who 
sustainably use the nearby forest 
for their livelihood.
Life was hard for Wolde 
in Hawassa. He knew 
no one and was often 
homeless—and starving. 
But now enrolled in 
Ethiopia’s extensive Urban 
Safety Net Programme, 
he receives a small salary 
for supervising street 
cleaners.
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Wolde must demonstrate his commitment by working a few more months. Then he 
can go to this polytechnic university. It offers skills training and computer courses.  
Wolde  can attend classes for three years without paying tuition. Then he hopes to find 
a good job in the private sector.
After a few days I started to like this place a lot. I got life skill training, to 
learn to be self-dependent; At the same time we got technical skills training, 
taught to operate machines, sew dresses.
There are many jobs here.  There’s no need to migrate like before. Maybe 5 to 
10 percent of the population migrates. In the community we have carpenters, 
and masons and plumbers, stores. There’s employment of all kinds.
The hope I have for my daughter is for her to enroll in a good school and get 
a better education, so she can grow and have a better life than I had. That is 
all that I want.
I have a dream to study and have a good job and look after my family. Now 
after this training, I have a job. I think I will be able to send money to my 
mother to help with her expenses.
My goal is to grow my business, have better equipment and a bigger market. 
One day I would like to participate in the furniture expo in Guadalajara.
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KEY FINDINGS ON ETHIOPIA 
Main findings on Ethiopia include the following:
• The scale of climate migration is projected to increase in all scenarios by 2050, set against a backdrop 
of rapid population growth. Ethiopia’s population is projected to grow 60–85 percent by 2050, from 
about 100 million in 2016 to 159 million (in SSP2) or 184 million (in SSP4). This growth is driven 
mainly by a youth bulge that will drive continued population growth for several decades. 
• The more climate-friendly scenario has the largest number of climate migrants by 2050. The number of 
climate migrants could almost triple, to as many as 1.5 million by 2050 under this scenario compared 
to 2020. The higher number of climate migrants under this scenario is in part driven by the regional 
climate models which project lower water availability by 2050 in general compared to higher precipitation 
under the two scenarios (pessimistic reference and more inclusive development scenarios) which are 
coupled with higher emissions. The more inclusive development scenario yields the lowest numbers of 
climate migrants by 2050, showing that sustained development gains can drive reductions in the scale 
of climate migration for a low-income country with high population growth like Ethiopia.
• Climate migrants will increase steadily as a share of total internal migrants through 2050 across all 
scenarios albeit at a slower pace than other development factors. This finding suggests that slow-
onset climate change remains a consistent and non-negligible driver of internal migration in a country 
that already has high internal mobility. It also reinforces the implication that climate migration should 
be managed in an integrated manner with other types and drivers of internal migration.
• Addis Ababa is projected to be a climate out-migration hotspot by 2050 and would thus see slower 
population growth. It is located in the heart of the rainfed agricultural region that is projected to be 
hit by crop productivity declines. Continued attention to adaptive capacity is needed to avert distress 
migration out of this area as a result of deteriorating livelihood conditions.
• Changes in water availability and crop productivity by 2050 will drive population redistribution across 
agricultural livelihood zones. Climate out-migration hotspots will occur in the increasingly desiccated 
rainfed cropland areas of the northern highlands. Climate in-migration hotspots will occur in the pastoral 
areas, rangelands, and semi-natural and wild areas (mostly semi-arid to arid areas) of the southern 
highlands and Ahmar Mountains in the east, where better water availability and crop productivity are 
projected. Nationally, 73 percent of the population depends on agriculture (World Bank 2017c). A 
better understanding of regional differences and vulnerabilities in rural livelihoods is therefore critical 
to provide a stronger basis for adaptive agricultural practices that would enable people to stay and 
identify viable livelihood systems in host areas for people to transition into.
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Country context 
Recent economic growth in Ethiopia has been impressive, though poverty challenges remain. GDP grew 
from $12.4 billion ($162 per capita) in 2005 to $72.4 billion ($707 per capita) in 2016 (World Bank 
2017c). During these 10 years, Ethiopia achieved marked gains across most sectors of the economy. 
The poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines declined from 44 percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 
2010 (World Bank 2017c).
Concurrent with recent economic growth, Ethiopia made progress in education. The gross enrollment ratio 
for primary school rose from 79 percent in 2005 to 95 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2017c). Secondary 
school enrollment was 35 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2017b). 
Some health outcomes also improved. Stunting among children under five has fallen since 2000, and 
access to water, sanitation, and hygiene has increased (WHO 2017). Access to improved sanitation is at 
28 percent up from 3 percent in 1996 (World Bank 2017c). 
Despite excellent economic performance, Ethiopia remains a low-income country, with about a third of 
its population classified as poor (living on less than $1.90 a day) in 2010 (World Bank 2017c). Map 5.1 
shows the political boundaries and elevation of Ethiopia. 
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Ethiopia’s population more than doubled between 1990 and 2016, rising from 48 million to more than 
100 million (World Bank 2017c). Population growth rates remain high by world standards, but they have 
fallen in recent years, from 2.7 percent a year in 2007 to 2.5 percent in 2015. The adolescent birth rate 
fell from 84 births per 1,000 in 2007 to 57 in 2015. Life expectancy rose from 59 in 2007 to 65 in 2015, 
as the mortality rate of children under five fell from 97 per 1,000 in 2007 to 58 per 1,000 in 2016 (World 
Bank 2017b). 
Even if the fertility rate were to drop to replacement levels immediately, Ethiopia’s population would 
grow for several decades because of the large share of young people (Figure 5.1). The high proportion 
of people under 18 creates future challenges for labor markets and economic stability, particularly if 
continued population growth cannot be absorbed in nonagricultural sectors. Given existing pressure on 
land resources, it is unlikely that future productivity gains in agriculture will be able to absorb such a 
rapidly growing population. Population growth is likely to exert enormous pressure on the country’s natural 
resources and institutions (UNDESA 2016). Massive investments in services are necessary to boost 
climate-smart and inclusive economic growth, including infrastructure, housing, and food production. 
133Placing Climate Migration in the Development Context for Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Mexico
Climate trends
Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries in Africa to climate and environmental change (Kassie 
and others 2014). Its climate is highly variable and its population highly vulnerable to droughts. Comenetz 
and Caviedes (2002) link drought to 18 El Niño Southern Oscillations (ENSOs) since 1500, including the 
latest events, in 1991–93 and 1997–98. These droughts have often caused food shortages or famines. 
The north, northeast, and east of Ethiopia tend to experience more frequent and severe droughts than the 
rest of the country. Severe floods associated with heavy rainfall in the highlands have affected vulnerable 
communities in the northwest (Bewket and Conway 2007).
Ethiopia’s reliance on rainfed agriculture as the dominant livelihood strategy makes the country particularly 
vulnerable to climate change impacts. Agriculture accounts for 37 percent of GDP, and 73 percent of the 
population depends on agriculture (World Bank 2017b). Agriculture in Ethiopia is largely subsistence 
smallholder agriculture with low levels of mechanization. Mixed farming dominates the northern and 
central highlands, and pastoralism and agro-pastoralism dominate the lowlands, which are arid and semi-
arid lands, particularly in the east, northeast, and extreme south (Headey, Taffesse, and You 2014). 
Land degradation threatens the country’s smallholder farmers, pushing down yields and putting stress 
on already shrinking farming areas (Haileslassie and others 2005). Deforestation is also widespread, 
particularly in the south central Rift Valley, which constitutes a core region for economic activity, population, 
urbanization, and road transport (Dessie and Kleman 2007).
Large changes in water availability and crop productivity drive the population distribution models through 
2050.31 The water sector models consistently show small increases in water availability throughout the 
country, except under the models driven by the Hadley Centre Global Environment Model version 2 
(HadGEM2) General Circulation Model, in which the northern highlands experience either no change 
or slight declines (see Appendix B). The population distribution model tends to be more sensitive to 
changes in water availability, in part because it projects results for the whole country whereas the crop 
model results are limited to areas with cropping. Modeling details used in this report are provided in 
Chapter 3 and Appendix B.
Cropping in Ethiopia is dominated by teff (a species of lovegrass), wheat, barley, corn, sorghum, and millet. 
The crop models include only wheat and corn. The LPJmL crop model shows increases in productivity—in a 
few areas up to 40–50 percent—in the northern highlands. The GIS-based Environmental Policy Integrated 
Climate (GEPIC) crop model shows decreases across the northern highlands and small increases elsewhere. 
During the second half of the 21st century, the trends in crop productivity for the two models become more 
accentuated (see Chapter 4 for ISIMIP water and crop model outputs for 2050–2100). In the highlands, 
the LPJmL crop model projects increases in yields of 40–60 percent; just to the west, in the lowlands, it 
projects declines of 60–80 percent. The GEPIC model projects yield declines in the northern highlands of 
30–60 percent. In both models, impacts are worse under the high emissions RCP8.5 than under RCP2.6. 
Water availability increases in the southern and southeastern areas of the country (relative to a baseline 
of very dry conditions) and remains stable in the northern highlands. 
31 There is significant uncertainty in future climate projections in the Horn of Africa (see Appendix B). Together with the different 
characteristics of the water and crop sectoral models, it explains the somewhat divergent results for the water availability and crop 
productivity projections for Ethiopia.
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Figure 5.2: Projected number of internal climate migrants in Ethiopia under three scenarios, 2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. White unshaded areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals are in 
part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes. 
Projected climate migration trends
Climate migration is projected to increase by 2050, showing similar upward trends across scenarios 
(Figure 5.2), though differences in numbers between the scenarios are small. Across scenarios, climate 
migrants represent 0.4 to 1.2 percent of the total population by 2050.
The more climate-friendly scenario with 1.5 million climate migrants by 2050 (with a range of 0.8–2.2 
million) has marginally higher numbers than the pessimistic reference scenario (Table 5.3). This is in part 
driven by the climate models, which project lower water availability by 2050 in the lower emissions scenario 
in general, hence increasing climate migration numbers. Numbers are thus lower under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, with 1.3 million climate migrants by 2050 (with a range of 0.7–1.9 million). The 
lowest numbers of climate migrants are under the more inclusive development scenario, driven by both 
the higher water availability projected in the higher emissions scenarios in general coupled with stronger 
development policies. This scenario projects 1.2 million climate migrants (with a range of 0.7–1.7 million) 
by 2050. These findings indicate that for a low income country with high population growth like Ethiopia, 
sustained development gains are an imperative to reduce the scale of climate migration. 
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.31 0.45 0.53 0.72 0.35 0.51 0.64 0.74 0.45 0.64 0.67 0.80
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
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Climate migration will not occur in isolation; other types of internal migration will occur simultaneously and 
will need to be managed in an integrated manner in a country with already high internal mobility. The number 
of other internal migrants will continue to outstrip the number of climate migrants through 2050 across all 
scenarios, owing to the large population growth projected for Ethiopia by 2050 (Figure 5.3). However, climate 
migrants will increase steadily as a share of total internal migrants through 2050 across all scenarios. 
The example of Ethiopia demonstrates how regional climate impact variations and their uncertainty can 
have implications on climate migration trajectories. This also emphasizes the need to better understand and 
contextualize the scale, nature, and magnitude of climate change-induced migration at the country-level. 







Number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 1.3 1.2 1.5
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) (million) 0.7 1.9 0.7 1.7 0.8 2.2
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 0.72% 0.74% 0.80%
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) 0.40% 1.05% 0.45% 1.04% 0.41% 1.18%
Note: The scenarios are based on combinations of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). SSP2 = moderate 
development; SSP4 = unequal development; RCP2.6 = low emissions; RCP8.5 = high emissions. 
 
























Other internal migrants under SSP4 Other internal migrants under SSP4
Internal climate migrants
Other internal migrants under SSP2
Internal climate migrants
Figure 5.3: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in Ethiopia under three scenarios, 2020-50
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are
no confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
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Figure 5.4: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, Ethiopia
b. 2050a. 2010 
Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
Ethiopia’s population is likely to grow by 60–85 percent by 2050, to 159 million (in SSP2) or 184 million (in 
SSP4). This huge increase will exert immense pressure on the country’s natural resources and institutions. 
Population densities will increase across most of the country. Figure 5.4 displays the baseline (2010) 
population density and 2050 projected population density under the pessimistic reference scenario. It 
shows that urban areas will continue to grow and to retain the highest population densities. Population 
densities will also increase in the highlands and the Ahmar Mountains. Historically, Ethiopia’s population 
has been highly concentrated in the highlands, with only sparse populations in the lowlands, because of a 
harsh climate and the presence of malaria and other diseases in the western lowlands and extremely arid 
conditions in the southeast and northeast. Consequently, some 80 percent of the population inhabits only 
37 percent of the country’s land area. All results on climate migration for Ethiopia should be interpreted 
against this backdrop of total population growth and distribution. Modeling suggests that climate change will 
increase movement out of some areas and livelihood zones and dampen movement into others. 
Figure 5.5 displays the change in population density between the baseline (2010) population and the 
2050 projected population under the pessimistic reference scenario. It shows that most areas of the 
country will see 100–300 percent increases in population density. Only isolated pockets of the country—
namely, areas with very low baseline populations—will see stable or declining population densities. 
Climate in-migration hotspots are expected in the southern highlands and the Ahmar Mountains, with a smaller 
in-migration hotspot in the far north in the Tigray region, amplifying the projected population growth trends in 
these areas (Figure 5.6).32 Recent population increases in these regions may be driven by greatly improving 
water availability and crop productivity, as projected by the ISIMIP model. These regions are predominantly 
pastoral areas, rangelands, and semi-natural and wild areas. The distribution of livelihood zones in accordance 
with anthropogenic biomes is presented in Figure 5.7 for the baseline year of 2015. Across Ethiopia these 
livelihood zones will see population growth in all scenarios. Increasing population densities in these marginal 
semi-arid to arid areas will require strong adaptation interventions in rangeland management to ensure 
sustainability. 
32 The modeling does not take into account limits to agricultural carrying capacity; no limit was placed on population densities based 
on theoretical or observed maximums. 
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b. Percentage change in population density
Figure 5.5: Absolute and percentage change in population density in Ethiopia under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, 2010-50
a. Change in population density
Figure 5.6: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in 
Ethiopia, 2050 
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution, which in 
East Africa represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 4.2 to 4.8 people per square kilometer, depending on the scenario. For decreased 
population density, it is about minus 3.6 to minus 5.5 people per square kilometer.
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
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An out-migration hotspot is expected in the northern highlands, dampening projected population growth 
trends in this area. This region is predominantly rainfed cropland, which will see population declines across 
Ethiopia in all scenarios (Figure 5.8), driven by declines in crop productivity in the rainfed agricultural 
heartland of the highlands. This region already suffers from soil erosion and land degradation as a result 
of high population densities. Given migration history in Ethiopia, it is likely that migrants will continue 
moving from the increasingly desiccated northeastern and southeastern parts of the country into the 
southern highlands and secondary cities in the dryland parts of the east.
Addis Ababa is projected to become an out-migration hotspot. Climate impacts are expected to reduce 
population densities, thus dampening the projected population growth trends for the capital. Although 
the population is projected to urbanize heavily through 2050, population will also be drawn to secondary 
cities. The capital is in the heart of the rainfed agricultural region that will be affected by declines in crop 
productivity. The large declines in water availability projected for 2030–50 will reduce the attractiveness 
of the capital region relative to other urban destinations.
Figure 5.7: Livelihood zones in Ethiopia, by anthropogenic biome, 2015 
Source: Elllis and others (2010).
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In-country consultations on modeling results
Consultations were undertaken with stakeholders in Ethiopia on the modeling results and to collect 
input on the case study narratives in June 2017. They were conducted with national, regional, and 
district (woreda) level government officials, civil society, cooperative associations, and academia. 
The national workshop was held in Addis Ababa, the regional workshop in Jigjiga, and the woreda 
level workshop in Shinile Town, outside Dire Dawa. Sixty-two people participated in the consultation 
sessions. For the national workshop, small groups of participants were asked about their experiences 
and knowledge of current observations of climate change and their expectations of climate change 
through 2030 and 2050, existing climate change-induced migration patterns (if any) and future climate 
migration, and vulnerability and livelihood impacts. Break-out sessions and consultations at the local 
level were conducted in local languages.
Participants found the 2050 modeling scenarios reasonable. Many noted that they had already observed 
mobility changes and indicated that the scenarios were in line with their expectations. They validated the 
spatial patterns of population movement, noting that secondary cities in the far east of the country have 
already begun growing rapidly. 
Participants suggested that the modeling and case study should include more research on pastoral 
movement; that the local institutional context (the ability of the government to plan and act, for instance) be 
included; and that the larger regional (East African) context be considered, given the history of cross-border 
migration.



















































Note: Whiskers show 95th percent confidence intervals for climate migrants. 
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What do these results mean for Ethiopia’s development future? 
Ethiopia’s reliance on rainfed agriculture makes rural livelihoods especially vulnerable to 
climate change in the face of high population growth and already high internal mobility. This 
suggests a need to diversify into less climate-sensitive sectors and pursue climate-smart 
and inclusive growth to secure recent development gains and sustained growth in the future. 
Historically, most migrants in Ethiopia have been internal (Ezra and Kiros 2001; Ezra 2003; Jónsson 2010; 
Afifi and others 2012). Ethiopia has had large rural to urban and rural to rural movements, both voluntary 
and involuntary. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that in 2015, 450,000 
people in Ethiopia were displaced by conflict and 104,000 were displaced by disasters (IDMC 2015). 
International mobility is less common than internal mobility, but it will likely represent a significant portion 
of mobility in Ethiopia. International outflows accounted for just 0.6 percent of the population in 2005, with 
the bulk of these migrants headed to Asia and North America (Fransen and Kuschminder 2009). Ethiopia 
also hosts large numbers of immigrants and refugees. Regional conflicts in Sudan and Somalia from 
the 1980s and 1990s have led to disruptions in the south, southeast, and southwest of the country. In 
2017 Ethiopia hosted about 245,000 Somali refugees displaced by food stress and conflict (Diaz 2017). 
Recent conflict in South Sudan has led to large movements of pastoralists in the south and southeast of 
that country into Ethiopia. Drought in northern Kenya has exacerbated the situation.
It is difficult to untangle climate- or environment-induced mobility in Ethiopia from mobility induced by 
political, social, or economic upheaval, as suggested in Chapter 2. The mere perception of climate change, 
through temperature and precipitation changes, has been shown to spur action by households (Gebrehiwot 
and van der Veen 2013; Kassie and others 2014). In other cases, households perceive change but do not 
act for reasons that include lack of access to credit or markets (Bryan and others 2009; Ringler 2010).
Individual and family motivations for migration are often strongly tied to weather events. Gray and Mueller 
(2012) find that among men, labor-related movements and migration out of their study’s rural highland 
district more than doubled under severe drought, with total mobility reaching 10 percent of adult men 
per year. They also find that women’s short-distance and marriage-related mobility was reduced by half 
under moderate drought, reflecting a decreased ability to finance wedding expenses and new household 
formation (Gray and Mueller 2012). Morrissey (2013) finds that several factors, including access to food 
aid, access to land, and age, can keep people from moving. He categorizes effects on decisions to move 
as “additive” or “non-environmental factors which create an imperative to move that is in addition to stress 
generated by the biophysical environment”; “enabling” or “non-environmental factors which make mobility 
a particularly suitable response to the livelihood insecurity generated by environmental stress, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of moving”; “vulnerability” or “non-environmental factors which exacerbate the 
negative impacts of changes in the physical environment on livelihood security;” and “barrier” or “non-
environmental factors which retard the imperative to move” (Morrissey 2013, 1507).
With population burgeoning throughout the country, climate migrants may exacerbate existing stresses 
on resources in receiving areas. Rapid economic growth is necessary to support widespread adaptation 
programs and policies such as the Productive Safety Net Programme (Box 5.1) and a forward-looking 
resilience strategy (Moller 2015) for addressing climate migration. Investments in infrastructure, housing, 
and food production are necessary. Accommodating climate migrants in host communities will require 
financial resources if they are not to be absorbed into slum areas. Climate migrants also have the potential 
to upset delicate land use arrangements. Rapid population growth will make it increasingly difficult for urban 
areas to provide infrastructure, housing, health services, and education. 
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Box 5.1: How well did Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme work?
In order to prevent food insecurity and reduce rural vulnerability, in 2005 the government of 
Ethiopia, with support from multiple donors, launched the Productive Safety Net Programme 
(PSNP). The program provides cash transfers to vulnerable households through public works 
projects that build community productive assets (Wiseman, Domelen, and Coll-Black 2010). 
Evaluations of the PSNP suggest that the effects have been positive but modest. Berhane and 
others (2014) find that the program may decrease food insecurity by 1.3 months. Other studies 
find that the program works best when coupled with the Ethiopia’s Food Security Programme, 
which provides households with access to credit, agricultural extension services, technology 
transfer, and irrigation and water harvesting schemes (Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Taffesse 2009). 
Andersson, Mekonnen, and Stage (2011) find no evidence that household participation in the 
PSNP prompted disinvestment in either livestock or trees. Sabates-Wheeler and Devereaux 
(2010) find that PSNP beneficiaries were better off than nonbeneficiaries but that the transfer 
had some inflationary effects. Debela, Shively, and Holden (2015) find that participation in the 
PSNP had positive effects on children’s health and nutrition.
Climate migration is not uniform across the country. Movement from rainfed croplands 
will increase pressure on semi-natural and rangeland areas by 2050. Projections also 
suggest migration out of the northern highlands and into the southern highlands and 
Ahmar Mountains.
Ethiopia’s diverse environments—from highland-montane to arid drylands—leave some parts of the country 
more vulnerable to climate change than others. 
The findings of this study are broadly consistent with the results of earlier work on future pathways of 
climate-related mobility in Ethiopia, which have coalesced largely around hotspot detection. The hotspots 
identified by Hermans-Neumann, Priess, and Herold (2017)—by combining data on climate variability, net 
primary productivity, and population density (Figure 5.9)—are largely coincident with the ones identified 
in this report. One area of divergence is in the east of the country. The scenarios in this report indicate 
increased concentration of population in Dire Dawa, Harar, and Jigjiga in the Ahmar Mountains. Hermans-
Neumann, Priess, and Herold suggest concentrations farther north in Afar. 
Given past migration patterns in Ethiopia, it is likely that migrants will continue moving from the increasingly 
desiccated northeastern and southeastern parts of the country into the southern highlands as well as 
urban areas and secondary cities in the dryland parts of the east. There is considerable uncertainty in 
climate projections for the Horn of Africa. However, climate models suggest the possibility of increased 
rainfall in the Rift Valley and southern highlands, but these could be offset by increases in temperature. 
Should farming practices remain unchanged, however, soil erosion and land degradation would be 
expected in areas of high in-migration in the highlands. 
Given historical patterns, modest cross-border migration from neighboring states is also expected. The 
refugee crisis in Somalia illustrates a possible climate migration future, as drylands continue to see warmer 
temperatures and lower rainfall and political and economic instability continue. An alternate scenario—
one that includes proactive planning—might include the growth of secondary cities, strong environmental 
remediation and adaptation development activities to support the local population.
Understanding future climate migration requires examination of the different dimensions of vulnerability, 
particularly for rural livelihoods. Much of the literature identifies climate and environmental stress as a key 
driver of displacement, though one intricately tied to social, economic, and political forces, for farmers, 
agro-pastoralists, and pastoralists alike (Ginnetti and Franck 2014). 
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Migration is but one of many possible outcomes of the combined impact of weather and socioeconomic 
stress (Morrissey 2013). It is a strategy for coping with and adapting to a changing climate, but it is not 
practiced in isolation from other strategies. Understanding how people cope and adapt can provide insight 
into responses to climate and environmental change. 
Agrarian households first cope with environmental stress, such as lack of precipitation or high temperature, 
by replanting crops or switching crop mixes, whereas, pastoralists sell small livestock (Adimassu, Kessler, 
and Stroosnijder 2014). Other coping mechanisms include migration to relatives, accessing relief 
programs, reducing seed density, accessing credit, and using the existing social security system. In 
addition to these on-farm coping mechanisms, households use off-farm coping mechanisms (Demeke 
and Zeller 2012), which can be viewed as a first step from localized agriculture and pastoral livelihood 
activities toward labor migration. 
Labor migration—migration prompted by the pursuit of other, often nonagrarian, livelihoods elsewhere—
has increased in recent years (Demeke and Zeller 2012). As Adimassu, Kessler, and Stroosnijder (2014) 
note, it has disparate effects on environmental conditions in rural areas, making a causal pathway difficult 
to establish. In the case of climate change-induced migration, the push to resort to such strategies could 
be deferred by enrolling households in social safety net programs such as the Productive Safety Net 
Programme. Even marginal improvement in livelihoods from participation in such programs may delay the 
onset of migration-as-coping during stress events.
While urban areas will continue to expand as a result of rural to urban migration and 
population growth, climate change will dampen population growth in Addis Ababa by 2050 
implying a role for secondary cities. 
Long-term rural to urban migration will continue in Ethiopia: projections indicate a near-doubling of the 
population of cities, from 15 million in 2010 to 37 million in 2030 (UNDESA 2014). Ezra and Kiros (2001) 
attribute rural to urban migration to poverty and food insecurity. Households in poor and food-insecure 
areas are compelled to send a family member to urban areas to secure a job and remit cash to the rural 
household. Mberu (2006) finds that out-migration did not significantly improve the living conditions of 
most migrants. Only migrants with higher levels of education and nonagrarian jobs appeared to benefit. 
Figure 5.9: Potential migration hotspots in Ethiopia as identified in Hermans-Neumann, Priess,  
and Herold (2017)
Source: Hermans-Neumann, Priess, and Herold (2017).
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Gibson and Gurmu (2012) find that higher levels of out-migration from rural areas were associated with 
development interventions. The provision of clean water promoted an increase in family size, which in turn 
compelled out-migration as a result of competition for scarce resources. 
With the relative attractiveness of the capital region declining as a result of climate change, secondary 
cities may become growth poles. A network of secondary cities could help reinforce Addis Ababa for 
continued economic growth and development by providing a large, active domestic market and focus 
areas for tertiary manufacturing (New Climate Economy 2015). These can also help strengthen rural to 
urban linkages by providing access to markets. 
Migration can be a positive adaptation strategy but must be addressed holistically and 
embedded into development policies and planning through inclusive and participatory 
approaches.
Migration can be an effective adaptation strategy in Ethiopia, yielding gains to individuals, households, and the 
state. As population grows rapidly through 2050, mobility will be critical to resolving land pressure in areas of 
high demand. Migration out of degraded and deforested areas can also help the country reach its commitment 
to restoring one-sixth of its deforested and degraded land area (Minnick and others 2014). At the same time, 
inclusive development can help absorb a growing young labor force into less climate sensitive sectors. 
The government should consider taking proactive steps now to facilitate climate migration by preparing 
for movement into more climatically favorable areas, acting while the window of opportunity is still open. 
In the past, resettlement, either forced or incentivized, has occurred frequently in Ethiopia, in the 1970s 
and 1980s and as recently as 2003. The National Food Security Strategy sought to move some two 
million people from food-insecure areas in the north to more fertile lowlands in the south (Fransen and 
Kuschminder 2009). The National Population Policy of 1993 sought to “ensure a spatially balanced 
population distribution pattern” (Ezra 2003, 63). A key consideration will be how to integrate climate 
migration into development policy and planning through participatory and inclusive approaches. 
Ethiopia has no specific government body to oversee planning or data collection on climate migration, 
enable the sharing of data with line ministries, or incorporate migration into national planning. At the 
regional and local levels, registration of migrants by municipality, city administration, and labor agencies 
needs to be fully implemented. Further support for migrants could also include providing information on 
destinations (especially information about jobs), vocational training, and access to microfinance.
Such an anticipatory approach should be coupled with the application and scaling up of tested and successful 
on-the-ground programs. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) provides some important lessons of 
proactive planning (see Box 5.1). Other areas of intervention that could be scaled up include multi-village water 
systems to provide small-scale irrigation to households in drought-prone areas, land use policy to support 
pastoralists, feed banks for livestock during droughts, a better system of food supply to help buffer short-term 
food shortages during droughts, and robust disaster risk management and early warning systems.
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KEY FINDINGS ON BANGLADESH 
Main findings on Bangladesh include the following:
• The number of climate migrants is projected to increase in all scenarios by 2050, in a highly climate 
vulnerable country. Large-scale internal movement is projected in a country that has been sensitive to 
environmental change, is already very densely populated, and will continue to experience population 
increases through 2050. 
• The number of climate migrants by 2050 is largest in the pessimistic reference scenario, reaching 
13.3 million on average. Climate migration levels show similar but lower trends in the more inclusive 
development and more climate-friendly scenarios. Both of these scenarios suggest that development 
pathways targeting lower inequality and lower global emission trajectories will help reduce pressures 
on people’s livelihoods and the associated scale of climate migration.
• The share of climate migrants in total internal migrants is projected to increase in all scenarios by 2050. 
In the pessimistic reference scenario, the number of climate migrants outpaces the number of other 
internal migrants. In this scenario, climate impacts may become one of the dominant forces driving 
internal migration in Bangladesh by 2050. In the other scenarios, climate migrants still represent a 
significant share of all internal migrants. 
• Climate change will dampen population growth in urban and coastal areas, as Dhaka, the river delta 
south of the city, and the eastern coast near Chittagong become out-migration hotspots. These major 
urban centers are in deltaic and coastal areas, which are particularly vulnerable to climate change 
because of rising seas combined with storm surges. Estimates show that a one meter combined sea 
level rise and storm surge leads to a loss of more than 4,800 square kilometers of land (roughly 3.2 
percent of the country); a two meter combined sea level rise and storm surge leads to the inundation 
of nearly 12,150 square kilometers (roughly eight percent of the country). The impacts of sea level 
rise are concentrated in coastal areas33, but they extend inland along the banks of the Brahmaputra, 
Meghna, and Ganges rivers. Continued attention to adaptive capacity is needed to avert distress 
migration out of these areas, but also local maladaptation. Efforts are also needed to accommodate 
people who cannot adapt in place because of the impacts of climate or natural hazards.
• Changes in water availability and crop productivity will drive population redistribution in agricultural 
livelihood zones. Climate out-migration hotspots will occur in the rice-growing areas of the northeast. 
In-migration hotspots will be seen in the irrigated and rainfed cropland areas along the main stem of 
the Ganges River basin, which is already densely settled but where better water availability and crop 
productivity are projected. Nationally, 47 percent of Bangladesh’s population depends on agriculture. 
A better understanding of regional differences and vulnerabilities in rural livelihoods is therefore 
critical to provide a stronger basis for adaptive agricultural practices that would enable people to stay 
where they are and to identify viable livelihood systems in host areas if people move. 
33 This report defines coastal areas as map grid cells for which more than half their area lies within 10 kilometers of the coastline.
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Country context 
Bangladesh is developing rapidly. In 2015 it achieved lower-middle-income status, following a decade of 
annual GDP growth of more than five percent (World Bank 2017b). The poverty rate fell to 24.3 percent in 
2016, down from 48.9 percent in 2000 (World Bank 2017c). 
Educational performance soared on several measures. The primary school completion rate rose from 57.3 
percent in 2008 to 98.5 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2017c). The percentage of girls repeating primary 
school fell from 12.9 percent in 2008 to 5.3 percent in 2015, and the rate for boys fell from 13.4 percent 
to 5.4 percent. Secondary school enrollment rose to 64 percent in 2015 (World Bank 2017c). 
Although the extreme poverty rate is declining, broad-based gains are more pronounced in cities (World 
Bank 2016). Growth has also seen some challenges, such as infrastructure (including power) deficits, 
lack of access to improved water supply and sanitation, and declines in remittances (World Bank 2016). 
Map 5.2 shows the political boundaries and elevation of Bangladesh.
Bangladesh has a growing population and one of the highest population densities in the world, particularly 
in urban areas. The 2016 population of 163 million people is projected to increase to 177 million (under 
SSP4) or 196 million (under SSP2) by 2050. The national population density was estimated at 1,252 
people per square kilometer in 2016 (World Bank 2017c); density in Dhaka was 20,000 people per 
square kilometer in 2015 (Walter 2015). 
Bangladesh also has one of the highest urban population growth rates in the world, estimated at 4 percent in 
2015 (Walter 2015). Population growth of 1.1 percent (World Bank 2017b), coupled with a continued pace 
of fertility decline, could lead to changes in the country’s age structure, yielding a lower dependency ratio 
and a larger working population by 2050 (Figure 5.10). Bangladesh could benefit from this “demographic 
dividend” if it creates a labor market that can absorb the working population into productive and climate-
resilient labor markets—and ensure that they have good access to health care, employment, and education 
(Bloom and others 2003; IMF 2006; El-Saharty, Ahsan, and May 2014; UNDESA 2015).
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Climate trends
As a deltaic and coastal country, Bangladesh is particularly exposed to compounding climate risks, resulting 
from the interacting effects of increased temperature, growing risks of river flooding, rising sea level, and 
increasingly intense tropical cyclones (World Bank 2013b). The IPCC reports that mean annual temperature 
in Asia has “very likely” increased (Hijioka and others 2014). The consensus on climate scenarios for 
Bangladesh is that the temperatures will rise by 2.6º–4.8ºC by 2100 (Caesar and others 2015). Sea 
surface temperature changes and sea level rise, both caused by temperature changes, will directly affect 
Bangladesh, perhaps more than any other non-island nation. These changes will increase the frequency 
and/or severity of tropical cyclones; cause unanticipated shifts in the timing and intensity of the South 
Asian seasonal monsoon; inundate the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta as a result of sea level rise 
and increased glacial melt; and change river flow in the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers (Immerzeel, Van 
Beek, and Bierkins 2010; Whitehead and other 2015; Dasgupta and others 2016; Yang and others 2016). 
Changes in precipitation are projected to increase the peak discharges of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and 
Meghna rivers, with the flooded area increasing by as much as 29 percent if global temperatures rise by 
2.5°C above preindustrial levels. Human activity (dams, barrages, river embankments, and diversions of the 
inland basins of rivers) can also significantly increase the risk of flooding downstream from extreme rainfall 
events higher up in river catchments (World Bank 2013b). Drought can exacerbate seasonal food insecurity 
(monga) in the ecologically and economically vulnerable areas of the northwest (Sarker and Mian 2012), 
which can result in seasonal displacements. The greatest effects from climate impacts will be felt on food 
production, livelihoods, urban areas, and infrastructure (World Bank 2013b).
Bangladesh has a monsoonal tropical climate, with one main rainy season, beginning in June, which is 
subject to interannual variability. Annual precipitation ranges from an average of 1,500 millimeters in the 
center-west to 4,500 millimeters in the far northeast. Tropical cyclone activity in the Indian Ocean is the 
main driver of interannual variability. Shifts in the timing or intensity of the South Asian seasonal monsoon 
are also factors of interannual variability. A late-onset or weak monsoon leading to lower than average 
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precipitation can cause as much disruption as a very strong monsoon leading to flooding. Because 
Bangladesh is at the confluence of three major rivers, heavy monsoons upstream can induce flooding, 
even if precipitation in the country is average.
The modeling takes into account impacts on water availability and crop productivity (largely rice followed 
by wheat production), as well as sea level rise (combined with storm surge) of one meter under RCP2.6 
and two meters under RCP8.5. The ISIMIP projections for 2010–50 suggest modest increases in water 
availability over the entire country for all models under all scenarios (except for a single map grid cell in 
the northwestern corner, which experiences a 10–30 percent decline). 
By contrast, the two crop models yield different results—which is not surprising given that the choice 
of models was guided in part by capturing the widest spread in outputs (see Appendix A). The LPJmL 
model shows modest increases in crop productivity by 2050 over the entire country; the GEPIC model 
shows declines in more than half the country. The GEPIC model driven by the IPSL-CM5A-LR climate 
model in particular shows that between 10 percent (under RCP2.6) and 18 percent (under RCP8.5) of the 
territory could experience 10–50 percent declines in crop productivity. Two pockets, around Dhaka and 
northeastern Bangladesh, may experience >50 percent declines under RCP2.6.
Toward the end of the century, crop productivity is likely to trend downward, especially under the GEPIC 
model, with widespread declines of 50–80 percent under RCP8.5 (see Chapter 4 for ISIMIP water and 
crop model outputs for 2050–2100). The LPJmL crop model projects fewer declines. Water availability 
increases slightly, but even areas that may see stable or increasing water availability may see extremes of 
flooding (as a result of the trend toward increasingly intense rainfall events) or periodic drought. The model 
does not fully capture these effects, because it looks at long-term averages.
The modeling has shown that Bangladesh’s population distribution is more sensitive to water availability 
and crop productivity than the distributions of Ethiopia and Mexico; relatively small deviations from 
the baseline water availability and crop productivity during 2020–50 are projected to produce a large 
population response relative to similar deviations in other countries. Changes in crop yields and potential 
changes in the pattern of the annual monsoon may drive fairly large population redistribution from the 
northeast to the western portions of the country, as discussed below. 
Bangladesh is a low-lying country with sizable areas just above sea level near the Bay of Bengal, leaving 
it highly exposed to storm surge and sea level rise. A one meter rise in sea level is projected to lead to 
a loss of more than 4,800 square kilometers of land area (roughly 3.2 percent of the country); a two 
meter rise, augmented for storm surge impacts, would lead to the inundation of nearly 12,150 square 
kilometers (eight percent of the country’s land area). The impacts of sea level rise are concentrated in 
coastal areas, but they are projected to extend inland along the banks of the Brahmaputra, Meghna, 
and Ganges rivers (Figure 5.11). 
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Projected climate migration trends
The number of climate migrants and their share in the population grows across all scenarios from 2020 to 
2050 (Figure 5.12). The number of climate migrants is highest under the pessimistic reference scenario 
and lowest under the more climate-friendly scenario with large differences between these two scenarios. 
In the pessimistic reference scenario, there will be 13.3 million climate migrants by 2050 (with a range of 6.8 
–19.9 million), which translates into 7.5 percent of the total population (with a range of 3.8–11.3 percent) 
(Table 5.4). The numbers are reduced by about half under the more inclusive development scenario to 6.7 
million (with a range of 3.7–9.7 million) and further halved to 3.6 million (with a range of 1.8–5.3 million) 
under the more climate-friendly scenario. Under these last two scenarios, climate migrants average about 2–3 
percent of the population by 2050. This suggests that development pathways with more inclusive development 
policies together with lower global emission trajectories will help reduce the scale of climate migration. 
Figure 5.11: Land area inundated by 1-meter and 2-meter combined sea level rise and storm surge in Bangladesh 





Number of iinternal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 13.3 6.7 3.6
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) (million) 6.8 19.9 3.7 9.7 1.8 5.3
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 7.53% 3.43% 2.02%
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) 3.82% 11.25% 1.89% 4.98% 1.04% 2.99%
Note: The scenarios are based on combinations of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). SSP2 = moderate 
development; SSP4 =unequal development; RCP2.6 = low emissions; RCP2.6 = high emissions. 



























Figure 5.12: Projected number of internal climate migrants in Bangladesh under three scenarios, 2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average runs for each scenario. White unshaded areas represent the 95th percentile confidence intervals. The wide intervals 
are in part a reflection of the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes. 
The number of climate migrants trends upward in the last decade of the modeling period in the pessimistic 
reference and more inclusive development scenarios, which share the high emissions pathway (Figure 
5.12). In contrast, in the more climate-friendly scenario, the number of climate migrants increase 
at a slower pace. The uptick, particularly in the pessimistic reference scenario, may reflect the more 
pronounced climate impacts expected in the second half of the century, as shown in the ISIMIP water 
availability and crop productivity projections. 
These findings indicate an opportunity to prepare for and address the potential scale and magnitude of 
climate migrants, particularly for a climate-vulnerable country like Bangladesh. It also reinforces the idea 
that a low-emissions development pathway may help stabilize or at least slow increases in pressures on 
people’s livelihoods and the ensuing rate of climate migration.
The vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate impacts is highlighted when examining climate migrants as a 
share of other internal migrants. While climate migrants will represent an increasing share of other internal 
migrants across all scenarios (Figure 5.13), the shares are largest under the pessimistic reference 
scenario, with climate migrants outpacing other internal migrants. Numbers are somewhat lower for the 
other two scenarios, but still represent a third to a half of other internal migrants. 
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.58 2.41 4.24 7.53 0.82 1.16 1.94 3.43 0.37 0.88 1.46 2.02
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
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Other internal migrants under SSP4 Other internal migrants under SSP4
Internal climate migrants
Other internal migrants under SSP2
Internal climate migrants
Figure 5.13: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in Bangladesh under three scenarios, 
2020–50
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are
no confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
Bangladesh’s population is likely to grow to 177 million (under SSP4) or 196 million (under SSP2) by 
2050.34 Figure 5.14 displays the baseline 2010 population density and 2050 projected population 
density under the pessimistic reference scenario. It shows that Dhaka and Chittagong will continue to 
grow and retain the highest population density levels. All results pertaining to climate migration should be 
interpreted against this backdrop of overall population growth in the country.
Modeling suggests that climate change will increase movement out of some areas and livelihood zones 
and dampen movement into others. But even in these cases, the population will still grow, though less 
quickly than in the absence of climate change.
Figure 5.15 displays the change in population density between the baseline 2010 population and the 
2050 projected population under the pessimistic reference scenario. It shows that in the pessimistic 
reference scenario, population density increases throughout most of Bangladesh, except in coastal areas 
and along the Brahmaputra River. Specifially:
• Population density grows fastest in the west, particularly the Ganges River basin, where it will more 
than double.
• Population density increases by 5–25 percent in Dhaka and by 25–50 percent in Chittagong.
• Population density increases by 5–25 percent in the eastern part of the country.
• Population density decreases by 40 percent along the coasts, except in the southwestern corner of 
the coastline. 
• Population density also decreases along the Brahmaputra River, an area that is still largely rural. 
Rural–urban migration out of the region is expected to outpace local urban growth. The region therefore 
experiences population density declines of 40 percent or more. 
34 The moderate development pathway for Bangladesh yields larger populations than the SSP4 pathway, because it is a lower-
middle-income country. Only low-income countries show marked increases in population under SSP4 (see Chapter 3). 
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Figure 5.15: Absolute and percentage change in population density in Bangladesh under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, 2010-50
b. 2050
Figure 5.14: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, Bangladesh
a. 2010
b. Percentage change in population densitya. Change in population density
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Figure 5.16: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in 
Bangladesh, 2050
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution, which in 
South Asia represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 8 to 14 people per square kilometer, depending on the scenario. For decreased 
population density, it is about minus 10 to minus 25 people per square kilometer.
A climate in-migration hotspot is projected in the Ganges River basin in the west (Figure 5.16). This area 
is a rainfed agriculture livelihood zone, amplifying projected population growth trends in this region. Higher 
crop productivity partly drives these increases, but they probably also reflect declining productivity in the 
northeast and the impact of sea level rise in coastal settlements, which drives people inland. 
The Ganges River basin is predominantly rainfed cropland, with some irrigated cropland areas (Figure 5.17). 
Across Bangladesh rainfed croplands will see strong population growth under all scenarios. Growth will be 
particularly strong in the pessimistic reference scenario, in which rainfed croplands see average climate 
in-migration of 1.3 million people by 2050 (with a range of 0.3–2.3 million) (Figure 5.18). As much as 10 
percent of the population in rainfed areas could be climate migrants. It bears reiterating that the model does 
not place limits on rural densities that reflect the land’s “carrying capacity.” Results need to be validated in 
light of current land tenure and productivity potential.
In contrast, out-migration hotspots are projected in the northeast (see Figure 5.16), dampening the small 
projected population growth trends in this region. Projected reductions in crop productivity of 10–50 
percent in isolated pockets, largely in rice-production areas, drive these declines. Rice-growing areas 
may see declines in population in the pessimistic reference scenario of about 0.2 million by 2050 (Figure 
5.18). The more inclusive development scenario sees projected population growth in such areas of 0.1 
million; the more climate-friendly scenario projects virtually no difference from the no climate impact 
scenario. In no case does the change exceed 0.2 percent of the population in these zones.
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
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Other out-migration hotspots are projected around Dhaka and the river delta south of the city and 
along the eastern coast near Chittagong (see Figure 5.16), dampening the projected population growth 
trends for these major urban areas. The dampening effect in coastal areas, along the Meghna and 
Ganges rivers near Dhaka and to the south of Chittagong along the Karnaphuli River, is a result of land 
losses associated with the modeled sea level rise and storm surge bands (see Figure 5.11). In the 
pessimistic reference scenario, roughly eight percent of the country’s total area is lost. Inland migration 
of households and economic activity has already been observed in Bangladesh, where exposed coastal 
areas are characterized by lower population growth rates than the rest of the country (World Bank 
2013b). Other effects of climate change on cities, such as heat stress and flooding, could discourage 
people from moving to urban areas. The infrastructure of Dhaka is already overstretched, and flooding 
is a perennial problem. Deltaic and coastal urban areas are highly vulnerable and are rendered less 
livable when climate change is considered.
These hotspot patterns imply movement in a country that is already highly densely populated and 
expected to become even more so by 2050. Past changes in population distribution in Bangladesh 
showed high sensitivity and responsiveness to changes in ISIMIP water and crop model outputs, which is 
understandable given the country’s riverine and coastal geography as well as history of natural disasters. 
Relatively modest changes in temperature and precipitation conditions may drive fairly large population 
redistribution. Given the strengthening of the climate signal after 2050—as shown by the water and crop 
model (ISIMIP) results and the increasing exposure of deltaic and coastal urban areas to climate hazards—
the scale, magnitude, and patterns of climate migration may be amplified in the second half of the century, 
underscoring the need to act before 2050.
Figure 5.17: Livelihood zones in Bangladesh, by anthropogenic biome, 2015
Source: Ellis and others (2010).
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In-country consultations on modeling results
National consultations were held in Dhaka on July 23 and 24, 2017. They involved 40 participants from 
more than 25 organizations, including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Food, the Department 
of Haor and Wetland Development, the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, the Rural 
Reconstruction Foundation, the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation, the Ashrai Foundation, the Sajida 
Foundation, the WAVE Foundation, East-West University, the Asian Development Bank, USAID, the UN 
Development Programme, the European Union, and some bilateral development partners. Participants 
were divided into small groups and addressed questions about their experiences and knowledge of 
current climate change, anticipated climate change to 2030 and 2050, existing climate change-induced 
migration patterns (if any), anticipated (future) climate change-induced migration, and vulnerability and 
livelihood impacts. Break-out sessions were conducted in local languages.
Many experts agreed that climate migration would affect the country’s population distribution and that 
the issues raised by the modeling were relevant. While there was some difference in opinion on some of 
the spatial configurations relating to climate in- and out-migration hotspots, others noted their plausibility 
in view of current mobility patterns. In terms of model projections of population growth and in-migration 
to the Ganges River basin, some participants argued that the country’s adaptation planning was well 
placed to counter these spatial reconfigurations. Participants noted that Bangladesh does not have a 
central ministerial focus on internal migration and that these issues need more attention. Participants 
mentioned the Bangladesh’s Perspective Plan for 2041, which would consider issues related to climate 
and migration.

















































Pessimistic (Reference) (RCP8.5/SSP4)  More Inclusive Development (RCP8.5/SSP2) More Climate-Friendly (RCP2.6/SSP4)
Note: Whiskers show 95th percent confidence intervals for climate migrants.
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Box 5.2: International migration trends and gender dimensions of migration in Bangladesh
Many Bangladeshis migrate overseas. Most go to the Gulf States and Europe. International migration to the Middle East is 
primarily labor migration (Farid and others 2009). Bangladesh was the top sending country for migrants to Europe in the first 
three months of 2017 (Dearden 2017).
Most international migrants are men, because men often use sociocultural norms to prevent women from migrating 
(Danneker 2005). Women’s dependence on remittances from men involves sensitive intrahousehold power relations. Women 
face increased vulnerability and workload as a result of the loss or inconsistency of the household male’s income, despite 
remittances, and female migrants can be victims of human trafficking. Women are particularly vulnerable to being trapped or 
left behind in Bangladesh with no possibility of migrating themselves (Nguyen, Yeoh, and Toyota 2006; Debnath and Selim 
2009). In some cases, changes in the household decision-making structure, with the absence of the male head, can lead to at 
least temporary empowerment of women (Debnath and Selim 2009).
Migration in Bangladesh is also strongly tied to gender relations and women may be particularly vulnerable to climate change 
impacts. As Bhatta and others (2015, 4) note, “unequal gender relations and access to resources may make women more 
vulnerable to climate change than men. Climatic events may not only directly impact women and vulnerable populations, but 
also make them more vulnerable because of their interaction with sociocultural factors.” They find that migrating increases the 
risk of sexual violence against women. In addition, women face livelihood and subsistence burdens when men migrate, their 
ability to cope with and adapt to stressors and shocks is reduced, they face increased mortality during a shock, and their food 
security becomes more precarious (Chindakar 2012).
What do these results mean for Bangladesh’s development future?
Climate migrants could reach almost 20 million by 2050 under the worst-case pessimistic 
reference scenario. Climate migration would occur in a country with already high internal 
mobility and where sudden extreme events already have important impacts.
Bangladesh has large numbers of people engaged in all four of the main migration types: rural to rural, 
rural to urban, immediate cross-border, and long-distance international (Box 5.2). Much of the country’s 
rural to urban migration is to Dhaka (Marshall and Rahmann 2013). Immediate cross-border migration is 
primarily to West Bengal, in India (Banerjee and others 1999; Datta 2004; Rahaman and Sheikh 2016) 
and international is to more distant areas, including the Gulf States and Europe. Recent economic growth, 
particularly in the garment industry, has driven much of the internal mobility.
Extreme events may be an additional driver of internal migration. In a study of migration in the wake of 
cyclone Aila, in 2009, Saha (2016) finds that households in central Bangladesh were reluctant to migrate 
but had no other livelihood options and felt compelled to move to the secondary city of Khulna. The coastal 
and deltaic areas that are vulnerable to impacts from tropical cyclones coincide with the out-migration 
hotspots resulting from slow-onset climate impacts identified in this report. 
Slow-onset changes and rapid-onset events may have compounding effects on internal migration patterns 
and should be considered together. Though not modeled in this study, sudden-onset and extreme events, 
particularly tropical cyclones, present major risks to some population groups in Bangladesh. Cyclone Sidr in 
2007 exposed 3.5 million Bangladeshis to flooding (World Bank 2013b). It also caused production losses 
of 800,000 tons of rice, or about two percent of total annual production that year (FAO 2013) and resulted 
in $1.7 billion in economic damages. Major damage occurred in the housing sector, followed by agriculture 
and infrastructure (Wassmann and others 2009; Mearns and Norton 2010). Increased river flooding 
combined with tropical cyclone surges poses a high risk of inundation in areas with the largest shares of 
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poor people. Approaches such as risk mapping, which combines hazard and vulnerability maps, can help 
better understand the sensitivities of different adaptation measures for future planning (DECCMA 2017). 
Migration directly affects the vulnerability of household livelihoods in Bangladesh (Rahman and Rana 
2016). Food price and health shocks are significant components of household vulnerability. Like people 
elsewhere, Bangladeshis’ coping and adaptation strategies include “doing nothing, sharing losses, 
modifying the threat [mitigation], changing [land] use, moving and ecosystem restoration” (Pender 2008, 
54–55). In response to floods in northern and northeastern Bangladesh in 2014, households took out 
loans, changed livelihood strategies, received support from relatives, exchanged labor, drew down savings, 
and sold productive assets (Walter 2015).
Climate change will interact with other factors to induce migration for different groups. In a case study on 
rural to urban migrants in the Barind Tract in the northern highland region of Bangladesh, Kabir and others 
(2017) examine how affected individuals and families make decisions to either stay or migrate internally in 
response to seasonal drought and other socioeconomic vulnerabilities. Their results suggest that migration 
decisions are consolidated by a variety of stressors, including both environmental and nonenvironmental 
components. Stojanov and others (2016) find that local experts in Bangladesh consider migration a viable 
adaptation strategy to climate change, although it is not exclusively an adaptation strategy. 
Large coastal urban cities like Dhaka and Chittagong will need to balance climate out-
migration against broader trends of population growth through longer term planning and 
investments in adaptive capacity to ensure resilience in the face of climate impacts.
Bangladesh has a long history of rural to urban migration to cities such as Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna. 
Economic growth in urban areas is a strong pull factor for the poorest. Islam and others (2006) find that 
35 percent of the population of six major cities live in informal settlements, highlighting the importance of 
understanding internal rural to urban migration processes. Chowdhury and others (2012) find a similar pull 
factor in Sylhet, a city roughly one-fifth the size of Dhaka. Haider (2010) documents migration to Rajshahi City. 
Low-lying coastal areas, particularly coastal cities, and the Ganges–Brahmaputra–Meghna Delta region, 
are especially vulnerable to climate impacts. Coastal populations must cope with progressive inundation 
from sea level rise and fluvio-tidal floods, heightened storm damage, loss of wetlands, river bank erosion, 
salinity intrusion as a result of seasonal low flow levels in rivers and upstream water diversion, and high 
levels of salinity in groundwater and arsenic contamination of shallow aquifers (Dasgupta and others 
2014; DECCMA 2017). A sea level rise of one meter is expected to affect 13 million people in Bangladesh 
(Mearns and Norton 2010); it would not necessarily permanently displace all people affected (Gemenne 
2011). By 2070 some 1.5 million people are projected to be affected by floods in the coastal cities of 
Bangladesh (Brecht and others 2012). About 20 million people in the coastal areas of Bangladesh are 
already affected by salinity in their drinking water (World Bank 2013b). Contamination of drinking water 
by saltwater intrusion may cause an increasing number of cases of diarrhea and more frequent outbreaks 
of cholera, among other health effects (World Bank 2013b).
Given its already high population, population density, and vulnerability to climate change, particularly in 
coastal and urban areas, Bangladesh must prepare for future shifts in population centers. Model results 
show that in all scenarios, urban and coastal areas may see dampened growth as they become less livable 
as a result of climate change impacts. Out-migration levels will be highest under the pessimistic reference 
scenario, followed by the more inclusive development and then the more climate-friendly scenario. 
These findings have several policy and development implications. First, even if the most optimistic 
scenario materializes, internal migration will be a pressing issue in places like Dhaka, where climate out-
migration only dampens the general increase in population and infrastructure and transport sectors are 
already overwhelmed. Increasing the adaptive capacity of urban areas, including the adequate provision 
of infrastructure and services, will take significant advanced preparation and resources. Second, the 
vulnerability implications of immobility, for those who choose to stay or are unable to move away, should 
also be considered.
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Rural to rural climate migration will be driven by shifts in water availability and crop 
productivity, as in the northeast and the Ganges River basin in the west. This will require a 
combination of targeted and strategic policy responses, such as livelihood diversification 
and shifts to less climate sensitive sectors. 
Large parts of Bangladesh’s population (about 47 percent) still depends on agriculture and therefore 
remains vulnerable to climate impacts (World Bank 2017c). Rice production in the Ganges–Brahmaputra–
Meghna Delta region, for example, accounts for 34 percent of national production and is used for domestic 
consumption only (World Bank 2013b]). Large parts of the area are less than five meters above sea 
level and therefore at high risk of sea level rise (World Bank 2013b). Yu and others (2010) estimate the 
discounted total losses in agricultural GDP as a result of the combined impacts of climate change at about 
$25.8 billion, or $600 million a year between 2005 and 2050. Destruction of ecosystems and livelihoods 
may occur as rivers and coastal marshes become increasingly saline, groundwater salinizes, riverbanks 
erode, and tropical cyclone activity intensifies.
Given the importance of rice for rural livelihoods, particularly in the northeast, where crop conditions 
are projected to deteriorate, adaptation to climate change is vital. Higher flood risk poses a severe 
threat to Aman rice, one of Bangladesh’s three main rice crops, which grows in the monsoon season 
and accounts for more than half the national crop (Wassmann and others 2009). Increased flood risk 
to the Aman and Aus (pre-monsoon) rice crops is likely to interact with other climate change impacts 
on Boro (post-monsoon) rice crop production, leading to enormous economic damage (Yu and others 
2010). Moniruzzaman (2015) finds that farmers change the variety of rice they grow in response to 
temperature. Farmers chose to switch to Aus as summer temperatures increased. Other practices include 
the use of hydroponics (Ayers and Forsyth 2009), the conservation of water, the use of wells and irrigation, 
crop switching, and automation or technological innovation (Selvaraju and others 2006). Increasingly, 
households are also seeking off-farm employment (Thomas and others 2013).
Given regional differences in climate vulnerability, rural to rural migration levels are likely to increase, 
especially over short distances. The uneven distribution of climate change impacts can have differential 
effects on food prices, agricultural yields, and production, which affect poverty reduction and well-being. 
Climate change may induce migration out of the mainly rice-growing areas of the northeast, where declines 
in crop productivity are projected, toward the mainly rainfed and irrigated cropland areas of the Ganges 
River basin in the west, where improving water availability and crop productivity conditions are expected. 
More understanding of regional differences and vulnerabilities in rural livelihoods is therefore critical to 
provide a stronger basis for adaptive agricultural practices that would enable people to stay where they 
are and to identify potential viable host areas if people choose to move. 
Opportunities will also need to be identified and pursued for livelihood diversification out of climate 
change–sensitive areas and sectors so that climate migrants can be absorbed into the national economy. 
Agriculture’s share of GDP declined (from 24 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2016), and industry’s 
share rose (from 23 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in 2016) (World Bank 2017b). Given the increase in 
manufacturing, particularly in textiles, and services employment, this trend is likely to continue. Absent 
major policy shifts or marked global economic changes, agriculture will continue to slowly decline in 
relative importance and propel livelihood diversification in rural areas, likely increasing labor out-migration.  
Given the acceleration of climate migration trends, priority and urgency should be given to 
embedding climate migration into development policy and planning. Some of these efforts 
are currently underway in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh has the institutional capacity to adapt to climate change. According to its Nationally 
Determined Contribution, climate change adaptation is a key priority. The country has already undertaken 
initiatives in the water, health, forestry, agriculture, and infrastructure sectors to mainstream adaptation 
into national development. Several adaptation programs are underway—such as a program to enhance 
food security in the northwest and another to encourage labor migration out of the northwest during the 
dry season that could help shield the population from the worst effects of climate change. The Cyclone 
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Preparedness Programme is central to the country’s early warning systems. It uses more than 42,000 
volunteers along with a transceiver telecommunications network to ensure rapid delivery of warnings to 
the population at risk (Habib, Shahidullah, and Ahmed 2012).
Bangladesh’s National Sustainable Development Strategy recognizes that absent adaptation efforts, by 
2050, sea level rise, river bank erosion, and saline water intrusion in coastal areas may displace large 
numbers of people, who will have to migrate or be resettled (Government of Bangladesh 2013). The 
government identified “a clear gap in the broader strategic policy framework, specific legal mandate and 
dedicated institutional arrangements to deal with the issue” of disaster and climate induced internal 
displacement (Government of Bangladesh 2015). The National Strategy on the Management of Disaster 
and Climate Induced Internal Displacement aims to address this gap (Box 5.3). Further integration 
of climate migration could align with the adaptation priorities set out in the Nationally Determined 
Contribution, including climate-resilient infrastructure, housing, and communications; urban resilience; 
options for agriculture; and better early warning systems and disaster preparedness. Bangladesh’s 
Vision 2021, which lays out development targets to that year, could incorporate good management of 
climate migration as an important factor in achieving inclusive development and adaptation. Bangladesh’s 
Perspective Plan for 2041 provides a longer term planning horizon.
Box 5.3: Bangladesh’s national strategy for managing disaster- and climate-induced internal displacement
Bangladesh’s vision for the National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement is to 
“set out a comprehensive and realistic rights-based framework that respects, protects and ensures the rights of climate-induced 
internally displaced persons in different stages of displacement and during the search for durable solutions.” It includes:
• creation of a common and coherent basis for policy directions and action plans at the national and local levels;
• adoption of both preventive and adaptive measures to minimize the internal displacement caused by climate-related 
disasters;
• development of guides for sectoral programs for the creation of conducive environments for safe, voluntary and dignified 
return/integration or relocation/resettlement;
• effective and efficient management and access to entitlements; and
• promotion of livelihood opportunities and overall human development as part of inclusive development programs.
Targeted actions under the pre-displacement phase aim at prevention and preparedness. They include:
• promoting activities related to understanding risk;
• investing in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation;
• strengthening disaster risk governance;
• creating employment and decent livelihood options, by promoting and encouraging the decentralization of urban growth 
centers; and
• engaging land use planning that is responsive to climate disaster risk, by identifying highly vulnerable zones and restricting 
human settlement in unprotected or highly vulnerable areas. 
Actions under the displacement phase would include strengthening humanitarian and disaster relief assistance and protecting 
fundamental human rights of people during displacement. Actions under the post-displacement phase would ensure that 
displaced people have the option to choose durable solutions, including return to their original place, local integration, or 
resettlement in a manner that is voluntary and safe and protects their dignity. 
A National Task Force on Displacement would constitute the highest decision-making body with regard to internal displacement 
caused by climatic hazards. This interministerial and interagency body would be responsible for implementing the strategy and 
ensuring coordination with line ministries and government departments. 
Source: Government of Bangladesh (2015).
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KEY FINDINGS ON MEXICO 
Main findings on Mexico include the following:
• The scale of internal climate migration is projected to increase in all scenarios by 2050, against a 
backdrop of overall population growth. Mexico’s population is projected to grow from 125 million in 
2015 to between 135 million (in SSP4) and 148 million (in SSP2) by 2050.35 As an upper middle 
income country with a diversified economy that has already experienced a demographic transition, 
Mexico could be in a good position to anticipate and cope with climate change-induced population 
redistribution.
• The number of climate migrants by 2050 is largest in the pessimistic reference scenario. The figure 
could be as high as 3.1 million. Numbers are lower in the more climate-friendly scenario and lowest 
in the more inclusive development scenario, suggesting that development pathways targeting both 
lower global emission trajectories alongside reduced poverty and inequality will help reduce the scale 
of climate migration. Sustained development gains and a stronger economy mean higher adaptive 
capacity and financial resources to target the most vulnerable areas and groups. 
• The share of climate migrants in total internal migrants is projected to increase in all scenarios. Climate 
migrants could constitute about 11 percent of all internal migrants in the pessimistic reference 
scenario by 2050, suggesting that slow-onset climate change may become an increasingly important 
driver of internal migration in a country that already has high internal mobility.
• The central plateau, where Mexico City and other major cities are located, will be a hotspot of future 
climate in-migration; the arid north as well as rainfed croplands and low-lying southern coastal areas 
will be out-migration hotspots. The central plateau may offer more favorable conditions for livelihoods 
and settlements than the arid north and the low-lying southern coastal states, which will be affected 
by sea level rise. This pattern aligns with Mexico’s advanced levels of urbanization, declining relevance 
of farming-only livelihoods, and continuing depopulation of rural areas. Rural to urban flows are being 
replaced by intra-metropolitan mobility and mobility from the central downtown areas to surrounding 
suburban and peri-urban areas.
Country context 
Mexico is a large and diverse country in terms of physical geography, climate, biodiversity, demographic 
and social composition, economic development, and culture. With a territory of 1.9 million square 
kilometers and a 2016 population of more than 125 million, it is the 10th most populous and 13th largest 
country in the world (World Bank 2017c). It is also highly urbanized, with 79 percent of its population living 
in urban areas (World Bank 2017c). Almost half of the population resides in cities of 100,000 people 
or more (CONAPO 2015; INEGI 2016). Map 5.3 shows the country’s political boundaries and elevation.
35 The moderate development pathway (SSP2) for Mexico yields larger populations than the unequal development pathway (SSP4), 
because it is a middle-income country. Only low-income countries show marked increases in population under SSP4 (see Chapter 3). 
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Mexico has already completed a demographic transition, which began in the 1970s. The national 
population growth rate is now declining, although there are regional differences. Baja California Sur, in 
the north, had the fastest growth, at 3.5 percent in 2010, while Mexico City contracted by 0.2 percent.
Mexico’s age structure had a typical pyramid shape in 1950. By 2017 it had a more mature structure, with 
smaller cohorts supporting an older population (Figure 5.19). These changes have resulted in a reduction 
of the age dependency ratio, which reached 104.3 in 1970 before falling to 51 percent in 2016, leading to 
a working population that represents a larger proportion of the total population (World Bank 2017c). This 
demographic dividend is assumed to have a positive impact on economic development—but reaping that 
dividend requires coordinated policies that must be implemented within a narrow time window. Current 
population projections indicate that after 2024 the demographic dividend may end (Nava-Bolaños and 
Ham-Chande 2016). By 2050, the age structure is expected to adopt the classical urn shape of aging 
populations, with a sharp increase in the proportion of older adults.
Educational attainment is also paramount for decreasing climate vulnerability (Cuaresma, Lutz, and 
Sanderson 2014). Education can directly influence risk perception, skills and knowledge, while also having 
indirect effects on poverty reduction, health improvement, and access to information and resources, which 
in turn confers greater adaptive capacity (Muttarak and Lutz 2014). Secondary school enrollment was 
91 percent in 2014 (World Bank 2017c). Disparities in educational attainment are wide, however, with 
lower levels in Chiapas, Michoacán, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Veracruz and much higher levels in Mexico 
City, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, and Aguascalientes.
Map 5.3: Political boundaries and elevation of Mexico 
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Climate trends
Mexico has large areas of semi-arid to arid lands in the north and pockets of semi-arid areas in the south 
(Oaxaca State for example) and in the northern Yucatan, making the country very susceptible to rainfall 
deficits. According to the IPCC, warming of 0.7°–1°C has been detected in Mexico over the past 40 years, 
and precipitation has declined since the 1950s by about 365 millimeters (Magrin and others 2014). 
Changes in streamflow and water availability have been observed and are projected to continue. 
Mexico has historically been exposed to extreme events such as hurricanes, floods, and droughts. 
According to the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), between 1900 and 2016 tropical cyclones were 
the most frequent climate-related disaster in Mexico, followed by floods and droughts.
Results of the two ISIMIP models for water availability are highly varied through 2050 (see Appendix B). 
The WaterGAP model driven by the IPSL-CM5A-LR model shows the greatest declines in water availability, 
especially under the high emissions scenario, which projects declines of 70–90 percent through 2050 
over large portions of Mexico. The WaterGAP model driven by the HadGEM2 model shows declining water 
availability only in the northwestern parts of Mexico, and in the Yucatan. The LPJmL water model driven 
by HadGEM2-ES shows only modest, mostly positive changes in water availability. The model runs driven 
by IPSL-CM5A-LR are similar to the WaterGAP results, with milder decreases. The general picture is one of 
declining water availability, with some individual runs showing modest increases over relatively large areas.
The crop model outputs do not generally see the same extreme proportional declines as the water models, 
except for the northwestern parts of Mexico under the GEPIC model. The LPJmL crop model projects slight 
increases in crop productivity (up to 20 percent) on the central plateau and marked increases in Oaxaca 
(up to 40–60 percent). In coastal areas, the LPJmL crop model projects crop productivity declines of 
10–30 percent.
Figure 5.19: Population pyramids for Mexico, 2017 and 2050 
































162 Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration
Sea level rise in 2010–50 will have impacts on low-lying areas of the Yucatan and other areas of the Gulf 
Coast, but the impacts are generally localized. The cities of Villahermosa and Campeche, on the southern 
Gulf Coast and western Yucatan, respectively, are particularly vulnerable, as are many smaller tourist-
oriented cities and towns of the Yucatan. Farther north along the Gulf Coast, Tampico, a city of nearly one 
million, is also projected to suffer from significant inundation under the pessimistic reference scenario. 
Nationally, Mexico stands to lose some 19,390 square kilometers of land area to sea level rise, or just 
over one percent of its total (Romero-Lankao and others 2014; SEMARNAT 2016). 
Climate change projections for 2050–2100 using the ISIMIP water and crop model outputs suggest 
extreme water stress for all of Mexico’s regions, except the northeast under the more extreme RCP8.5 
pathway (see Chapter 4 for ISIMIP water and crop model outputs for 2050–2100). The same models 
project increased temperatures, which will negatively affect crop yields and rural livelihoods. The IPCC 
(Christensen and others 2013) concurs with these results, stating that much of Mexico will likely see 
decreases in mean annual precipitation through the end of the century.
Projected climate migration trends
The number of climate migrants is projected to increase by 2050 regardless of the emissions and 
socioeconomic development pathway (Figure 5.20). Although the percentage of climate migrants will 


























Figure 5.20: Projected numbers of internal climate migrants in Mexico under three scenarios, 2020-50
Note: Dark lines represent the average of all model runs for each scenario. White unshaded areas represent the highest and lowest model runs for that scenario. 
The large intervals partly reflect the fact that climate and sectoral models were selected to represent the widest possible range of outcomes. 
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
% 0.45 0.45 1.08 1.23 0.14 0.30 0.55 0.80 0.31 0.64 0.88 1.01
Climate migrants as a percentage of the total population
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The largest numbers of climate migrants are in the pessimistic reference scenario, which projects that 1.7 
million people (with a range of 0.3 million–3.1 million) are likely to move as a result of climate impacts (Table 
5.5). This is followed by the more climate-friendly scenario which projects 1.4 million climate migrants (with 
a range of 0.2–2.5 million). The more inclusive development scenario with 1.2 million climate migrants (with 
a range of 0.4–1.9 million) has the lowest numbers.
Comparing the higher numbers of climate migrants in the pessimistic reference scenario with the lower 
numbers in the more inclusive development scenario, results suggest that in a middle-to-high income 
country like Mexico, development policies and targeted interventions that strengthen adaptive capacity play 
an important role in reducing climate migration. This is despite the higher population projections under the 
more inclusive development scenario. 
 
The number of climate migrants under the more inclusive development scenario begins to trend upward, 
however, towards 2040, when more pronounced climate impacts start to set in. This suggests that 
development policy must also be accompanied by action on emissions reductions by Mexico and actors 
worldwide. This is particularly important given that the ISIMIP water and crop models project more widespread 
climate impacts in the second half of century. 
Climate migrants will represent an increasing share of internal migrants across all scenarios (Figure 5.21). 
This share will increase slightly in the pessimistic reference and more climate-friendly scenarios. These two 
scenarios share an unequal development pathway (SSP4), which drives a higher number of other internal 
migrants and results in a smaller share of climate migrants by 2050. In comparison, under the more inclusive 
development scenario, where the number of other internal migrants are lower, climate migrants represent a 
larger share of other internal migrants by 2050.







Number of internal climate migrants by 2050 (million) 1.7 1.2 1.4
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) (million) 0.3 3.1 0.4 1.9 0.2 2.5
Internal climate migrants as percent of population 1.23% 0.80% 1.01%
Minimum (left) and maximum (right) 0.20% 2.27% 0.28% 1.31% 0.11% 1.90%
Note: The scenarios are based on combinations of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). SSP2 = moderate 
development; SSP4 = unequal development; RCP2.6 = low emissions; RCP8.5 = high emissions. 
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Other internal migrants under SSP4 Other internal migrants under SSP4
Internal climate migrants
Other internal migrants under SSP2
Internal climate migrants
Figure 5.21: Projected number of climate and other internal migrants in Mexico under three scenarios, 
2020–50
Note: The whiskers on the climate migrant bars represent the 95th percentile confidence interval for the four model runs that comprise each scenario. There are 
no confidence intervals for other migrants, because only a single development trajectory is used in each scenario (SSP2 or SSP4).
b. 2050
Figure 5.22: Baseline population density 2010, and projected population density under the pessimistic 
reference scenario 2050, Mexico
a. 2010
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Projected spatial patterns of climate migration
The spatial distribution of population growth will vary widely across Mexico. Figure 5.22 displays the 
baseline (2010) population density and 2050 projected population density under the pessimistic reference 
scenario, while Figure 5.23 displays the change in population density over that time frame. These maps 
show highest growth and population densities in urban areas and widespread declines in population 
density in rural areas (the percentage changes appear high because of low baseline populations in many 
rural areas). The maps also underscore Mexico’s ongoing urbanization story by showing urban growth in 
secondary or new urban areas around Mexico City. As people move from central cities to the surrounding 
suburban and peri-urban areas, they create new demand for housing, transportation, social services, and 
jobs. Depending on policies, they may also create new vulnerabilities (if, for example, settlement occurs 
on floodplains or on steep hills). 
Projections show large climate in-migration hotspots in the central plateau near Mexico City and to the east 
of Puebla and scattered out-migration hotspots in the arid north and along the Gulf of Mexico (Figure 5.24). 
In-migration hotspots occur in the central plateau, where several of Mexico’s largest cities are. Smaller 
hotspots are visible farther south, in Oaxaca State, and along the northern coast of Baja California just 
south of Tijuana. The map also shows some small out-migration hotspots scattered across the arid north 
of the country; the largest ones are concentrated on the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico, especially Veracruz 
and Tabasco States; in the southern state of Chiapas; and on the Pacific coast, especially in Guerrero State. 
b. Percentage change in population density
Figure 5.23: Absolute and percentage change in population density in Mexico under the pessimistic 
reference scenario, 2010-50
a. Change in population density
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Figure 5.24: Hotspots projected to have high levels of climate in-migration and climate out-migration in 
Mexico, 2030 and 2050
Note: High certainty reflects agreement across all three scenarios modeled, and moderate certainty reflects agreement across two scenarios. In- and out-
migration hotspots are thus areas in which at least two scenarios concur on density changes in the top 10th percentile of the density distribution, which in 
Mexico and Central America represents an increased population density in 2050 of about 3.3 to 6.8 people per square kilometer, depending on the scenario. 
For decreased population density, it is about minus 1.8 to minus 3 people per square kilometer. 
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
High certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate in-migration
High certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
Moderate certainty in high levels of climate out-migration
IN-MIGRATION OUT-MIGRATION
These findings are consistent with the current geography of domestic mobility in Mexico, including 
movements induced by climate change. Under future climate change scenarios, the central plateau 
around Mexico City will offer more favorable conditions for livelihoods and settlements than the arid north 
and low-lying states along the coast in the south and southeast. Low-lying coastal areas may also be 
prone to sea level rise, leading to out-migration. However, urban areas in the central plateau, Mexico City 
in particular, may face water shortage challenges if water management systems are not improved and 
prepared to accommodate increasing numbers of people (World Bank 2013a).
Climate migrants are projected to leave rural livelihoods in rainfed croplands and move to peri-urban or 
urban locations (Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26). Magnitudes are small—generally no greater than plus 
or minus 300,000, or less than 0.2 percent of Mexico’s 2050 population. Only in the case of rainfed 
croplands does the change approach three percent of the total population of the livelihood zone; in most 
zones, it is less than one percent. Trends and even changes in direction between periods need to be 
interpreted in this light, for example the declining trend occurring for dense settlements under the more 
inclusive development scenario in 2050.36 
Rainfed cropland areas are likely to have the most climate out-migrants, mainly as a result of declining 
productivity in rainfall-dependent cropping areas (see Figure 5.26). The downward trend is more moderate 
for the more inclusive development scenario. Irrigated croplands display an upward trend, which is more 
pronounced for the more inclusive development scenario than in the more climate-friendly and pessimistic 
reference scenarios. Dense settlements enjoy net in-migration, with similar trends across scenarios up to 
2040. In 2050, dense settlements continue to see net in-migration in the pessimistic reference and more 
climate-friendly scenarios but see net out-migration in the more inclusive development scenario as noted 
above. Likely related to the concentration of population on the dry central plateau, pastoral and rangeland 
areas also see net in-migration.
36 This declining trend is associated with out-migration from Mexico City, a megalopolis of more than 20 million people. Even if all 
200,000 climate migrants were to leave this city (an unlikely scenario), they would represent no more than one percent of the 
population.
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Figure 5.25: Livelihood zones in Mexico, by anthropogenic biome, 2015














































Note: Whiskers show 95th percent confidence intervals for climate migrants.
Source: Ellis and others (2010).
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Results across crop and water models show that it is not solely water availability that drives crop yields but 
also increases in average and extreme temperatures, especially in low-lying (and therefore hotter) regions, 
such as coastal Mexico and especially the Yucatan. This finding is consistent with the agricultural pathway 
described by Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer (2010) and Nawrotzki and others (2015). 
In-country consultations on modeling results
Consultations on the results in Mexico were held at both the national and local level in December 2017. 
This involved about 40 participants from academia, research, government, and community organizations. 
The consultations revealed a good level of awareness and strong research and analytics in the context of 
climate impacts and migration. Current attention on human movements relating to the environment was 
largely driven by extreme events and geophysical hazards, and in the context of cross-border movements. 
The participants welcomed the insights presented on the nexus between slow-onset climate change and 
internal migration. While some participants underscored the need for continued attention to displacements 
from extreme events in the near-term, others emphasized the need for anticipatory analysis to inform 
dialogue and decision support to manage the movements relating to slow-onset climate change for the 
medium to longer term. There was strong interest in more granular and customized modeling for Mexico.
Local level consultations in Oaxaca highlighted that presently socio-economic factors were perceived as the most 
important driver of out-migration, and climate change was not yet seen as a distinct contributor. The perception 
was that this was unlikely to change in the future. This observation aligns with the findings of this report, which 
shows this locality as a possible climate in-migration hotspot compared to movements away from the coast. The 
consultations also emphasized that communities were key players in managing migration through strong cultural 
and social ties, with remittances representing an important source of income support for many families. 
In addition, the consultations noted a lag between research and policy; and called for stronger and more 
aligned policies on migration with action on the ground. 
What do these results mean for Mexico’s development future?
As an upper-middle-income country with a diversified and expanding economy, a 
predominantly urban population, and a large young population entering the labor force, 
Mexico has the potential to adapt to climate change, but needs to pay close attention to 
climate effects on pockets of poverty.
Mexico’s economic growth and development have been erratic, with intermittent periods of strong growth 
and crisis (Loría and Salas 2014). Structural reforms and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) helped shift the economy from overreliance on fossil fuel exports to a diversified economy with 
export-oriented manufacturing. The economy continues to perform well—despite relatively weak oil prices 
and escalating drug-related violence—thanks to strong domestic demand, low inflation, expansion of 
credit, and increasing international trade (Rivas 2016; OECD 2017).
The main sectors of the economy in 2016 were services (63 percent of GDP) and industry (33 percent), 
followed by agriculture (4 percent) (World Bank 2017b), with the composition differing substantially across 
states (INEGI 2012). As Mexico becomes a global manufacturing hub, the production of export goods is 
becoming highly concentrated in just a few cities (Sobrino 2016), adding to regional disparities. 
Unemployment was at 3.9 percent in 2016 (World Bank 2017c). The country has a very large informal 
sector (54 percent of the nonagricultural workforce in 2013) (World Bank 2017c). The services sector is 
the largest employer (61 percent of total employment), followed by industry (25 percent) and agriculture 
(13 percent) (World Bank 2017c). 
The main challenges include persistently high poverty rates and income inequality, low female labor 
force participation, lagging educational attainment (compared with other OECD countries), and pervasive 
financial exclusion (OECD 2017). As a result, income, wealth, social connections, education and skills, 
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safety, and work-life balance are all affecting the average Mexican household (OECD 2017). The Human 
Development Index is higher in the capital and toward the north and lower in the southern states. Poverty 
rates are higher in rural areas, but the urban–rural poverty gap is narrowing because poverty rates have 
increased in urban areas (World Bank 2017b).
Adaptation efforts in Mexico have to pay close attention to these pockets of poverty. Stronger economies 
tend to have higher adaptive capacity and financial resources to target the most vulnerable areas and 
groups in a future with climate change, but they need to make use of them.
The rate of change of climate migration increases as the climate signal becomes stronger. 
How climate affects households’ decision to move needs to be better understood and 
managed, alongside other types and drivers of migration.
The impacts of climate shocks on migration can be instantaneous or occur only after a delay. In their 
analysis of rural households’ response to climate shocks, Nawrotzki and DeWaard (2016) find a time 
pattern in which the probabilities of migration are low immediately after a shock, increase to peak three 
years after the event, and then decline. This pattern suggests that adaptation in place may be behind this 
final decline and thus represents an important strategy, which has implications for policy interventions 
and planning. 
Nawrotzki and others (2017) explore the impacts of climate shocks for adults 15–39 on four types of 
migration: rural to urban, rural to rural, urban to urban, and urban to rural. Their results reveal different 
timing, depending on the type of internal migration. Migration to rural destinations (rural to rural or urban 
to rural) shows a weak association with these shocks. In contrast, migration to urban destinations, 
particularly rural to urban migration, displays a strong and positive relationship with months of exposure 
to droughts and warm spells.
Findings for Mexico are in line with earlier literature indicating that climate variability can affect internal and 
international migration. Warmer temperatures and declining rainfall will have the greatest effects on rural 
populations, people heavily dependent on rainfed agriculture, people with low education, and domestic rural 
to urban and U.S.-bound migration flows (see Nawrotzki, Riosmena, and Hunter 2013; Nawrotzki and others 
2015; Chort and Rupelle 2016; and Nawrotzki and others 2017). Jessoe, Manning, and Taylor (2017) 
project that internal out-migration from rural areas will increase by 0.67–1.4 percent (about 110,000–
233,000 people) by 2075 in a medium-emissions scenario (depending on the climate model), with regional 
differences.37 These forecasts are in line with the results of the modeling done for this report and support 
the overall conclusion that changes in water availability and crop yields affect mobility.
Climate migrants’ share of the population is likely to increase to 0.8–1.2 percent by 2050, 
with movement out of rainfed croplands and low-lying coastal areas, especially in the 
south, to peri-urban or urban locations. 
Projected spatial patterns of movement are in line with Mexico’s high level of urbanization, the declining 
relevance of farming-only livelihoods, and the continuing depopulation of rural areas.
Internal mobility has contributed greatly to Mexico’s changing population distribution. Between 1970 and 
2015, the population concentrated in urban areas. Between-state mobility rates declined, and within-state 
rates intensified. Rural to urban flows are being replaced by intra-metropolitan mobility, and by mobility 
from the central downtown areas to the surrounding suburban and peri-urban areas (Figure 5.27). There 
was a decline in the number of municipalities in the “push” category over time, and there were changes in 
the status of several northern municipalities from areas of attraction (pull) to areas of expulsion (push). In 
addition to economic migration to Mexico’s largest cities, there has also been growing internal migration 
to the country’s coastal tourist centers, including Cancun, Los Cabos and Puerto Vallarta among others 
37 Jessoe, Manning, and Taylor used two climate models (the Community Climate System Model 4 Community Earth System Model 
[CCSM4] and HadGEM2) and two emissions scenarios (medium [RCP 4.5] and high [RCP 6.0]).
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(Aguayo-Téllez and Martínez-Navarro 2013; Gordillo and Plassot 2017; Romo Viramontes et al. 2013; 
Perez-Campuzano and Santos-Cerquera 2013). However, some of these coastal areas are vulnerable to 
extreme weather events. Los Cabos, for example, was severely impacted by Hurricane Odile in 2014 and 
Tropical Storm Lidia in 2017.
Improvements in living conditions (education, job status, and income) and the diversification of labor 
markets in predominantly rural sending areas could lead to the decline of certain types of mobility 
(emigration flows) and the increase of others (urban commutes). Such improvements could also reduce 
the decline in the well-being gap between migrant and nonmigrant households (Jones 2014). For example, 
irrigation support for the production of Mexico’s primary crop (corn [maize]) may reduce the odds of 
domestic migration from agriculture-dependent rural communities (Nawrotzki and others 2016). 
As climate migration is unlikely to occur uniformly across rural livelihood zones, regional 
differences must be taken into account to strengthen adaptive capacity and avoid distress 
migration.
Agriculture, particularly corn production, is the economic activity most likely to be affected by climate 
change, putting farm owners, farm workers, and their families at risk (Ziervogel and others 2006; Smith 
and Olesen 2010; Hunter, Murray, and Riosmena 2013; World Bank 2014). Nationally, the share of 
Mexico’s population that works in agriculture is low and declining. Some states—such as Chiapas and 
Oaxaca—have larger shares in agriculture. They also have higher rates of poverty, making them more 
vulnerable to climate impacts. Some analysts estimate that by 2050, climate change impacts could 
reduce the incomes of agricultural households by up to 15 percent, mainly through reductions in yields, 
especially in corn but also for barley (Calderón-García and others 2015) and coffee (Gay and others 
2006). These populations are more likely to migrate in response to threats to their main income source.
Smallholders, self-employed farmers, and independent farmers tend to have higher poverty rates than 
the average rural residents (Galindo and others 2014), about 58 versus 37 percent in 2008 (Rodriguez 
and Meneses 2010) Poverty status varies greatly across rural households, depending on the degree 
of livelihood diversification, household structure, asset composition, and degree of local autonomous 
adaptation (through changes in land allocation, for example) (Skoufias, Rabassa, and Olivieri 2011).
b. 2005–10 
Figure 5.27: Net migration rates in Mexico, by municipality, 1995–2000 and 2005–10
a. 1995–2000
Source: Created by authors, based on data from Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia; cut off points for the categories are from Romo Viramontes, Tellez 
Vasquez, and Lopez Ramirez (2013).
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Any analysis of the potential impacts of climate change on livelihoods and mobility needs to consider 
the possibility of “double exposure”—the interaction of climate risk with economic and political 
changes—which can amplify or reduce household vulnerability. Eakin (2005, page 1924) notes that 
“while adaptation is occurring and will occur spontaneously, the effectiveness of these adaptations for 
mitigating future sensitivity to climatic risk will be strongly influenced by the ways in which policy enables 
or inhibits households’ capacity to address climatic challenges.” Her case study of adaptive capacity 
(assets, capabilities, strategies, and their constraints) in three Tlaxcala communities during a period of 
agricultural reform uncovered multiple livelihood strategies, including subsistence corn production under 
land scarcity; crop diversification and livestock investment; irrigated vegetable production; and economic 
diversification into nonfarm activities, including giving up farming altogether and seasonal migration (see 
also Andersen and others 2016).
Several institutional and policy frameworks in Mexico can already accommodate the 
integration of climate migration.
Poverty reduction programs for rural areas can increase adaptive capacity to climate change in parallel 
with or as an alternative to mobility (Aksakal and Schmidt 2015). Those programs include the Fondo de 
Apoyo Rural para Contingencias Climatológicas (Rural Support Fund for Climatological Contingencies), 
which provides insurance against hydro-meteorological events (including droughts and floods) as well 
as early warning forecasts, targeting low-income producers; the cash-transfer program Oportunidades 
(Opportunities), a social protection program for the rural poor; and PROCAMPO, designed to support 
subsistence farmers. Some subprograms included in the Programa de Apoyos a Pequeños Productores 
(Support programs for Small Farmers) of the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fishing and Food (SAGARPA) outline actions to facilitate the permanence of young farmers in rural areas. 
Going forward, climate migration could be explicitly referenced in policy instruments related to climate 
change (for example, the country’s Nationally Determined Contribution and the 2012 Climate Change 
Law), as well as other policies that may affect drivers of climate-related mobility, particularly rural to 
urban movements (Ochoa Lupián and Ayvar Campos 2015). Policy and planning instruments could 
outline actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience of populations, ecosystems, and 
infrastructure and prioritizing prevention rather than reconstruction (SEMARNAT-INEEC 2016). Examples 
include water management (Sanchez Cohen and others 2012) and climate change adaptation plans. 
Targeted interventions can build on ongoing adaptation efforts underway at the national and regional 
levels, through institutions such as the National Institute of Climate Change and Ecology, the National 
Water Commission (CONAGUA), and the Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA). Future plans could 
harmonize agendas and policies on disaster management and prevention and on climate change. These 
plans could be articulated in existing programs, such as the Mesoamerica Integration and Development 
Project, which includes regional cooperation for risk management, adaptation, and mitigation.
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Chapter 6 
Using a novel scenario-based approach, this report shows that slow-onset climate 
change is becoming a potent driver of internal climate migration. Beyond the 
scale and trajectory of climate migration within countries, the analysis reveals 
that migration patterns are not uniform—some areas and livelihoods are more 
adversely impacted than others. While some climate migration cannot be avoided 
due to the lock-in of climate effects of past emissions, the results also indicate that 
future trajectories of climate migration are not set in stone. 
In other words, internal climate migration will be a reality, but it does not have to 
become a crisis, if concerted and targeted action is taken now to better predict and 
prepare for its likely effects and to harness its potential as an adaptation strategy. 
Importantly, policy decisions made today will shape the extent to which the effects 
of climate change will be positive for migrants and their families, sending and 
receiving communities, and for equitable national economic growth. Inaction would 
mean missing a vital opportunity to reconfigure where, when, and how climate-
resilient investments are made in support of robust economies. 
As noted in previous chapters, the report’s main findings include the following:
• The scale of internal climate migration could be substantial but good development policies together 
with action on climate change mitigation and adaptation could reduce these numbers. By 2050, up 
to 143.3 million people or 2.8 percent of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin 
America could be internal climate migrants under the pessimistic reference scenario. The number of 
climate migrants is projected to reach a high of 85.7 million in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40.5 million in South 
Asia, and 17.1 million in Latin America by 2050. In the more inclusive development scenario, internal 
climate migration could drop to between 65.1 million and 105.3 million across the three regions. The 
largest declines would occur in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, with smaller declines in Latin 
America. The more climate-friendly scenario projects the fewest internal climate migrants, ranging 
from 31.2 to 71.7 million and implying reductions of up to 80 percent of the pessimistic reference 
scenario. These results represent lower-bound estimates of the likely overall impact of climate change 
on migration. As noted earlier in the report, the analysis is limited to climate-induced migration within 
countries in three regions and has a focus on slow-onset climate impacts (water availability, crop 
productivity, and sea level rise) rather than on rapid-onset events such as floods and hurricanes. The 
analysis done in this report could be extended to cover other countries and other regions.
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• The poorest and most climate-vulnerable regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia will be 
hardest hit. Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to have the largest numbers of internal climate migrants: 
ranging from 56.6 to 85.7 million in the pessimistic reference scenario by 2050. This represents an 
average of 3.5 percent of the region’s total population, which is more than twice the proportion of the 
other two regions. Two factors may be driving this. First, Sub-Saharan Africa is highly vulnerable to climate 
impacts, especially in already fragile drylands and along exposed coastlines. Second, the region’s 
agriculture, which employs a significant portion of the labor force, depends on rainfall for almost all its 
crop production. South Asia is projected to have between 30.9 to 40.5 million internal climate migrants 
by 2050 under the pessimistic reference scenario. This is 1.6 percent of the region’s total population 
in 2050. Bangladesh, which is very densely populated and highly exposed to climate risks, accounts 
for almost one-third of the region’s total climate migrants. In Latin America by 2050, the pessimistic 
reference scenario projects between 4.3 to 17.1 million internal climate migrants, or an average of 1.6 
percent of the region’s total population. These lower numbers may reflect generally stronger economies 
in the region with higher adaptive capacity and less reliance on climate sensitive sectors, with some 
exceptions in the low-income countries in Central America. 
• Climate in- and out-migration hotspots emerge by 2030, and by 2050, the scenarios increasingly 
converge on their growing number, intensity, and spatial extent. Climate out-migration will occur in 
areas where livelihood systems are increasingly compromised by climate impacts, while in-migration 
will occur in areas with better livelihood opportunities. The geographic distribution of climate in- and 
out-migration hotspots will vary widely across the three regions. Climate out-migration hotspots across 
the three regions will include low-lying cities, coastlines vulnerable to sea level rise, and areas of 
high water and agriculture stress. Even with expected out-migration, many climate-vulnerable areas 
will continue to support significant numbers of people. Climate in-migration hotspots emerge in 
locations with better climatic conditions for agriculture as well as cities able to provide better livelihood 
opportunities. Major cities in all three regions may become hotspots of climate in-migration. Declining 
crop productivity, coupled with existing rural to urban migration pathways, means a high likelihood 
of movement toward non-climate-related sources of income and cities. Some of the large urban and 
coastal cities (e.g. Addis Ababa, Dhaka) will need to balance climate out-migration against broader 
trends of population growth through longer-term planning and investments in adaptive capacity to 
secure resilience in the face of climate impacts. Climate in- and out-migration projections do not 
consider technological advances or adaption and development responses that might allow cities or 
rural areas to sustain larger populations. 
Looking ahead, there are several takeaways policy makers should heed to better plan and prepare for 
future climate migration. 
MIGRATION CAN BE A SENSIBLE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
STRATEGY IF MANAGED CAREFULLY AND SUPPORTED BY GOOD 
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND TARGETED INVESTMENTS. 
While development strategies can support people to adapt locally in areas where it makes sense to do 
so, adaptation “in place” has its limits. Where there is no credible long-term pathway to viable livelihoods, 
there is a risk that people will be induced to remain in places where conditions are deteriorating (McAdam 
and Saul 2010). For example, about 20 million people in coastal Bangladesh are already having their 
health affected from saltwater intrusion in drinking water supplies related to sea level rise. Remittances 
from family members working elsewhere can induce people to stay, possibly against their long-term best 
interests. Without appropriate policy interventions, perverse incentives to stay in place could undermine 
community health and well-being (McKenzie and Yang 2014; McLeman 2016b; Waldinger 2015). To 
avoid trapping people in increasingly unviable areas, opportunities should be identified for a transition out 
of climate-sensitive areas and sectors, for example by pursuing livelihood diversification outside places of 
origin, through skills training and other education.
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Migration as an adaptation strategy can be a pathway out of poverty (Adger and others 2014; Elllis 
2003). Under certain circumstances, voluntary migration can be a desirable form of adaptation, not a 
reflection of failure to adapt (McLeman and Smit 2006; Black and others 2011b; Tacoli 2011). However, 
migration must be addressed holistically and embedded in development policies and planning through 
inclusive and participatory approaches. Strengthening adaptive capacities and increasing readiness in 
the face of climate change (Warner 2010), can create an enabling environment for positive migration. 
Climate migration demands development policies that respond to the scale of the issue over the 
medium to long term. Incremental, low-regrets measures only may not be sufficient to counter the 
magnitude of climate impacts. Sequences of flexible incremental adaptation should be explored alongside 
more transformational adaptation, which include measures that are taken at a much larger scale or 
intensity, those that are new to a particular region or resource system, and those that transform places 
and shift locations (Kates and others 2012; Park and others 2012; Rickards and Howden 2012), to 
secure resilience over longer time-scales. 
In some cases, an economic transition toward sectors that are less sensitive to climate change 
need to be part of the longer-term solution. These shifts can provide alternative job opportunities for 
climate migrants and growing populations and help strengthen the resilience of economies. For example, 
Bangladesh’s shift to manufacturing is absorbing some migrants into less climate-sensitive sectors, but 
the country needs to ensure that these migrants are not disadvantaged. Mexico is an upper middle-
income country with a diversified and expanding economy that is relatively less climate-sensitive, though 
attention needs to be paid to pockets of poverty, and vulnerable coastal areas. To support such shifts, 
countries can provide training to potential migrants, identify destination labor markets, and support 
integration (ADB 2012).
Good management of demographic transitions and investment in human capital can also reduce 
climate vulnerability. Reduced mortality and fertility rates translate into smaller, young and dependent 
populations and larger, working-age populations. This “demographic dividend” can boost the economy 
(Bloom and others 2003; IMF 2006). For example, both Bangladesh and Mexico may have the 
opportunity to benefit from demographic dividends and gains in educational attainment. Advances in 
education, especially for girls, can help reduce vulnerability to climate risks, as educated individuals are 
more empowered and adaptive in their response to, preparation for, and recovery from such risks. But to 
tap the dividend, demographic transitions need to be accompanied by policies to absorb larger working-
age populations into productive and climate-resilient labor markets—and to ensure that they have good 
access to health care, employment, and education (PRB 2012). For example, countries such as Ethiopia, 
which could see a population increase of up to 85 percent by 2050 and experience lower agricultural 
productivity due to climate change, will need to absorb labor and a large youth bulge into non-agricultural 
and less climate-sensitive sectors. Good management of migration, driven by climate change over longer 
time scales, can produce positive momentum for such shifts.
Targeted interventions can be deployed in the short and medium term to support migrants. Some good 
practices stand out from development projects and programs:
• Facilitating informed migration decisions. Migration choices are based partly on perceptions of 
vulnerability and opportunities, which are often based on scant information (Koubi and others 2016; 
Zickgraf and others 2016). Migrants sometimes overestimate the benefits of moving (Munshi 2003; 
Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2012). Without material resources, information, and contacts, they 
may move, not to the most suitable next habitat, but to the most accessible one (Waldinger 2015). 
Policies that provide pre-departure orientation, increase migrants’ financial literacy, and secure their 
legal status, and access to financial resources can ease migrants’ adjustment to host areas, protect 
them from abuse, and improve financial decision making by migrants and the families they leave 
behind (McKenzie and Yang 2014; Waldinger 2015). World Bank projects such as the China Rural 
Migrant Skills Development and Employment Project have tailored interventions to both rural and 
urban areas to help address migrants’ needs in both sending and receiving areas by providing skills 
training, information, and legal support. 
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• Making social protection portable and scalable. Lack of portability in safety nets can tie poor people 
to places that no longer support their livelihoods (Holzmann, Koettl, and Chernetsky 2005; Kuriakose 
and others 2013; Gentilini 2015). Strategies to increase the portability of social protection benefits 
and programs include: (i) establishing program offices in major urban centers where migrants can 
register on arrival; (ii) ensuring channels for information, including on how to remain in a program 
and where registration offices are; (iii) making it easier to access benefits, by using mobile money, 
biometric verification of beneficiaries, and real-time online monitoring; and (iv) building social welfare 
systems that can be scaled up or down in response to changing needs. Examples include the Bolsa 
Familia program in Brazil; and the World Bank’s Third Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, and China 
Guangdong Social Security Integration and Rural Worker Project (Gentilini and Omamo 2011).
• Tapping the potential of financial and social remittances. Migration and remittances tend to increase 
in response to climate shocks; both may support coping (Wodon and Blankespoor 2014). Research 
shows that remittances have the capacity to protect people from income shocks and lifecycle risks, 
increase household income, and improve living conditions (de Haas 2010). Remittances tend to be 
more stable than other private capital flows during crises (Kapur 2004). Facilitating remittance flows 
through institutional frameworks that foster cheaper, faster, more stable, and secure channels can 
increase their value (de Haas 2010). Linking migrants to their areas of origin—by, for example, easing 
the transfer of remittances at the sending end and facilitating financial literacy at the receiving end—
can improve disaster recovery and to some extent preparedness and adaptation (Mohapatra, Joseph, 
and Ratha 2009; Joseph, Wodon, and Blankespoor 2014; Manandhar 2016; Banerjee and others 
2017). Meanwhile, remittances can also create inequalities within a community and destabilize 
local markets, and in other cases create perverse incentives to stay in place in increasingly climate-
vulnerable areas. Remittances cannot replace sound development, but policy interventions can help 
maximize their potential. In addition to lowering transactions fees, efforts include facilitating disaster 
relief from diasporas, and facilitating investments through remittances (Zickgraf and Gemenne 2017). 
When social remittances enter receiving communities through local social networks and interactions, 
as they do in Mexico for example, they also benefit people who are not direct beneficiaries of financial 
remittances (Cascone and others 2016).
INTERNAL CLIMATE MIGRATION MAY BE A REALITY, BUT IT DOESN’T 
HAVE TO BE A CRISIS. ACTION ACROSS THREE MAJOR AREAS 
COULD HELP REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BEING FORCED TO 
MOVE IN DISTRESS.
Countries will be locked into a certain level of climate migration—but these trajectories are not 
set in stone. Even at current level of warming, countries will be locked into a certain level of internal 
climate migration. Climate migration patterns will play out differently both within and across countries. 
The distribution of climate migrants between hotspots of climate in- and out-migration depends on 
each country’s climate vulnerability and development context. Early action on good development policy 
alongside global action on emissions towards the Paris targets could help counter the upward trend and 
reduce the overall scale of climate migration. The window of opportunity is still open to plan and act before 
climate change impacts are expected to worsen—perhaps irretrievably—after 2050. 
The consequences of inaction are ominous. Without early and concerted action, the results of this report 
indicate that the upward trend of climate migration ramps up across all regions, for all scenarios. The 
2016 World Bank Shock Waves report found that climate conditions or climate events can be the impetus 
that pushes households into poverty through price shocks linked to lower agricultural production; natural 
disasters that destroy poor people’s assets; and health shocks influenced by climate and environmental 
conditions (Hallegatte and others 2016). These consequences, compounded with slow-onset climate 
impacts, could greatly diminish options for adapting in place and migrating under favorable conditions, 
while increasing climate migration under distress.
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PURSUING EARLY AND CONCERTED ACTION IN THREE AREAS IS KEY. 
Cut global greenhouse gas emissions now
Rapid reductions in global emissions can reduce the pressures on people’s lives and livelihoods, the 
scale of climate migration, and movements under distress. Lower global emissions reduce climate 
pressure on ecosystems and livelihoods and broaden the opportunities for people to stay in place or move 
under better circumstances. In the more climate-friendly scenario, the number of internal climate migrants 
could be reduced by as much as 80 percent by 2050 across the regions of focus. Stringent global climate 
action would be needed to adhere to the Paris Agreement and limit future temperature increases to less 
than 2°C by the end of this century, close to the more climate-friendly scenario in this report.
There is a window of opportunity for the global community to adjust and amplify mitigation measures 
before the climate signal is likely to worsen beyond 2050, putting increasing pressure on livelihoods and 
escalating the scale of climate migration. In the latter half of the century, water and crop sectoral models 
suggest much stronger climate impacts for some sectors and regions. However, even with the best mitigation 
measures, there is a lock-in of climate change impacts from past and predicted emissions (World Bank 
2013), leading to pressures on livelihoods and driving climate migration that cannot be ignored.
Embed climate migration in development planning
Climate migration is currently inadequately built into policies and long-term planning (Martin 2009; 
Leighton, Shen, and Warner 2011; Martin 2012; Warner and others 2014; Warner and others 2015). 
In most regions, laws, policies, and strategies for dealing with human movements from increasing climate 
risks and enabling positive development outcomes are weak or absent (Nansen Initiative 2015). A 
“sedentary” bias overemphasizes development and adaptation in place and frames internal migration 
as negative, even though households regularly use it to cope with and adapt to climate change (Bakewell 
2008, Agrawal and Perrin 2009, Ober 2014). The lack of frameworks for planned relocation as a measure 
of last resort is worrisome (Brookings Institution, Georgetown University, and UNHCR 2015; Georgetown 
University, UNHCR, and IOM 2017). Governments will require guidance, technical assistance, and 
capacity building on implementing international frameworks, laws, policies, and strategies relating to 
climate migration (Leighton, Shen, and Warner 2011; Melde, Laczko, and Gemenne 2017).
Given the possible acceleration of climate migration trends and the closing window of opportunity, 
long-term planning is imperative. National development planning provides a chance to integrate climate 
migration issues systematically beyond five-year cycles. Nationally Determined Contributions under the 
Paris Agreement as well as National Adaptation Plans and National Adaptation Programs of Action are also 
key instruments. Longer-term planning with an eye toward transformative end-points are vital in setting 
countries on pathways that mitigate or adapt to climate risks and reduce poverty. For example, Ethiopia’s 
Growth and Transformation Plan and the Climate Resilient Green Economy has set targets for diminishing 
the weight of agriculture from 42 percent to 29 percent of GDP through a shift from agricultural jobs to 
services and industry, aiming to make livelihoods less climate-dependent. Bangladesh’s Perspective Plan 
for 2041 factors in climate change as a driver of future migration and recognizes migration as a potential 
adaptation option for people living in the most vulnerable areas. 
National agencies need to integrate climate migration into all facets of policy. The scale of projected 
climate impacts will also require substantial improvement of frameworks and organizational capacities, 
especially climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction. For example, Nepal’s draft Climate 
Migration and Strategy Plan proposes an interagency steering committee that would help all key ministries 
address climate migration (Government of Nepal, ICIMOD 2017). 
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Development frameworks will need to consider migration along each phase of its life cycle (before, 
during, and after moving) (Figure 6.1). Securing resilience means:
a. Adapt in place—help communities stay in place where local adaptation options are viable and 
sensible, in order to prevent distress migration or displacement, while continuing to look at the viability 
of landscapes and livelihoods over time. Components of successful local adaptation include: investing 
in climate-smart infrastructure, diversifying income-generating activities, building more responsive 
financial protection systems for vulnerable groups, and educating and empowering women. Local 
adaptation also requires strengthening safety nets for people remaining in traditional agriculture 
(Hallegatte and others 2016). Sustainable land management can help communities stay in place by 
expanding options for local adaptation and improving the flow of remittances.
b. Enable mobility—for people who need to move away from unavoidable climate risks, by facilitating 
safe, orderly, and dignified migration (or, as a last resort, planned relocation) toward areas of lower risk 
and higher opportunity that will not be maladaptive. Adaptation in place should never be an end in 
itself (McAdam and Saul 2010), and when the limits of local adaptation are expected to be reached, 
orderly migration can be a path to successful adaptation (Adger and others 2014). Countries need 
to create enabling environments for migration and create incentives in a sequenced, sensitive, and 
inclusive manner to areas of low risk and high opportunity. They can also start creating “pulls” in 
other locations, instead of waiting for “pushes” to materialize. Policies should also be careful not to 
constrain individuals who would benefit from moving from doing so, by creating bureaucratic, financial, 
informational, or other constraints (McKenzie and Yang 2014).
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c. After migration—ensure that sending and receiving areas, and their people, are well connected 
and adequately prepared, including in terms of numbers of inhabitants, the security of livelihoods, 
and provision of infrastructure and basic services. Many urban and peri-urban areas in particular 
will need to prepare for an influx of people, including through improved housing and transportation 
infrastructure, social services, and employment opportunities. These urban areas will need to ensure 
that climate migrants live in adequate housing, in safe circumstances, and prevent discrimination in 
terms of access to employment and social services. Programs fostering integration and social cohesion 
are also among the basic needs related to in-migration. The urban poor and women require special 
attention to ensure delivery of basic services and infrastructure in an inclusive manner. Policy makers 
should develop and implement migration preparedness plans for the additional long-term population 
growth that will come from climate migration. Such plans should include viable livelihood opportunities, 
critical infrastructure and services, registration systems for migrants (to access services and labor 
markets), and the inclusion of migrants in planning and decision making. 
BEFORE MIGRATION
 • Invest in better knowledge, 
anticipation and monitoring
 • Foster emissions mitigation and 
inclusive development
 • Embed climate migration in policies 
and national bodies
 • Facilitate adaptation in place
 • Enable adaptive mobility
DURING MIGRATION
Support people on the move (holistic 
approach to all of those migrating, 
displaced, relocated)
Holistic approach to 
all forms of mobility 
including displaced, 
relocated, return and 
temporary migrants
AFTER MIGRATION
Prepare, support, and connect 
sending and receiving areas and 







Source: Adapted and expanded from Martin (2009).
Figure 6.1: Strategic entry points for action along the life cycle of climate-related mobility
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Global dialogue and action on climate migration also need to be strengthened. Several global initiatives 
and processes are underway that are beginning to consider climate change as a driver of migration, 
migration as an adaptation strategy, and to address the climate risks associated with movements (Box 
6.1). National efforts on managing the growing reality and challenge of internal climate migration could be 
greatly supported by global dialogue and consensus.
Box 6.1: Global frameworks and processes on migration
Some key initiatives and global frameworks and platforms addressing climate change and migration issues include: 
• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) called for 
respecting, promoting, and considering the respective obligations of parties on migrants. It established a task force to 
develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to adverse 
impacts of climate change.
• The Nansen Initiative, a state-led consultative process, built consensus among states on a protection agenda for disaster 
displacement. It provides comprehensive guidance on effective practices as well as challenges for reducing vulnerability 
and building resilience to displacement. This important work by the Nansen Initiative continues under the Platform on 
Disaster Displacement.
• The Platform for Disaster Displacement, a state-led process addressing the protection needs of people displaced across 
borders in the context of disasters and climate change. 
• The Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative provides guidance for the protection of people who migrate in 
response to natural disasters or conflicts.
• The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-30 emphasizes the role of mobility in risk reduction, but also 
the increased disaster risks that migrants often face.
• The September 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants recognizes the environment and climate change 
as drivers of migration and displacement. The Global Compacts for Migration and on Refugees are expected to be 
proposed at the UN Global Assembly in 2018.
• The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development incorporates migration into mainstream development policy for the first 
time. Target 10.7 seeks to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people.” 
• The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015), the foundation for implementing the global sustainable development agenda, 
explicitly recognizes the “positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries 
of origin, and transit and destination countries.”
• The International Organization for Migration (IOM) became a Related Organization of the United Nations in 2016. 
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Box 6.2: Migration at the World Bank
The World Bank is increasingly recognizing migration as a complex and cross-cutting issue with important implications for 
reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity. Recent publications include:
• A paper by the World Bank–Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group (World Bank 2016) discusses 
(a) the major drivers of international migration; (b) the benefits and costs associated with global labor mobility in both 
sending and receiving countries; (c) the global architecture for governance of migration; and (d) areas in which the Bank 
could design context-specific solutions to address migration. 
• The International Development Association (IDA) 18th Replenishment, approved in 2016, calls for adopting a migration 
lens in IDA countries where migration has a significant economic and social impact in the context of jobs and economic 
transformation.
• A study by the United Nations and the World Bank (2017)—Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent 
Conflict—examines migration, forced displacement, and refugees. The report notes that climate change contributes to 
drought, food insecurity and migration. 
• A report by the World Bank and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights—Forcibly Displaced: Toward a 
Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts (World Bank 2017a)—provides insight 
into the scope and scale of the forced displacement of the 65 million people who were living under such conditions at the end of 
2015. The report proposes ways to help people before, during, and after forced displacement and provides recommendations 
for development actors at each stage. 
• Maximizing the Impact of the World Bank Group in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (World Bank 2017b) provides a 
comprehensive overview of the Bank’s engagement, highlighting strategies and operations in contexts of fragility, conflict, 
and violence. 
• The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) is a global hub of knowledge and policy 
expertise on migration and development issues coordinated by the World Bank.
The engagement of international organizations, private actors, and civil society is key to guiding policy 
frameworks and capacity. Development institutions, including the World Bank, are increasingly recognizing 
migration as a key cross-cutting issue with implications for meeting its development goals and targets (Box 
6.2). Cooperation and stepped-up action by development, humanitarian, and disaster communities across 
the mobility continuum could greatly assist countries in pursuing more holistic and durable solutions. 
Invest now to improve understanding of internal climate migration
More investment is needed to better contextualize and understand climate migration, particularly at scales 
ranging from regional to local, where climate impacts may deviate from the broader trends identified 
in a global-scale analysis (Box 6.3). In many cases, a richer, more detailed set of climate, biophysical, 
socioeconomic, and political indicators is available at regional, national, and local levels. There are inherent 
uncertainties in the way climate impacts will play out in a given locale and this will affect the magnitude and 
pattern of climate change-induced movements. Over time, as more data become available on climate change 
and its likely impacts on water availability, crop productivity, and sea level rise, the scenarios and models 
would need to be updated. Increasing the modeling resolution and improving data inputs to produce more 
spatially-detailed projections are among the possible future applications of the approach used in this report. 
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Building country-level capacity to collect and monitor relevant data can increase understanding of the 
interactions among climate impacts, ecosystems, livelihoods, and mobility and help countries tailor policy, 
planning, and investment decisions. Including climate-related and migration questions in national census 
and existing surveys is a cost-effective way to advance understanding. Decision-making techniques under 
deep uncertainty need to be further developed and applied for policy making and development planning. 
Evidence-based research, complemented by country-level modeling is vital. In support of this, new data 
sources—including from satellite imagery and mobile phones—combined with advances in climate information 
can be beneficial to improving the quality of information about internal migration. In order to make sense of the 
data, research capacities on local as well as global-scale methods and models need to be enhanced at the 
same time. In all of these efforts, the privacy of personal data needs to be protected.
Internal climate migration must be addressed holistically with other forms of climate-induced mobility. 
While internal migration is expected to be the most frequent form of such mobility, cross-border migration 
is another serious policy concern (Foresight 2011; Groschl and Steinwachs 2016; McLeman et al. 2016). 
Several hotspots of climate in-migration are in transboundary areas—migration does not necessarily stop 
at borders. Climate change can be an inhibitor or a driver of cross-border migration, depending on a range 
of factors that propel individuals to decide to move or stay. Although this study did not focus on cross-
border climate migration, potential agglomerations around border hotspots must be explored for their 
opportunities and managed for their challenges.
Slow-onset climate change and sudden-onset extreme events may have compounding effects on internal 
migration, and displacement patterns, and thus should be considered and monitored together. Climate 
change can affect disaster displacement (Black, Kniveton and Schmidt-Verkerk 2013; Black and others 2013; 
see also Box 2.2). Rapid-onset events such as floods and cyclones displaced an average of more than 26 million 
people a year from 2008–15, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC 2015). These 
numbers are expected to rise as such disasters become more frequent and severe (Adger and others 2014). 
Immobility—estimated to affect millions of people who are unwilling or unable to leave strained environments— 
may be one of the most important blind spots in the current debate (Adger and others 2015; Foresight 2011). 
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Box 6.3: Deepening the understanding of climate migration: Avenues for future research
Systematic investment in gathering the best available information related to climate change and migration and robust empirical 
work complemented by country-level applications are critical for supporting policy and planning efforts. This report provides 
an initial basis to inform these efforts by using novel and transparent modeling to quantify the potential impacts of climate 
change on the intensity of internal migration, over time and across space. Extending global and regional-scale modeling of the 
type applied in this report can further enhance confidence in the large-scale patterns of climate impacts and related migration 
outcomes. Multiple avenues are open for future enquiry:
• Applying the model to countries or smaller regions. One of the key features of the model used in this report is its flexibility. It 
can be applied at varying spatial scales, including the country level. The model can accommodate alternative national and 
subnational projections of urban/rural change and different assumptions about the habitability of land parcels, among other 
parameters. It is easily expanded or altered to consider a richer, more detailed set of climate, biophysical, socioeconomic, and 
sectoral impacts and political indicators at the national, subnational, and local level that may help tailor the model to countries, 
regions, or localities. In regions for which detailed historic migration data exist, the model can be expanded to project bilateral 
migration flows. If complemented with ground-truthing, through local consultations and use of local information, future work 
using this model could inform specific policy and development planning recommendations at various levels.
• Incorporating additional climate impacts, geophysical characteristics, and climate feedback. This report considers the 
climate impact on two sectors, agriculture and water. Future work could examine the effect of climate change on other 
sectors, such as health. Geophysical characteristics such as projected changes in coastlines could also be included, 
as could the projected availability of certain resources, responses to climate feedback, and policies designed to affect 
settlement patterns.
• Considering the impacts of extreme events. This report includes some extreme events (such as drought and extreme 
temperatures) to the extent that they affect water availability and crop productivity. It does not examine short-duration, 
rapid-onset events if they do not add up to successive shocks over several years that affect water availability and crop 
productivity. Future work could find ways to also look at short and sudden-onset events.
• Quantifying the economic consequences of climate migration. Climate migration affects economic activity. Depending on 
their specific contexts, regions that receive migrants will likely show increases in output; regions that experience net out-
migration will likely decline. The change in production will depend on how much surplus labor there is in different regions 
and on the relationship between the demand for and the supply of labor by sector. Methodologies such as computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) modeling can help assess the economic implications of projected shifts in population.
A CALL TO ACTION 
Climate migration is projected to intensify over the next several decades and could accelerate even 
more after 2050. The window of opportunity for action is still open now. Stakeholders should act together 
by cutting global emissions and pursuing climate-smart development. Policies and planning should 
encompass climate migration and all other forms of climate change–induced movement, without forgetting 
about people who are unable or unwilling to leave increasingly unviable environments. 
States also need to manage climate migration along its life cycle, helping communities stay in places 
that are viable, while enabling welfare-enhancing migration where needed as an adaptation strategy, 
and addressing climate migration hotspots. More systematic investments in knowledge and data are 
needed at all levels to anticipate and address all forms of climate movement holistically.
Given the lock-in of past and predicted emissions, some climate migration will occur. It need not 
create a crisis, however, if all actors—global, national, and local, and the private sector, civil society, 
and international organizations—use the window of opportunity to invest in knowledge, mitigation, and 
adaptation and take steps now to secure resilience for all.
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Appendix A
This section provides details on model inputs (Section A.1) and methodology (Section A.2).
A.1 DATA INPUTS
Section A.1.1 provides justifications on climate and impact model input choices, and Section A.1.2 
provides information on uncertainties inherent in the population data.
A.1.1 Choice of ISIMIP Models
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the modeling team needed to choose among a number of global climate models 
(GCMs) and crop and water models. Here the rationale is provided for the models used in this effort.
A.1.1.1 Climate models
Of the more than 30 global climate models (GCMs) that participated in the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project phase 5 (CMIP5; Taylor, Stouffer, and Meehl 2012), five models were used in the ISIMIP Fast 
Track to drive the crop and hydrological models. These were already selected to cover a large fraction of 
the range of temperature and precipitation projections across the whole CMIP5 ensemble, although the 
entire range cannot be represented with only five models (Warszawski and others 2014; McSweeney and 
Jones 2016). For the present study, the climate model ensemble had to be further reduced to make its 
application in the population modeling framework feasible. From the five ISIMIP GCMs, the HadGEM2-
ES and IPSL-CM5A-LR models were chosen. One reason for choosing these models is that the future 
precipitation trends differ substantially in magnitude, and partly even in sign, between these models for 
the case study regions of this report (Schewe and others 2014), so that at least for these regions a large 
range of possible future climate changes can be covered with only these two models. Further, both models 
are also being used currently for producing new impact simulations within the ISIMIP2b project (Frieler 
and others 2016), so that the analysis presented in this report could easily be updated when those new 
impact simulations become available. Moreover, the HadGEM2-ES model has a particularly fine native 
resolution, potentially rendering it more realistic than other models at the regional scale. 
It is noted that the crop yield and water indicators exist for all five ISIMIP GCMs, so that the methodology 
of this report could easily be extended to include more GCMs. Further, while it would be desirable to use 
climate impacts data at a higher spatial resolution, so far no consistent set of impact model simulations 
is available that have been forced by regional climate models (RCMs). It is worth recalling that the use 
of global impact simulations in this study presents an advance over using purely climate model-based 
indicators because they represent the actual resources (crops, water) relevant for human livelihoods. 
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A.1.1.2 Crop models
Muller and others (2017) provide an evaluation of global crop models by comparing simulations driven 
with observations-based climate input (within the ISIMIP2a project) to reported crop yields. Six of these 
models contributed future simulations within the ISIMIP FastTrack, which could have been used in the 
work underlying this report. Among these, at the global level, one of the best-performing models (in terms 
of time-series correlation and mean bias in global yield) for both maize and wheat is LPJmL (Bondeau and 
others 2007). For maize, GEPIC (Liu and others 2007) also performs very well; both models also have a 
reasonable performance for rice. Another advantage of this choice is that LPJmL is an ecosystem model, 
while GEPIC is a site-based model; thus, two of the major structural model types are covered. 
It should be noted that, for some crop-country combinations (e.g. wheat in Mexico), very few models show a good 
performance at the national scale in terms of time-series correlation and mean bias (Müller and others 2017), 
which is, however, not to say that they cannot capture longer-term trends. To reflect overall agricultural productivity, 
the four major crops—maize, wheat, rice, and soybean—were combined into a total production index. Depending 
on the country, other crops are also important, but are not simulated by most of the global crop models. 
A.1.1.3 Water models
The ISIMIP hydrological models have so far been evaluated (Gosling and others 2017; Hattermann and 
others 2017) mainly for 11 large river basins, of which the Ganges (Bangladesh) and Blue Nile (Ethiopia) 
are relevant for the present set of case study countries. Moreover, in these studies the models have been 
anonymized, i.e. individual models cannot be identified. One criterion that narrows down the choice is that 
only a few models can provide simulations, including human water abstraction, dams, and reservoirs, 
which are major non-climatic human influences on the water cycle. These simulations are normally closer to 
observed discharge, and of the models that participated in both ISIMIP2a and the ISIMIP FastTrack, these 
are available from H08, WaterGAP, PCR-GLOBWB, MPI-HM, or LPJmL. From these, LPJmL and WaterGAP 
(Flörke and others 2013; Döll, Kaspar, and Lehner 2003) were selected. LPJmL integrates crop yields, 
water resources, and ecosystems in a single model. WaterGAP, on the other hand, can be calibrated 
separately for each basin and therefore matches observed river discharge better than other global models 
in many river basins. It is noted that none of the ISIMIP global models include glacier dynamics. Work is 
ongoing to include glacier dynamics both in PIK’s regional hydrological model SWIM and in WaterGAP. 
A.1.2 Uncertainties in the Population Data Inputs 
Uncertainties in GPWv4 2010 population count grid generally relate to the timeliness and accuracy of 
the underlying census data and to the input resolution of the census units. In terms of timeliness and 
accuracy, a number of low- and middlie-income countries have censuses that are either out of date or that 
are known to contain inaccuracies. Hillson and others (2014) discuss the accuracy and uncertainties in 
census data, especially in countries with rapidly growing and urbanizing populations. CIESIN (2011) and 
Cohen (2004) address issues of timeliness in the context of GPWv3. All of these factors affect the degree 
to which the baseline population distribution for 2010 is accurately mapped. 
In terms of the spatial resolution of inputs, while GPWv4 incorporates significantly higher resolution census 
inputs than prior versions (12.5 million input units in GPWv4 versus about 400,000 in GPWv3), there are 
still significant portions of the developing world in which the spatial resolution of input units is suboptimal. 
The average input unit resolution for very high development regions is 944 km2, whereas the low and 
medium human development countries have an average input resolution of 3,518 km2 and 4,700 km2, 
respectively. Further uncertainties in the year 2000 estimates relate to the lowest common denominator 
spatial units that match between the years in GPWv3 and GPWv4, or for which growth rates are available. 
These units are used to apply consistent rates of change across all sub-units. So, for example, if only 
admin1 units (state or province) match between censuses, population is backcast from 2010 to 2000 by 
using consistent rates of change across those units, even if GPWv3 and GPWv4 included population count 
data for 2010 at a significantly higher resolution. This affects the confidence in the decadal population 
change grids used for model calibration. 
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In general, the aggregation of the higher resolution population count and change grids to coarser 7.5 
arc-minute grids (equivalent to about 193 square kilometers at the equator) reduces the uncertainty in 
the data, since all things being equal, uncertainty tends to increase with resolution for census-based 
population grids.
A.2 TECHNICAL DETAILS ON THE POPULATION MODEL
As described in Chapter 3, the value Ai (from equation 3.2) is calculated as a function of these indicators, 
and represents an adjustment to the relative attractiveness of (or aversion to) specific locations (grid-
cells) reflecting current water availability and crop yield relative to “normal” conditions. 
In order to carry out the procedure, model estimates of the α and β parameters for the urban and rural 
populations are necessary, and Ai (Equation 3.2) must be calibrated. Two separate procedures are 
employed and carried out both for the urban and rural population distributions separately. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, urban and rural populations interact in the model, but changes in both are projected separately 
at the grid-cell level in the same manner. Here the procedure is described once, and, unless otherwise 
noted, the process is redundant for urban/rural components. 
The α and β parameters are designed to capture broad-scale patterns of change found in the distance-
density gradient, which is represented by the shape/slope of the distance decay function (parabolas) 
depicted in Equation 3.2. The negative exponential function described by Equation 3.2 is very similar 
to Clark’s (1951) negative exponential function which has been shown to accurately capture observed 
density gradients throughout the world (Bertaud and Malpezzi 2003). To estimate α and β, the model in 
Equation 3.2 is fitted to the 1990-2000 urban and rural population change from GPWv3 and to the 2000-
2010 urban and rural population change data from GPWv4, and we compute the values of α and β that 
minimize the sum of absolute deviations:
       (A.1)
where Pmodi,t  and Pmodi,t  are the modeled and observed populations in cell i, and S is the sum of absolute 
error across all cells. We fit the model for two decadal time steps (1990-2000 and 2000-2010) and take 
the average of the α and β estimates. 
In this modified version of the population potential model the index Ai is a cell-specific metric that 
weights the relative attractiveness of a location (population potential) as a function of environmental 
and socioeconomic conditions. The modeling approach requires that the relationship between Ai and the 
different sectoral impact indicators is estimated, which are hypothesized to impact population change. 
When α and β are estimated from historic data (e.g. observed change between 1990 and 2000 and 
between 2000 and 2010), a predicted population surface is produced that reflects optimized values 
of α and β, such that absolute error is minimized. Figure A.1 includes a cross-section (one-dimension) 
of grid cells illustrating observed and predicted population for 10 cells. Each cell contains an error term 
that reflects the error in the population change projected for each cell over a 10-year time step. It is 
hypothesized that this error can at least partially be explained by a set of omitted variables, including 
environmental and sectoral impacts. To incorporate these effects we first calculate the value of Ai such as 
to eliminate εi (from Figure A.1) for each individual cell (which is labeled observed Ai):




P e–ßdijαj (Equation 3.2)
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where ΔPobsi,t  and ΔPobsi,t  are the observed and modeled population change for each cell i and Ai is the 
factor necessary to equate the two.
The second step is to estimate the relationship between observed index Ai and cell-specific water 
availability and crop production metrics by fitting a spatial lag model:
      (A.3)
where C and H are the set of explanatory variables that go into producing index Ai (crop production and water 
availability, respectively), ρ is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient and W is a spatial weight matrix. From 
this procedure, a set of cell specific A(i) values is estimated for both urban and rural population change.
For future projections (for urban and rural populations), projected values of Ci,t and Hi,t and coefficient 
estimates from Equation A.3 are used to estimate spatially and temporally explicit values of Ai. Finally, to 
produce a spatially explicit population projection, estimates of α and β are adjusted to reflect the SSPs (e.g. 
the SSP4 storyline implies a more concentrated pattern of development than SSP5, see Jones and O’Neill 
2016), incorporate spatio-temporally variant estimates of Ai for the RCPs, and exogenous projections of 
national urban and rural population change, and the model applied as specified in Equation 3.2. 
It is important to note that, as a result of testing, cells meeting certain criteria are excluded from the 
calibration procedure. First, cells that are 100 percent restricted from future population growth by the 
spatial mask (l, Equation 3.2) are excluded, as the value of Vi in these cells (0), renders the observed value 
of Ai inconsequential. Second, the distribution of observed Ai was found, in most cases, to include significant 
outliers that skewed coefficient estimates in Equation A.3. In most cases, these values were found to 
correspond with very lightly populated cells where a small over or under-prediction of the population in 
Figure A.1: Cross-section of grid cells illustrating observed and projected population distributions
Note: The error term is used to calibrate the index A(i).
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absolute terms (e.g. 100 persons) is actually quite large relative to total population within in the cell (e.g. 
large percent error). The value of Ai (the weight on potential), necessary to eliminate these errors, is often 
proportional to the size of the error in percentage terms, and thus can be quite large even though a very 
small portion of the total population is affected. Including these large values in Equation A.3 would have 
a substantial impact on coefficient estimates. To combat this problem, the most extreme 2.5 percent of 
observations are eliminated on either end of the distribution. Third, because the model is calibrated to 
urban and rural change separately, cells in which rural population was reclassified as 100 percent urban 
over the decade (2000-2010) were excluded, as the effect would be misleading (in the rural distribution of 
change it would appear an entire cell was depopulated, while in the urban change distribution the same cell 
would appear to grow rapidly). It would be incorrect to attribute these changes to sectoral impacts when, 
in fact, they are the result of a definitional change. In most cases these exclusions eliminate 5-10 percent 
of grid cells.
A.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Key features of the gravity approach to modeling future population distributions include its flexibility in 
producing alternative outcomes that are consistent with qualitative global change narratives such as the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), as well the ability to calibrate the model to historical data, thus 
grounding the results in observed outcomes. Additionally, the model can accommodate alternative national 
and sub-national projections of urban/rural change, additional parameters and/or alternative mathematical 
forms of distance decay, varying assumptions regarding the habitable of land parcels, and is applicable 
at varying spatial scale and/or levels of aggregation. The gravity framework is also advantageous in that 
it is easily expanded or altered to consider additional spatially explicit climate, sectoral impact, socio-
economic, or geopolitical data that may aid tailoring the model to specific countries, regions, or localities. 
The novel approach to estimating climate change-induced internal migration introduced here considered a 
specific set of scenarios and sectoral impacts corresponding to two plausible socio-economic and climate 
futures. However, as a tool for generating scenarios and exploratory research the gravity structure appears 
to hold significant promise.
A.3.1 Country and Regional Downscaling
For purposes of comparability across countries and regions, as well as scenarios, the approach adopted 
for this work required that all model inputs were spatially and temporally consistent across all countries. 
This constraint restricts data inputs largely to those that are globally available. However, in many cases 
a richer, more detailed set of climate, biophysical, socio-economic, and political indicators are available 
at the regional, national, sub-national, and local level. Downscaling can easily be achieved. Significant 
model refinements resulting in higher resolution and therefore more detailed projections (free from 
the constraint of global data consistency) are one of many possible future applications of the gravity 
approach.38 Additionally, in regions for which detailed historic migration data exist, the model can be 
expanded to project bi-lateral migration flows potentially incorporating machine learning techniques 
to improve scenario-based predictive capacity. At the national or subnational and city levels there is 
significant opportunity for the enhanced application of the approach presented here.
A.3.2 Adding Additional Climate Impacts, Geophysical Detail, and Climate Feedbacks
In this report we considered the climate impact on two sectors, agriculture and water, in addition to sea-
level rise and storm surges (coastal populations and infrastructure). The ISIMIP fast-track projections 
include projections related to two additional sectors (biomes and health). The ISIMIP 2 was launched 
in May of 2013 and is intended to last four years, broken into two, two-year segments (ISIMIP 2.1 and 
ISIMIP 2.2). The fisheries, permafrost, biodiversity, and energy sectors have been added to the original 
fast-track sectors for this phase of the project. Some of the data from ISIMIP 2.1 are already becoming 
available. These data are easily incorporated into the gravity framework, either through the existing A(i) 
38 Impact simulations driven by regional climate models (RCMs) are not yet available via ISIMIP. RCM-driven impact simulations are a 
desirable next step, and would particularly be beneficial for mountainous countries in which orography plays a strong role in local rainfall.
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index or through additional indices that exert influence over the attractiveness or repulsiveness of specific 
locations. Future work should, where appropriate, include an expanded catalog of sectoral impact data 
relating to a wider range of livelihoods. In addition to sectoral impacts, the existing geospatial mask can be 
expanded to include additional geophysical characteristics deemed important, including those that are not 
temporally static such as projected changes in coastlines, and the gravity field can easily accommodate 
additional detail including, but not limited to, the projected availability of certain resources, anticipated 
response to climate feedbacks, resource availability, and policy designed to influence settlement patterns. 
A.4 GEOSPATIAL PROCESSING AND DATA VISUALIZATION METHODS
In addition to the modeling methods, it is important to describe the methods used for generation of 
climate migrant estimates and data visualization. This section describes those methods.
Beyond the population distribution modeling that includes the sectoral climate impacts for crops 
and water, as well as sea level rise, results presentation depended on two additional sets of spatial 
population projections (Table A.1). In one set of projections, only the SSPs are used to produce a no 
climate impacts (development only) set of population distributions. Also, a counterfactual population 
projection based on 2010 population distributions, but scaled according to the SSP2 and SSP4 population 
totals by country and decade, was produced. It is “counterfactual” because it is a scenario in which there 
is no migration, and all population growth is a function of natural increase within each grid cell. These 
additional spatial population projections were produced in order to develop estimates of climate migrants 
and other internal migrants in ways described under Section A.4.1. 
Table A.1: Spatial population projection scenarios
Climate impacts scenarios 
(combining ISIMIP sectoral impacts 
by RCP with SSPs)
No climate impacts (SSP-





SSP4): Population is projected 
based on ISIMIP sectoral impacts 
model outputs for RCP8.5 and on 
development trajectories found in 
SSP4
SSP4: Population is 




Population is projected 
using the spatial population 
distribution in 2010, but 
proportionally scaled to 
match the population totals 
for each decade under SSP4
More inclusive development 
(RCP8.5/SSP2): Population is 
projected based on ISIMIP sectoral 
impacts model outputs for RCP8.5 
and on development trajectories 
found in SSP2
SSP2: Population is 




Population is projected 
using the spatial population 
distribution in 2010, but 
proportionally scaled to 
match the population totals 
for each decade under SSP2
More climate-friendly (RCP2.6/
SSP4): Population is projected 
based on ISIMIP sectoral impacts 
model outputs for RCP2.6 and on 
development trajectories found in 
SSP4
SSP4: Population is 




Population is projected 
using the spatial population 
distribution in 2010, but 
proportionally scaled to 
match the population totals 
for each decade under SSP4
Note: Shared Socioeconomic Pathways—SSP2 (moderate development) and SSP4 (unequal development); Representative 
Concentration Pathways—RCP 2.6 (low emissions) and RCP 8.5 (high emissions); ISIMIP = Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 
Intercomparison Project
Three approaches were used to develop summaries for data visualization. These are described in the 
following three sections.
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A.4.1 Climate Migration Estimates
In the first approach, totals of climate change-induced migrants (“climate migrants”) are shown for the 
three scenarios, along with confidence intervals, to understand the scale and trend of migration. To 
produce these estimates, the total populations in each grid cell for the respective no climate impact 
(development only) population projections are subtracted from the three spatial population projection 
scenarios that include climate impacts—i.e. the pessimistic reference, more inclusive development, 
and more-climate-friendly scenarios. Then, all those grid cells that have positive totals in the region are 
summed to estimate the number of climate migrants.39 To arrive at other migrants—shifting populations 
as a result of the development (SSP) pathways—no climate impacts (SSP only) scenarios were subtracted 
from the counterfactual population projection. Again, positive grid cells were summed to estimate other 
migrants (those who move because of development trajectories).
Two types of graphs are used to present the data: linear trend and categorical bar charts. The linear trend 
charts are used to display the trend in number of climate migrants and climate migrants as a percentage of 
the total population from 2020 to 2050. The dark line represents the average, and the white area around 
the dark lines represents the confidence interval across the four model runs. Bar charts were used to display 
climate migrants and other migrants by scenario and decade, with confidence intervals for bars representing 
the climate migrants. The other migrants bar has no confidence interval because the results are based on 
subtracting the counterfactual population distribution from the population distribution of a single SSP model 
run (SSP2 or SSP4). Confidence intervals for climate migration estimates are generally fairly wide owing to 
the small number of model runs per scenario, and for reasons further described in Chapter 3 (Box 3.1). The 
statistical formula for calculating the confidence interval is found in Section A.4.3.
A.4.2 Hotspot Mapping
A second approach of hotspots and coldspots mapping of climate in and out migration, respectively, is used 
to indicate top areas of attraction and/or repellence across the landscape. These in-migration hotspots 
are identified for each scenario by taking the top 10 percent of the distribution in increased population 
densities compared to the respective no climate impact scenarios. The out-migration hotspots reflect the 
bottom 10 percent of the distribution of decreased population densities compared to the respective no 
climate impact scenarios. We then overlay the areas for the top 10 percent in-migration hotspots and the 
bottom 10 percent out-migration hotspots across the three scenarios, and we identify those areas where 
at least two out of three scenarios coincide. An area qualifies as a hotspot when results are consistent 
across at least two out of the three scenarios. These are termed climate in- and out-migration hotspots, 
respectively.
A combination of ArcGIS tools and Python scripting were used to identify which grids cells represented 
the top and bottom 10 percent referenced above. For example, in the case of in-migration hotspots, for 
each of the three scenarios a grid cell was flagged with a “1” if it was greater than or equal to the lowest 
possible population density value for climate migrants in the top or bottom 10 percent. These flags were 
then added together to determine the total number of scenarios identifying the grid cell as a hotspot. Table 
A.2 displays the possible results in each grid cell after the flags were added together. 
39 At the country and regional levels, all in-migration (positive grid cells) must necessarily be balanced by out-migration (negative grid 
cells), so total migrants can be assessed by summing differences in the positive cells.
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0 This grid cell is not within the top or bottom 10 percent. This grid cell is not 
considered a hotspot.
1 One scenario identifies this grid cell as being in the top or bottom 10 percent. This 
grid cell is not considered a hotspot.
2 Two scenarios identify this grid cell as being in the top or bottom 10 percent. This 
grid cell is considered a hotspot.
3 Three scenarios identify this grid cell as being in the top or bottom 10 percent. This 
grid cell is considered a hotspot.
A.4.3 Climate Migration Estimates for Zones
A third approach addresses migration in select natural and urban zones. This provides a deeper narrative 
in relation to the coastal zone, urban areas, and rural livelihood zones – reflecting a combination of 
attractiveness and viability of ecosystems. Within the zones, trends in positive or negative population 
differences between the three scenarios (pessimistic reference, more inclusive development, and more 
climate-friendly) and the respective no climate impact scenarios are examined (Table A.1). Positive 
differences in zones reflect the likelihood that these zones will be more attractive to migrants owing to 
climate impacts on the water and crop sectors, and negative differences reflect the likelihood that the 
zone will be less attractive to migrants owing to climate impacts on the water and crop sectors as well as 
sea level rise. Again, confidence intervals are applied reflecting the range across the four model inputs 
(see Table 3.3) for each of the three scenarios. The following are the zones used in this analysis:
i. The coastal zone is defined as those areas within 10km of the coastline. 
ii. Urban areas are defined by identifying all those areas that have a population of ≥ 300 persons per 
square kilometer40, except for South Asia where ≥ 3,000 persons per sq. km is applied (owing to much 
higher population densities there). 
iii. Livelihood zones are aggregations of “anthropogenic biomes”, which reflect a combination of 
agricultural livelihood types and population densities.
The Zonal Statistics tool summarizes the values of a data set based on its spatial overlay with another data 
set. This tool was crucial for determining the counts of various projected populations described above in 
each of the zones, so that differences among the different climate impact scenarios, SSP-only scenarios, 
and the counterfactuals could be assessed. To produce estimates by zone, we ran the results for each 
scenario (including the four members of each climate impacts scenario) through zonal statistics in ArcGIS. 
The zones used for the item (i) was a 10km coastal buffer; the zone used for item (ii) was the urban areas 
mask dynamically generated for two time slices; and the zone used for (iii) were livelihood zones derived 
from an aggregation of anthropogenic biomes for the year 2015 (also referred to as “anthromes”; Ellis 
et al. 2010). Note that the anthropogenic biomes are static, in the sense that their boundaries do not 
change over the 40 year time horizon from 2010 to 2050 owing to either increases in population density 
(a key parameter in their definition) or climate changes. This was a necessary simplifying assumption, 
since projected anthropogenic biomes do not exist. 
ArcGIS’s Zonal Statistics as Table tool was used to obtain the total population for each scenario within 
zones (i) and (iii). For zone (i), the PLACE III data set (CIESIN 2012) – used for the 10km coastal buffer 
– has a significantly smaller cell size, roughly 1km compared to the scenario’s 14km. When their grid 
cells are spatially aligned, there are 225 PLACE grid cells within one scenario grid cell. Consequently, 
40 This is the Eurostat definition of urban densities at 1km resolution, and includes the proviso that contiguous pixels must add 
up to 5,000 persons to qualify a location as urban (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Urban-rural_
typology). When applied to grid cell size used in this modeling of approximately 200 sq. km at the equator (193 sq. km to be 
precise), the total population per grid cell would be 57,880 people if the average population density is 300 persons per sq. km. 
This would qualify as a small city in most regions of the world.
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determining the population within the coastal zone was a multi-step process. First, the number of PLACE 
grid cells within each scenario grid cell was calculated by running the ArcGIS Zonal Statistics as Table tool 
and using the COUNT field function within the tools output table. The COUNT field function provides the 
total number of PLACE cells within a single scenario cell. Within the output table, values within the COUNT 
field ranged from zero to 225, with 225 identifying the scenario grid cell as completely covered by coastal 
grid cells. A proportion of the coverage was obtained by dividing the COUNT field by 225. Finally, each grid 
cell was labeled as “majority coastal” if the proportion was greater than .50 or “not majority coastal” if the 
proportion was equal to or less than .50. Scenario grid cells that did not intersect with PLACE grid cells 
were left as NULL. Using the calculated proportions and the majority labels, the total population within the 
coastal buffer zone could be calculated. 
For zone (iii), the livelihood zones, the anthropogenic biomes data set originally had 19 different 
anthropogenic classes. Using the ArcGIS Reclassify tool these classes were reclassified to create six 
different classification groups. Table A.3 shows how the values were reclassified. 
Table A.3: Reclassification of anthropogenic biomes to create livelihood zones
Original Description Reclassification
Urban Dense settlements (populated >=100 persons per sq 
km)Mixed settlements
Rice villages Rice growing areas
Irrigated villages Irrigated croplands grouping
Residential irrigated croplands








Residential woodlands Seminatural and wild grouping
Populated woodlands
Remote woodlands
Inhabited treeless and barren lands
Wild woodlands
Wild treeless and barren lands
After the data set was reclassified, the ArcGIS Zonal Statistics as Table tool was used to determine which 
anthropogenic biomes intersected with each scenario grid cell. Since multiple anthropogenic biomes can 
intersect a grid cell, the “Majority” zonal statistics type was selected. The final output table produced by 
the tool contained a MAJORITY field. This field contained the value that corresponded to the anthropogenic 
biome that covered the greatest area of the scenario grid cell. The final output table also included the 
scenario population projections. Therefore, the total population within each anthropogenic biome could 
also be calculated, in order to derive the climate migrants as a percent of population.
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Creating the urban extents and obtaining the total population within those extents, as described in item 
(ii), was also a multi-step process. ArcGIS and Python were used together for automation. First, for each of 
the scenarios, the grid cells that were within the population density threshold were identified. A subset of 
the original data, comprised of the identified cells, was created. Each individual grid cell within the subset 
was part of the urban extent and contained the population count value for that area. The ArcGIS Summary 
Statistics tool was used to calculate the total population within the urban extent area by summing all the 
grid cell’s population count values. The data were saved in tabular format.
For all of the aforementioned zones, and for each country and region of focus, the tabular data, saved in 
CSV (Coma Separated Values) format, was imported into R and manipulated using “reshape” and “plyr” 
packages (R Development Core Team 2008). The table was first reshaped from “wide” (i.e. information 
for each pixel ID was included in multiple columns) to “long” to facilitate the representation of the data 
by four categories: decades, scenarios, models and anthropogenic biomes. In the next step, the data 
were aggregated using “ddply” function by summing the climate migrant population (the climate impacts 
minus no climate impacts populations) in each of these four categories. We further aggregated the data 
by calculating the average and standard deviation of the four model runs per scenario described in 
Chapter 3 (Table 3.3). These statistics helped us calculate the 95 percent confidence intervals using 
the following formula: 
SE is the standard error, and is calculated as 
SD
√n
, where SD is the standard deviation and n is the number 
of model runs.
The z value for the 95 percent confidence interval is 1.96. The value of 1.96 is based on the fact that 95 
percent of the area of a normal distribution is within 1.96 standard deviations of the mean.




In the final step, we plotted data using ggplot function of “ggplot2” R package. 
Bar charts were used to represent the climate migration by livelihood zone by scenario and decade, with 
whiskers used for confidence intervals. For the other zones (coastal and urban), linear trend charts were 
to display the decadal change along with confidence intervals. The confidence intervals are generally fairly 
wide owing to the small number of model runs per scenario, and for reasons further described in Chapter 
3 (Box 3.1).
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Climate impacts on water availability and crop productivity will have important impacts on the population 
potential of given locations in the gravity model. This appendix provides the water and crop production 
indices and the climate background for each of the regions. This is important background information for 
the modeling results described in Chapters 4 and 5. This is because the climate impacts are an input 
to the gravity model and, when combined with parameters derived from the development scenarios (the 
SSPs), directly affect the population potential of regions within countries. Thus, these results aid in the 
interpretation of results related to population redistribution and climate migration. 
In each section major results for the regions from the IPCC Fifth Assessment report or more recent climate 
science are summarized. Then, ISIMIP average index values for annual surface water availability and 
crop productivity during the period 2010-50 are discussed, with reference to respective map figures. 
White (blank) areas on maps representing crop model results represent areas where there is no current 
crop production. While crop areas may change in the future, our modeling is based on the assumption of 
constant crop areas. 
Recall from Equation 3.1 in Chapter 3, that the index represents the deviation from the long-term average, 
with values such as 0.2 representing 20 percent above the baseline average, and -0.6 representing 60 
percent below the baseline average. Positive and negative values are represented in blue scale and red 
scale, respectively, with increasing color saturation representing higher values (more positive or negative 
values, respectively) on both scales. 
The long-term averages depicted in the map figures are useful to consider in the context of projected 
population outcomes, as differences across population distribution scenarios and relative to the no-
climate scenarios are driven in part by these indicators. It is important to remember, however, that the 
modeling approach explicitly considers 10-year time steps, not one 40-year time stretch. Over each period 
the projected change in urban and rural population is influenced by decadal deviation from baseline 
conditions in water availability and crop production. Thus, this 40-year index could mask, for example, 
above average results in the first two decades, and below average results in the last two decades.
It is also important to remember that these model results represent plausible scenarios of future changes 
in water resources and agriculture, which are consistent with the scientific literature; but they do not 
represent predictions, nor the most likely outcomes. Consequently, the same is true for the population 
model results based on these scenarios. The reader is referred to the IPCC’s Working Group 1 Fifth 
Assessment Report report (especially chapters 11 and 12) for a comprehensive account of uncertainties 
and likelihood estimates of future climatic changes. 
Appendix B
ISIMIP Water and Crop Model Results
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B.1 ISIMIP WATER AND CROP MODEL RESULTS FOR EAST AFRICA
The ISIMIP models, which are driven by two different GCMs, reflect different patterns and uncertainties 
in the region (Box B.1). The water models driven by the HADGEM2-ES GCM (Figure B.1, top four maps) 
mostly project the region to have higher average water availability in 2010-50 than in the baseline, except 
eastern Tanzania, northern Mozambique, Malawi, and eastern Zambia. Water declines relative to baseline 
are particularly strong in northern Tanzania. Water models driven by the IPSL-CM5A GCM (Figure B.1, 
bottom four maps) show drying in northern Mozambique under RCP2.6 and southern Mozambique under 
RCP8.5. 
For crop production, the greater differences are between the two crop models—IPJmL-crops and GEPIC. 
Under LPJmL there are generally modest deviations from the baseline except for parts of Ethiopia (Figure 
B.2, maps on left side), where there are stronger positive signals in the northern highlands. Under GEPIC, 
northern Kenya has strong negative impacts, and in some scenarios there are also negative impacts 
around Lake Victoria. 
Overall, this region shows fairly distinct trends that are driven more by the GCM-sectoral model combinations 
than by the warming reflected in the RCPs. One sees fairly strong negative impacts in selected sub-regions 
under both RCPs. This may reflect the fact that between now and 2050, the differences in total temperature 
increase between the high and low RCPs are not that great, and they only bifurcate substantially after 
2050 (Figure B.2). 
Box B.1: Uncertainties in climate projections in East Africa
The East Africa region—from Zimbabwe and Swaziland in the south to Ethiopia in the north—
comprises three distinct climatic regions, with varying degrees of uncertainty in each. The 
smallest of the three climatic regions in East Africa is the eastern Sahel, which is only found in 
northern Ethiopia. The eastern Sahel has sometimes divergent precipitation projections across 
GCMs, but broadly speaking, the models used in the IPCC fifth assessment report suggest a 
reasonably robust wetting (increased precipitation trend) for the region (Biasutti 2013). This 
wetting is mostly concentrated at the end of the rainy season. For coastal East Africa, which 
comprises the majority of the countries in this region, the climate is very different. Here there 
are two rainy seasons that lie between the northern hemisphere summer and winter monsoons. 
In terms of average annual rainfall, coastal East Africa is semi-arid due to the cool waters 
offshore (Yang and others 2015a). Climate models tend to, in general, underestimate east-
west sea surface temperature (SST) gradients and to weaken them further under greenhouse 
gas forcing (Yang and others 2015b). Hence, they predict coastal East Africa to get wetter.  
However, coastal East Africa has gotten drier over the past century (Williams and Funk 2011). 
This may partially be due to natural variability; however, it may also be that the GCMs do not 
well-represent the role of ocean dynamics in influencing tropical SSTs. This inability means the 
models do not correctly represent the seasonal cycle of precipitation in coastal East Africa 
(Yang and others 2015b). Furthermore, it may be that the east-west SST gradients could 
actually increase, which would tend to result in drier conditions, not wetter (R. Seager, personal 
communication). Finally, the southern Africa region—comprising Zimbabwe, Zambia, southern 
Mozambique, and southern Madagascar—is an already dry region that is likely to get drier 
owing in part to increased temperature trends (Christenson and others 2014). There is medium 
confidence in projections showing reduced precipitation in the Austral winter in this region. 
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Figure B.1: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for water availability, 
from LPJmL/water (left) and WaterGap (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) 
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Figure B.2: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for crop production, 
from LPJmL/crop (left) and GEPIC (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) and 
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B.2 ISIMIP WATER AND CROP MODEL RESULTS FOR SOUTH ASIA
According to the IPCC (Christensen and others 2014), in South Asia changes in the summer monsoon 
dominate annual rainfall. There is medium confidence in summer monsoon precipitation increase in the 
future over South Asia. Overall, projections indicate that more rainfall will be very likely at higher latitudes of 
South Asia by the mid-21st century under the RCP8.5 scenario. Under the RCP2.6 scenario, more rainfall 
at higher latitudes is likely by mid-century but substantial changes in rainfall patterns are not likely at low 
latitudes. Besides these long-term average trends, rainfall variability both within the rainy season and 
between years is projected to increase in the South Asian monsoon region (Menon, Levermann and Schewe 
2013; Menon and others 2013), consistent with observational evidence (Singh and others 2014).  
ISIMIP average index values for water availability and crop production during the period 2010-50 are 
provided in Figures B.3 and B.4, respectively. The ISIMIP water model results are largely consistent with 
the IPCC projections, showing relatively unchanged or increased water availability during the period 2010-
50 (Figure B.3). The only country that shows consistently negative deviations from the long-term baseline 
is Afghanistan.
Crop model results are more muted across all GCM-crop model combinations, reflecting the heavy reliance 
on irrigation across South Asia. The GEPIC model driven by the HADGEM2—ES model (Figure B.4, top two 
right-hand maps) shows pockets of modest declines along the Indus in Pakistan and the Ganges in India. 
In the GEPIC model driven by the IPSL-CM5A model, there are more widespread parts of northern India 
and the highlands in the south that would see declines in crop productivity. These become more intense 
and cover wider areas under the higher emissions scenario.
216 Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration
Figure B.3: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for water availability, 
from LPJmL/water (left) and WaterGap (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) 
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Figure B.4: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for crop production, from 
LPJmL/crop (left) and GEPIC (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) and IPSL-
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B.3 ISIMIP WATER AND CROP MODEL RESULTS FOR MEXICO AND 
CENTRAL AMERICA
In terms of IPCC results, there is medium confidence that Mexico and Central America will experience 
a decrease in precipitation over the coming century. Specifically, ensemble mean projections indicate a 
precipitation decrease from October to March in northern Central America and Mexico, by the end of the 
century (Christensen and others 2014). CMIP5 GCMs and regional models model project precipitation 
reductions over Mexico and all of Central America from June to September. The El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) is the main driver of inter-annual climate variability, with El Niño generally being associated with 
dry conditions in the southern part of the region and wet conditions in the northern part; and La Niña with 
the opposite pattern (Mason and Goddard 2001). ENSO will continue to influence Mexico and Central 
America’s climate, but changes in ENSO frequency or intensity remain uncertain, although there is some 
evidence for more extreme El Niño events in the future (Cai and others 2014).
ISIMIP average index values for water availability and crop production during the period 2010-50 are 
provided in Figures B.5 and B.6, respectively. Consistent with the short-term (Kirtman and others 
2013) and long-term (Collins and others 2011) precipitation projections, as reported by the IPCC, water 
availability changes are different between the different climate models, but show an overall decreasing 
trend. The water models driven by the IPSL-CM5A GCM (Figure 8.5, bottom for maps) show very sharp 
decreases in water availability across much of the region, with particularly strong reductions in the Yucatan 
in the WaterGap model. Under the high emissions scenario with this GCM, much of the region sees strong 
declines in water availability. For the HadGEM2-ES model, the results are more muted, and the highlands 
of Mexico and much of Central America actually see no change or even increases in water availability 
under both emissions scenarios.
There is less disagreement across crop model results. For GEPIC (Figure B.6, right hand maps), the 
northwest corner of Mexico shows strong production decreases relative to the 1970-2010 period. The 
LPJmL crop model also shows declines in this region, but they are more muted, and some of the areas of 
decline under GEPIC actually overlap with increases under LPJmL. Honduras also sees modest declines 
under LPJmL. 
There are differences between RCPs 2.6 and 8.5 across water models, with significantly lower water 
availability compared to baseline under RCP8.5 than under RCP2.6 in many regions. For the crop models, 
there are fewer significant differences across emissions scenarios.
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Figure B.5: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for water availability, 
from LPJmL/water (left) and WaterGap (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) 
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Figure B.6: ISIMIP average index values during 2010-50 against 1970-2010 baseline for crop production, from 
LPJmL/crop (left) and GEPIC (right), forced with the HadGEM2-ES climate model (top four maps) and IPSL-
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